


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**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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12 February 1992

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Dangers for Caucasus Troops Viewed

92UM0389A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 92
p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Nevskiy, PRAVDA special correspondent: "Who Fired First..."]

[Text] Tbilisi-Moscow—Before New Year's day A. Shiponnikov, department chief of the Tbilisi Military Artillery School, was killed by a bullet through his forehead. Several days later a Zhiguli car driven by Captain A. Zalebukin was fired upon from two vehicles. A. Zalebukin was killed. On 1 January, Lieutenant Colonel A. Yefimov was fatally wounded, and his wife badly wounded.

All of these tragic incidents occurred on the territory of the garrison of the Georgian capital, and all within one week.

Now you will seldom see a person wearing an officer's, to say nothing of general's, uniform in Tbilisi, especially during evening hours. They now drive around the city in "civvies," and for the most part in regular cars, always with guards. Lieutenant General S. Beppayev, deputy commander of the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District, strictly enforces this, though Sufiyan Uzeirovich himself uses "the privileges" of his rank: At times he shows up in the street "in regulation dress," which draws the appropriate upbraiding from the commander. At that point, the general throws up his hands and smiles apologetically, as if a new recruit gone AWOL who has been apprehended by a patrol:

"Comrade commander, I am from the Caucasus after all."

General Beppayev was born in 1937 in the godforsaken Balkar village Upper Chegem at the very foothills of the Elbrus. His grandfather and father were shepherds. Sufiyan, one of five children, helped them tend sheep. However, this was after the war, when his father came back from the front. As everybody knows, the dream of becoming an officer of the Soviet Army appeared remote and even impossible for a young man from the village. However, fate favored Beppayev: He alone of the few mountaineers in his age group was admitted to the Kiev Tank School. What was he distinguished for? He always won through his persistence and diligence, thoroughness and resourcefulness. He began at the level of platoon commander, and later was put in charge of a battalion and a regiment... He became one of the first generals of Balkar ethnic background in postwar times. He commanded a division and a tank army in Belorussia until he was reassigned, with promotion, to his native Transcaucasus Military District. Prior to this, S. Beppayev managed to graduate from the Academy of Armored Troops and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy, the latter in 1978. Sufiyan Uzeirovich ended up in the Caucasus at the most uneasy and tragic of times, at the height of the Nagorno-Karabakh internecine war.

We sat down with S. Beppayev in his office; our conversation was continuously interrupted by phone calls: Reports came in on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, Tbilisi and other areas of Georgia. After the liberation of the South Ossetian leader T. Kulumbekov, a lull of sorts set in in Tskhinvali. Fighting continued in Karabakh even after the Internal Troops were withdrawn. However, one Army regiment of the Transcaucasus Military District remained there.

"Mind you, they stayed at the request of the two opposing parties," noted Sufiyan Uzeirovich and sighed: "I just got a report that our soldier was killed in the morning next to a checkpoint. He was blown apart by an artillery round. My God, when will this end?"

"Comrade general, perhaps you know what the citizens of Russia are saying: All our guys should be withdrawn from Transcaucasia; let those nationalists slug it out among themselves and do whatever they please."

Beppayev shrugged his soldiers:

"I understand this: Russia should not be losing her sons. It is not just the citizens of Russia: We have Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Uzbeks serving there. The Army remains multinational, and it is faithful to its old oath. While not taking part in the fighting, our servicemen do contain local soldiery from both sides, and they protect peaceful inhabitants. This is a stabilizing factor, at least to some degree. Incidentally, we do not keep any of our servicemen in the hot spots through coercion. Everyone is free to transfer to another unit. However, very few do this."

The general talked in my presence to some Armenian and Azeri leaders. He was strict and even severe in the course of the conversations:

"Get this: My guys are not going to be a human shield for you. After all, you call yourselves great democrats and politicians—so come to terms with each other in the language of politicians..."

"I could not care less about this Aliyev of yours, even if he proclaims himself president. Let them try and scare us—we are not easily frightened."

I asked the general: "Which Aliyev was that about?"

"The Aliyev, the former Politburo member. You see, he issues ultimatums to the Army and intimidates us with 'unpredictable consequences.' This has to do with a fire which happened in one of the Air Defense units during a withdrawal from Nakhichevan. A warehouse burned down. For his part, Aliyev interpreted this as 'a provocation by the military,' and demanded that all units be withdrawn from the territory of the republic. He is threatening us." The general added: "Well, I think that the border guards will be able to hold their own."

Indeed, "resurrected" former and new politicians who have grabbed power look for all kinds of ways to compromise the Army in the eyes of the population. This was

also the case in Georgia during the reign of Z. Gamsakhurdia. He stated to the command of the district: "Get your troops out of Tskhinvali and give me weapons!" Naturally, we turned him down. Talking to military commanders, the president threw out this phrase last December: "So, will it be peace or war?"

A "guerrilla war" against the Army began in the republic after that. DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Aid to the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy] assets were seized. A wave of raids on military depots and posts began. Major Berilov was brutally murdered on the doorstep of his own house.

The general went on to say: "Gamsakhurdia wanted to pit us against the opposition, the Kitovani guardsmen. They tried to impress on us that the depots were being plundered and servicemen were being killed on the opposition's instructions. However, we have experienced specialists who established that the entourage of the president deliberately organized attacks as provocations. Nonetheless, the military did not lack either restraint or patience. Since the Tbilisi events of 1989, when the leadership of the Union and Georgia drew the Army into a conflict in front of Government House, we have taken a firm position of noninterference."

Both in Georgia and adjacent republics the Army ended up, as they put it, between a rock and a hard place. This was happening in hospitable and quiet Georgia, where military men have long been respected, taken into the family, invited to visit, and placed at the very seats of honor. Suddenly, they began to fuel anti-Army attitudes and attack the "occupiers" in a frenzy. Officers and soldiers were murdered. It came to a general being dragged out of a car and beaten up by a crowd of youths armed with automatic weapons. The car of Lieutenant General Yu. Grekov, first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, was fired upon. They threatened S. Beppayev personally, pointing a barrel at his chest...

The "guerrilla war" against the Army still continues. On 12 January a military vehicle was fired upon, and on 13 January the checkpoint of a unit... The war has now shifted from Tbilisi to western Georgia: Several attacks against military posts occurred there in the second 10-day period of January.

At the same time Tengiz Sigua, who headed the provisional government, stated to the district leadership that he "would not stand for the military to be wronged," and that the attacks were "schemes by Gamsakhurdia's supporters." In a conversation with a PRAVDA correspondent he confirmed that he and his government "extend their protection to the Army and the families of officers":

"We should and will have a most friendly relationship with the military. We appreciated the worthy position of the Army during the December events in Tbilisi."

It would be nice if the new authorities, following the example of President of Adzharia A. Abashidze, helped the servicemen resolve social and housing issues. After the tragic death of Major Berilov, Abashidze allocated a new apartment in Batumi and a one-time grant of 100,000 rubles to his widow. He also allocated a new building with 30 apartments to the families of servicemen. I think that he is a truly reasonable and far-sighted politician. One does not have to flirt with the Army, but rather help it.

Several days ago an officers assembly of the Transcaucasus Military District adopted an appeal to the presidents and ministers of defense of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], soldiers of the Armed Forces, and peoples of the former USSR. In the appeal, they unanimously denounced attempts to divide up the united Armed Forces by means of accomplished facts, without mutual arrangements for a civilized transfer of the Armed Forces to the jurisdiction of independent states envisaged by international agreements:

"Only the restraint of the soldiers of our district prevented the Army from being dragged into the conflict between opposing sides in Tbilisi, and averted still more bloodshed and further anti-Army hysteria."

General S. Beppayev went on to say: "At present some democratic figures are scaring the people with a new military coup. I consider such statements a provocation. However, they should not try the limits of patience of the people in uniform, and persecute and humiliate the Army and Navy, to say nothing of dragging officers into quite unscrupulous political 'games.' The attitude toward the Army is precisely what determines the standard of civilization and democracy in democratic countries."

In their address, the officers of the Transcaucasus Military District proposed to set up a commission consisting of the heads of independent states and Ministries of Defense with a view to solving problems concerning all servicemen: guaranteed retirement benefits after discharge at a chosen place of residence and assistance with the building and acquisition of housing. They also proposed to introduce a contractual system of recruitment to the Armed Forces, especially in the territories of the former republics, to say nothing of "hot" regions.

"In our district, there is not an officer, warrant officer, or soldier who supports the idea of partitioning the united Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and dragging them into ethnic quarters, which politicians foist on us. However, you know yourself whether they pay heed to the military now, especially those who call themselves democrats. As a rule, none of them have served in the Army."

I asked the general: "Sufiyev Uzeirovich, what is your attitude toward military men who have become professional politicians?"

"I take a very bad view of all politicians in the Army who, after the ban on the CPSU, have attempted to set

up other parties here. The Army and the servicemen should take care of their business—defending the present-day Commonwealth. If someone wants to engage in politics he should get a discharge; at present, we do not hold anybody back. This is a quite different profession."

When S. Beppayev last visited his native Nalchik, home-grown democrats suggested that he run for the post of president of Kabardino-Balkaria, and later even more—become the leader of the Balkar people, following, so to say, Dudayev's "example."

Sufiyan Uzeirovich said: "I said outright on local TV that I am against ethnic repartitions, especially in Russia. We have one president, and should have one president, one Army, and one oath. I remain faithful to my oath to the Motherland which I gave while still a cadet, despite the fact that the USSR has disintegrated. Finally, I am responsible to my soldiers and officers, and to their families. Russia needs them alive and well..."

Indeed, alive. Precisely! However, in 11 months of last year alone 450 servicemen were killed in Transcaucasia and 750 were wounded. These tragic statistics come close to those of Afghanistan!

People in Army uniform are still being killed, and not only in the field but now in city streets and next to military settlements. According to a decision of the commander, they now have the right to use their weapons first in dangerous situations. However, they very seldom exercise this right. Unlike local paramilitary units, servicemen do not wish to shoot people or spill blood. This is how they have been conditioned. This is how General Beppayev and other commanders of the Soviet Army conditioned them. This Army is still alive, it is still protecting us, the former Soviet people. What about us protecting the Army?

Troops of Northwest Group Discuss Problems

92UM0420A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 17 Jan 92
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[Article by Lidiya Malash: "Whose People Are We, and Where Are We To Go?"]

[Text] An army-wide conference, to which not only the officers of the Armed Forces of the former USSR were invited but also presidents of the independent states of the current CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], is to open in Moscow today. The military men will certainly demand that leader-politicians answer straightforwardly and specifically the acute questions which the Army and the Navy are now facing. A special correspondent of KURANTY who visited the Northwestern Group of Forces deployed in the territory of the Baltic states most frequently heard the following words from the servicemen: "Whose people are we, and where are we to go?"

It Is Hard to be Russian

Captain First Rank Valeriy Stalev, chief of the Liepaja Garrison, began our conversation by referring to the August events for a reason. For him, a career naval officer who has devoted 27 years to the Navy, these days were a genuine shock. For the first time in all his years of service, he received an order at the time which is referred to as a "combat signal" in the Army. According to military service regulations, the combat signal is given to repulse an attack by a foreign enemy.

Stalev said: "I did not know where the enemy was coming from. However, we put all materiel and personnel on complete combat-ready status. Armored personnel carriers and tanks were parked in our yard. Thank God, I did not take them into the streets of the city then..."

At 0700 on 19 August, the chief of the garrison called the operations duty officer solely for the purpose of finding out who personally issued this order. The answer was: "It has been signed by Marshal Yazov."

Stalev recalled: "I thought that since the marshal himself gave the order, all of this had to come from Gorbachev. After all, Yazov was the best friend of the president, elevated by him and appointed to this position by him. This is why I carried out commands to enhance combat readiness as they were received. Only later I began having doubts, on account of the coup being somewhat hesitant. I decided to put on the brakes and merely called for calm. When this entire nightmare ended, I did not even curse Yazov—I was somehow disgusted by him... How could he betray the Army? After all, millions of soldiers and officers were prepared to carry out any order of his."

The chief of the Liepaja Garrison worded the main conclusion he drew from those events as follows: "Hardly any commander will now have enough determination to order shooting somebody." After August 1991 our society has a little more respect for the Army and the Navy. The people are grateful to the military for not mounting a bloody massacre in the country, for whatever reason, despite all the orders of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. I am referring to respect only because it is premature to discuss prestige. Moreover, a dangerous trend has emerged recently: The servicemen are becoming outcasts in the very country to which they swore allegiance. The Soviet Union is no more; agreements of the CIS on a united army of the Commonwealth have been violated by the division which began in Ukraine. Leaders of other states, as if afraid of falling behind the "radical" Kravchuk, are also trying to divide up the Army along ethnic and territorial lines, being entirely unconcerned about slicing through living flesh.

To be sure, the situation in the Baltics is somewhat different. The Army and the Navy play the role of "occupiers" here, which from time to time is stated to them. There used to be the Baltic Military District, and

now there is the Northwestern Group of Forces, because there are not supposed to be military districts in the territories of other states. The withdrawal of troops from the territories of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has been discussed repeatedly, but no policy decisions have been made concerning this. The Baltic leaders are in a hurry to cleanse their territories of the military presence, but the leaders of Russia are not prepared for it.

Servicemen are leaving Latvia, although not all of them at one time. Last year 111 families of retired officers left the Liepaja Garrison. Their inability to obtain citizenship, and therefore housing and social benefits, was the main reason. The Latvians calculated that there are approximately 57,000 officers and warrant officers in the territory of their state. If we include family members, this comes to more than 200,000. This amounts to 10 percent of the population of Latvia, 2 million. It has also been calculated that 12 percent of the area of the republic is used by the Armed Forces. To be sure, it is not mentioned that a lot of land is not farmed because there are no people to work it. Without attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of an independent Latvia, I will still say that a thrifty owner would find an opportunity to overcome the crisis in the economy by using the labor of people of any nationality. However, this applies to all republics equally. It is a great pity that land reform in Russia has been going nowhere so far. Many retired servicemen are prepared to start farming. Meanwhile, here, in Liepaja, former naval officers, captains first and second rank, work as stokers and fitters at the Laume textile combine. They receive retirement pay of between R500 and R600, but how far does this go nowadays? Incidentally the chief of the Liepaja Garrison receives pay of R1,303, with all bonuses included. This is less than the wages of bus drivers in Liepaja.

Here are some other statistics and facts describing the ethnic composition of the Liepaja Garrison: Forty percent of the sailors and officers are Russian. In Stalev's words, "perhaps, one sailor per vessel is Georgian, Armenian, Moldovan, or Azeri." There are absolutely no Latvians, Lithuanians, or Estonians. At the same time, vigorous work is underway on the demarcation of the maritime borders of the Baltic states. It should be completed by 1 February. Latvia is training the crews of border patrol craft, and has already purchased a military plant very cheaply. However, this is the question: Whose borders are the naval personnel guarding now?

Stalev said: "I served for 18 years in the north, and I thought that I would finish my tenure in the Baltics and retire here. Now I come home and see a silent question in my wife's eyes: What next? Where are we to go?"

"Where is there a place for the Russian sailor to serve?"

"There are two fleets, the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. However, they will have no vacancies."

"Is it bad to be Russian?"

"I think Yeltsin should get control of the situation. I liked his statement that the Black Sea Fleet was, is, and will be Russian. I hope Boris Nikolayevich will be bold enough to say this about the Baltic Fleet."

I Will Swear Allegiance to Kravchuk

This was said by Captain First Rank Valentin Oleynikov, former chief of the military-political department of the large unit of vessels guarding the maritime region of the Liepaja Garrison. He is one of those who, in his own words, "dedicated 25 years to the Motherland, to the Union, and has now ended up with everything shattered." Oleynikov considers himself a Communist by conviction. He is unhappy with the September ukase of the president of Russia on the elimination of military political organs in the Army and the Navy, and he does not conceal it.

He said: "Previously, everything was clear. We, the party leaders, engaged in indoctrinating the personnel. What is to be done now? What policy is to be pursued? I understand that no political officers are needed for the army which is being formed for a capitalist society of Russia. Whose bidding are we to do—that of cooperative members and entrepreneurs? Let them pay if they hire us!"

Oleynikov recounted a funny episode which we may very well consider a fleet joke. An order of the division commander on commendations for distinguished sailors based on yearly performance was being read. The first sailor responded hesitantly: "In service to... the Soviet Union." The second said: "In service to the working people." The third said: "In service to the Motherland." The fourth sailor stated: "In service to the common economic space." This is funny, of course, but also sad. Indeed, whom do the sailors serve at present? The garrison received the text of the Russian oath but nobody is in a hurry to take it. They are waiting for what an officer assembly will say on 17 January.

I asked: "Why did they swear allegiance to Ukraine then?"

In response, I heard what has been said by the servicemen a number of times: "After all, Kravchuk had a package of laws on the social protection of servicemen accepted. He guarantees retirement pay whereas Yeltsin does not."

Oleynikov has a drama of his own. He is Ukrainian, and his wife is Russian. She flatly refuses to adopt Ukrainian citizenship. Oleynikov believes that "it will certainly not come to our getting divorced. We will think of something. However, can you see how many problems the division of the army has caused?" Under Ukrainian law, Oleynikov is considered to be on assignment because he was drafted into the Navy from Ukraine. Previously, he never thought about it, but now he is thinking: Has his republic sanctioned his swearing allegiance to Russia? Of course it has not. Everyone has a choice, but it is a very difficult one because this is about the Motherland in the

most serious meaning of the word. Oleynikov does not want to automatically lose the citizenship of his republic. However, he is not certain that Kravchuk needs him, either. After all, there are more than 120 "supernumerary" political officers in the Black Sea Fleet.

Oleynikov said: "If Kravchuk does not take me in, I will go back to Russia. I have been in the service for 25 years. I qualify for retirement but who needs me? I do not have a dwelling either in Ukraine or Russia, whereas here in Latvia, I have a three-room apartment which I can neither sell nor trade. However, if I give the Russian oath, Kravchuk will not accept me; meanwhile, all of my relatives and my mother are in Ukraine."

I felt that Oleynikov was sort of arguing with himself. The documents concerning his reassignment to the Black Sea Fleet were already at the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense, and yet there was no peace of mind.

It turns out that he does not entirely agree with Kravchuk: It was all right to create a national guard as a variety of the internal troops, but the Ukrainian leader should not have gone for his own army and navy. Maintaining the Black Sea Fleet takes R50 billion, which precisely equals the entire budget deficit of Ukraine. So what need does it have for an ocean-going fleet?

Oleynikov was not aware that according to calculations by Western economic analysts, Ukraine would both contribute to its budget and become the richest republic of the CIS if it were to sell the Black Sea Fleet. Would he still have been prepared to swear allegiance to Ukraine had he known?

Oleynikov was justifiably outraged by the fact that amateurs were beginning to resolve the issue of the Army and the Navy. However, it depends on what we interpret as amateurishness. From the point of view of politics, the Ukrainian leader has already accomplished a lot in order to split the frail entity of the CIS and try to bring Russia to its knees. To be sure, in this instance, the desires of Kravchuk and the former political officer of the Baltic Fleet who, facing a hopeless situation, is prepared to swear allegiance to Ukraine are clearly dissimilar. In Oleynikov's words, the best outcome for him would be to remain with the Navy but serve in the united troops of the CIS. However, does the CIS need commissars?

This Cannot Go on Much Longer

This is what Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, believes.

"The Union has disintegrated, and the division of everything and anything is underway. However, political leaders have forgotten that the army does not consist of weapons and materiel alone, but primarily of people who have given an oath. As of now, there are no elementary policy decisions with regard to each combat arm of the armed forces, including districts, groups of forces, and fleets. We understand full well that from a legal point of

view, we are located in the territory of sovereign foreign states, and we do not intend to dispute this. The very name "group of forces" presupposes the temporary nature of our stationing."

"Is this why the servicemen, even former servicemen, are deprived of all rights of citizenship here?"

"The issues of citizenship and requisite legislative acts are resolved in different ways in the Baltic area. For example, Lithuania agrees to servicemen converting residential premises which they have been assigned through general procedures into private property. As far as Latvia is concerned, it unambiguously states that we are occupiers. A decision on the withdrawal of troops was made at a council of the leaders of the Baltic republics. However, how is this to be done? After all, we cannot load hundreds of thousands of people onto military trains and transport them to the middle of nowhere."

"Along the lines of the group of forces which was withdrawn from the GDR? After all, they were also stationed in the middle of nowhere..."

"Why do you say were?" They still are. For some reason, the servicemen are forgotten. However, people are people, and they cannot be kept for a long time in cattle-like conditions. Processes which are underway in the Army may get out of control if politicians do not make radical decisions within a very short period of time. Of course, we attach hopes to the results of the army-wide conference. However, I for one do not hope that all state leaders will show up for it. The situation has gone too far."

"Do you mean the creation of its own army by Ukraine?" "Yes. For example, a colonel who has served in the army for 25 to 30 years retires. All of his relatives are in the Poltava area. Who will greet him there? Who will pay his retirement benefits? Lately we have been talking a lot about civilized behavior, whereas we have made barbaric decisions. Everybody is screaming on behalf of the people and beating his breast. Actually, who has asked the people about what to do with the army? They kept saying forever that the army needed to be depoliticized! So, it was done. However, at present the process of veritable politization of the army, in keeping with the nationalist aspirations of political leaders, is underway. Several Ukrainian officers from our group of forces went to their native parts before being discharged to the reserves in order to float trial balloons down there concerning their future lives. They were told: Go where you served! How are we to view the instance in which hundreds of servicemen who refused to take the Ukrainian oath were expelled (I am at a loss for another word) from Ukraine within 24 hours? I believe that we will be in a lot of trouble if the state leaders do not change their minds in time, because, after dividing up the army, we will begin to revise the borders. This means barricades and people standing on different sides of them."

"Some officers maintain that troops will be withdrawn from the Baltic area by April. Is this so?"

"For now, it is premature to discuss the withdrawal of the group of forces. Where will the people go? Where will they have a roof over their heads? The troops on the whole, each serviceman, and his family, should have a certain status. Clear-cut procedures for the withdrawal, with its beginning and end scheduled, should be established. In general, the states should set forth specific claims against each other at the inter-governmental level and work out a good methodological foundation. Perhaps, in this case a decision will be made that each republic will make its contribution to the troop withdrawal operation."

"Are you not alarmed by the fact that, for example, Estonia refused to provide bread for our soldiers, citing shortfalls in the deliveries of grain from Russia?"

"At present, bread is available to all our servicemen in the Baltic area. We have mechanized field bakeries; therefore, we sustain soldiers and officers, as well as the members of their families. We have emergency reserves as our last resort. I hope we will not have to use them despite the fact that unfortunately no decisions to allocate food resources have been made by the governments, including Russian. We have put many questions to the Government of Russia. We are awaiting their resolution as soon as possible because the indefinite situation of the Army cannot last much longer."

Reorganizing Military Publications

91UM0540C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Jan 92 p 2 sb

[Interfax: "The Military Media Need Reorganization"]

[Text] The current system of military media (SMI) are in need of a "cardinal and thoroughgoing reorganization" stated "Interfax" Chief of the Department of the Media's Committee for Personnel Work Colonel Aleksandr Yakubovskiy. Now, not a single one of the more than 600 registered military media, in which around 900 officer-journalists work, possesses the juridical and economic independence envisaged by the Law on the Press.

The largest publications—the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (print run of 650,000 copies) and the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN (410,000)—are in the most difficult straits. As a result of increased prices for their printing, for 1991 around 110 million rubles is needed.

Activities of 'Zashchitnik Otechestva' Group

92UM0458A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Jan 92 p 4

[Interview with Genadiy Aleksandrovich Isayev, dean, Moscow Evening Metallurgical Institute, by Major I. Ivanyuk: "'The New Profession'—Such is the Name of the Program the 'Zashchitnik Otechestva' Fund has Embarked Upon"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA already reported the first steps of the 'Zashchitnik Otechestva' fund for humanitarian assistance to military servicemen. A new effort undertaken by this social organization is associated with adaptation of former servicemen to civilian life. A group of officers discharged or undergoing discharge into the reserves in connection with the reduction in armed forces was brought together at the Moscow Evening Metallurgical Institute for retraining and acquisition of a new specialty.

The details are explained by G. Isayev, dean of this educational institute's training faculty.

[Ivanyuk] Genadiy Aleksandrovich, how did you come to be associated with the fund?

[Isayev] We thought a long time about making our contribution to social support to military servicemen forced to instantly switch to "the rails of peace," to change their accustomed way of life. Then we heard about the 'Zashchitnik Otechestva' fund which, as it turned out, had also posed a similar objective for itself, and was seeking the way to reach it.

One way is to utilize the training base of higher educational institutions such as ours to retrain former officers and warrant officers. Evening courses are a unique form of training, and in the 60 years that this VUZ has existed we accumulated considerable experience that may be useful in such a case.

Let me add that it was easy for us to find a common language with the fund's leadership, because they are enthusiastic about their work, and they feel deeply and strongly about it.

[Ivanyuk] What occupations can be acquired in your institute?

[Isayev] Our's is a multiprofile VUZ. We train engineers, economists, accountants.... A total of 12 specialties, to include automation and mechanization of metallurgical production, automation of production processes and operations, the economics of the sector's administration, bookkeeping, monitoring and analysis of business activities, powder metallurgy, welding and soldering, ecology. Three or four specializations are possible in each of them—for example, forging metal artwork, robot engineering etc.

[Ivanyuk] Whom are you prepared to accept for training, and how will it be organized?

[Isayev] Any officer, warrant officer or extended-service serviceman who has completed a higher education may enter without examination. An accelerated course of instruction lasting 2.5 years is offered to such persons. After it, they can acquire a new higher education and the corresponding diploma. Training is possible in two variants—with or without leave from present employment. In either case our wish is to create favorable conditions for who are still in the service but who express a keen desire to learn. Lessons begin as soon as a group forms.

Those without a higher education may undergo the full course of instruction, as usual.

[Ivanyuk] How specifically is the fund for humanitarian assistance to servicemen involved in your joint program?

[Isayev] First of all, 'Zashchitnik Otechestva' displayed the lion's share of initiative in this matter, even to include organizing our interview. In addition the fund pledged to cover all expenses associated with organizing training at the VUZ. I should make the qualification right away that the training itself is free of charge—I'm referring to writing the training programs and providing visual aids, literature and other technical assistance. The fund has also taken responsibility for preliminary selection of candidates for training; after meeting and talking with applicants, it will refer them appropriately to our VUZ. After this, we will organize the study groups, which will then begin studying in the institute and at enterprises associated with us, including in Moscow.

[Ivanyuk] One last question: Where and with what documents should a serviceman wishing to become a student for the 2.5 year program apply?

[Isayev] He must submit a request to the 'Zashchitnik Otechestva' for a referral. He must have in his possession a document attesting to his higher education, a certified copy of it, and six 3x4 photographs. He should go to 111250, Moscow, 1-y Krasnokursantskiy Poyezd Street (the Officers' Club of the Moscow Garrison), Room 305 (304), from 1000 to 1700 daily except Saturday and Sunday. Inquiries may be made at the institute's committee for admissions, telephone 361-13-75.

Riga Training Center to Close

92UM0416A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Captain Ye. Kirillov under the rubric "Direct Line": "From Riga: The Last Bursts of Gunfire Ring Out at the Training Center. Next Is the Eviction of Officers' Families"]

[Text] For the time being, assault rifle and machine gun bursts are ringing out on the military firing range of the Riga training center. But this, perhaps, is the only hot spot of the winter combat training on the entire huge territory of the center. In connection with the impending withdrawal of troops from the Baltics, the training center has fallen into the disbandment category.

"At the present time the dismantling of range equipment is going ahead at full speed," Lieutenant Colonel I. Ignatov, chief of the training center, told me in a conversation. "Afterward, it will be turned in to group depots, after which, apparently, it will be used to complete the equipping of other military ranges...

Has the best resolution of the issue been chosen? The chief of the range is executing the instructions given to him. Of course, he is executing them conscientiously.

But in his heart he thinks that it would have been simpler to sell the range property at retail price and release the acquired resources to set up servicemen and members of their families. There is a serious question here: How will the future of the personnel of the range be decided? Many officers, warrant officers, and members of their families have already been advised that they will have to exchange their comfortable apartments in the Adazhi military compound for communal housing in another place.

The reaction to this is ambiguous. Officers and warrant officers who have the length of service plan to be discharged into the reserve. But the young officers want to switch to other military districts and also to continue service on a range. Lieutenant Colonel Ignatov himself, speaking of the fate of subordinates, many of whom have very rare specialties and are experts in their field, express deep concern as to whether all of them will be able to get assigned in their specialty. If not, this will not be the best way to resolve the personnel problem.

Ulan-Ude Garrison Attacked

92UM0460C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 92 p 3

[Report under the rubric "Telegraph Line": "Attack on Sentry at Ulan-Ude Garrison"]

[Text] Early in the morning unknown persons attacked the sentry at an installation at the Ulan-Ude Garrison. Stunning the sentry, the attackers took possession of an automatic gun, a bayonet and a container of live shells. Law-enforcement agents of Buryatiya, together with the military procuracy, are searching for the culprits. The sentry's life is not in danger.

Military Procurators Subordinate to Russian Procuracy

92UM0460B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 92 p 3

[Report under the rubric "Telegraph Line": "The Military Procuracy Has a New Boss Again"]

[Text] Due to the abolition of the Procuracy of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has established a system of agencies of the military procuracy operating within the territory of Russia, as well as on the territory of the Western, Northern and Northwestern groups of forces, and decreed that they be subordinate to the General Procuracy of the Russian Federation. It has been proposed that the government finance their operations for 1992.

Crime Rate Among Belarus Troops Reported

92UM0515C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Military Procuracy Has Summed up Results for the Work Year"]

[Text] The crime rate among servicemen of the Belorussian Military District increased 32 percent in the past year. The republic's military procurator, Major-General of Justice Anatoliy Glyukov, deputy procurator general of Belarus, cited this alarming figure. One of the reasons for the increase in violations of the law is the redeployment of troops from Europe to the republic's territory. The unsettled state of daily life and uncertainty about the future has affected military discipline even among officers. Soldiers inducted from other republics are going absent without leave. Most often the initiators of relations that are at variance with regulations are not old-timers but young soldiers.

Military Academy Instructor Calls for Creation of Russian Army

92UM0519A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel Vladimir Rodachin, instructor at the Humanities Academy of the Armed Forces: "Russia Needs Its Own Army: Existence of the State Is Impossible Without a Reasonable Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Given all the urgency and importance of issues of settling overall defense problems of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and the collectiveness of military-political efforts we are accustomed to, we also must not ignore any longer the desires of the independent states to pursue their own national military policy.

On the one hand, the CIS is not a new state formation and, therefore, does not have the right to lay claim to, as is being done today, preserving the institution of unified armed forces. And would it be able to accomplish this in practice? Life is already now placing a multitude of difficult issues before the members of the Commonwealth and service members. Whose state policy are the unified armed forces supposed to support? Is there a guarantee that one of the founders of the Commonwealth will not want to use the overall military strength to protect its own interests (say, in resolving the Nagornyy Karabakh issue)? And will a well-founded refusal to do this really not cause a reaction of discontent and bewilderment as to why national financial and other assets are being spent to maintain a unified army? And what state symbol (flag, coat of arms, distinguishing marks on uniforms and combat equipment) should be used by the unified armed forces? Without it they lose legal status while overseas. With respect to ships of the Navy, the decision has been made to return to them the flag of St. Andrew. But will it suit all participants of the CIS? What about other branches of the armed forces and other state symbols?

On the other hand, the Russian state, which inherited the overwhelming majority of the defense potential of the former Union and makes the greatest contribution to maintaining the unified armed forces, continues to exist without its own army.

Today there are quite a few opponents to the creation of a Russian army. The All-Army Officer Assembly has also come out in favor of unified armed forces. However, in the strict sense of the word, unified forces no longer exist. A sizable grouping stationed in Ukraine has broken off from them. It is unlikely that the CIS will be able to restore control here. A similar process is also taking place in other sovereign states.

One can agree with the need for a transition period agreed upon by all members of the CIS, during which a unified army and unified command would be retained. But why not create elements of a future Russian army in parallel, beginning not with combat units and large units, which arouses alarm in neighbors but with bodies for planning and controlling military activities and command and control of the armed forces? Those early stages of them which exist today do not correspond either to Russia's potential or to the tasks facing them of safeguarding national and international security. The lack of a military policy designed for the future deprives service members of a clear picture of those goals which they are called upon to serve, of Russia's allies, of sources of possible threats to its security, of the model of the future Russian army, of the basic directions and priorities of military organizational development, and so forth.

Russia, like other great powers, must publicly announce the nature and content of its military policy. The President of Russia and its minister of defense must periodically submit to parliament and to the people reports on the strategy of national security and the military policy of the state. Every citizen of Russia has the right to know what his taxes are being spent for and how the state is guaranteeing his military security.

It is also advisable to use the scientific potential of independent social centers and organizations for developing alternative drafts of military policy. Such experience is widely used in the majority of countries of the West. Thus, data published in 1988 from an expert examination conducted by scientists of British universities, "An Alternative Defense Policy," proved the fallacy of obvious exaggeration in government documents of the USSR's military potential and helped correct the content of Great Britain's military policy.

Quite a number of public drafts of the military policy and armed forces of Russia are now being prepared and have been created. As far as I know, not a single one of them foresees destabilization of the military-political situation on the territory of the CIS and the unleashing of civil war as an inevitable consequence of their implementation, which opponents of creation of a Russian army are trying to play. Creation of a Russian army does not restrict or affect the sovereignty and security interests of the other independent states. What is more, a Russian army, like the armies of other states, can serve on the basis of inter-state agreements not only its own but also common goals of security and protection of democracy. Finally, no army will resolve once and for all

the inter-state contradictions and conflicts that have emerged. It is not the issue of a Russian military policy and the creation of an army but rash forms and methods of resolving it that can lead to undesirable consequences.

Army Paper Demands Fair Treatment by Distributor

PM3101151592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "'Shock Therapy' in Newspaper Market"]

[Text] Yes, it seems that in the very near future people could encounter in the newspaper and magazine market what is described as "shock therapy." (We have learned that virtually all editorial offices and publishing houses are now faced with the dilemma which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has been agonizing over for two weeks now: Either to increase sharply the price of the newspaper to 2 rubles [R] or more or give up distributing it through the "Soyuzpechat" system. For the time being this concerns Moscow, but, by all accounts, the same issues are arising in other regions too. Certain publications are already announcing an increased retail price. For example, KOMMERSANT will cost R5 per copy from 1 February. From discussions with colleagues from other newspapers we have learned that many of them also think that a further increase in prices within reasonable bounds is inevitable...

Unfortunately, inflation is gathering momentum. What seemed acceptable only yesterday, say, our current 50 kopeks per copy, will soon no longer cover the newspaper's expenses. And what is today's 50 kopek coin or ruble worth—5-10 kopeks of yore.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers have been informed of our relations with Moscow's "Soyuzpechat." We have devoted several articles to this topic. Some "Soyuzpechat" workers have taken offense, alleging that we are giving one-sided coverage and are not investigating thoroughly the problems and difficulties they are suffering.

This is not so, esteemed partners. We well understand all this and esteem your difficult work. And we are not such naive people that we fail to realize that nowadays, when prices on virtually everything have been freed, that some kind of sanctuary of low prices can be created for newspapers and magazines. No matter how regrettable, it has to be accepted that prices for newspapers will have to go up, and undoubtedly more than once during the year. But this can be done without ultimatums or bias being shown toward particular publications.

We simply fail to understand why the leaders of Moscow's "Soyuzpechat" decided to pick on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to launch its price rise in mid-January? Why was it necessary to stop the sale of the newspaper for several days? It is against such approaches that we are protesting.

It is difficult for all of us today. But that makes it all the more important to find mutually acceptable solutions—calmly, without diktat, and with the least possible damage to our readers.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA too almost daily runs up against more and more surprises of "liberalization": We now have to buy the bulk of our paper at commodity-exchange prices, and they are constantly increasing. A sharp increase in telephone charges was announced the other day and R750,000 demanded from us for information transmitted by telex. And all this, after all, is indispensable to a newspaper.

Nevertheless, we are today raising the question that the increase of prices be mitigated as much as possible. If it cannot be avoided altogether, then let there be no "shock therapy" at least, let prices go up gradually, in stages. We at any rate will be insisting that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers do not lose out, compared with the readers of other newspaper.

The editorial office is currently receiving a large number of telephone calls. Reserve Lieutenant Colonel N. Yegorov, for example, put the issue this way: "If there is no other way, let KRASNAYA ZVEZDA become a little dearer, only do not let it disappear anymore from the kiosks. And one more thing—you must consider an alternative distribution system. This will help avoid rampant price increases."

We are able to see yet again what faithful and devoted friends we have. And how many of them there are. We thank everyone for their support and advice. It is difficult to predict at present how events will develop. But we will without fail, dear readers, keep you all informed.

CIS Chief of Combat Training Interviewed

92UM0485A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Ground Forces Deputy Commander for Combat Training Colonel-General E.A. Vorobyov interviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "Timely Interview: The Army In New Conditions: How the Training Process Is Viewed"]

[Text] The Minsk meeting of heads of state determined the future of the strategic forces. They will be under a unified command. But what about the general-purpose forces? Here a temporary compromise was found: The republics, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces, are to resolve the question of procedures governing their command and control, with due regard for national legislation and continuity in exercising their rights to the creation of the own armies.

As the politicians try to work out the contours of the general-purpose forces, life takes its course—combat training has gotten under way among the troops and in the fleets. Our correspondent met with Colonel-General Eduard Arkadyevich Vorobyov, Ground Forces Deputy

Commander for Combat Training, and asked him to tell about plans for improving troop combat training in present conditions.

E.A. Vorobyov was born in 1938 in Voronezh. He joined the army in 1957. He graduated from the Baku Higher Combined-Arms Command School (1961) with a gold medal, as well as from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy (1971) and the General Staff Military Academy (1981). He has held a variety of command and staff posts. He has served as an army commander, First Deputy Commander of the Turkestan Military District, and Commander of the Central Group of Forces.

The rank of Colonel-General was conferred on him on October 27, 1988.

He is married and has two children.

[Dokuchayev] The first question has to do with recent events and the major decisions taken in Minsk. The right of each state to create its own armed forces was confirmed. Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan have set about implementing these agreements. This changes a lot of things in the army and navy and will undoubtedly have an effect on the character and content of combat training. In what ways, in your opinion?

[Vorobyov] Significant changes in the command and control structures are possible, including with regard to the combat training of troops and naval forces. As for lower-level units—the company, battery, battalion, and division, and as we know, fighting skills and combat readiness are forged at just these levels—all the best elements of prior experience in organizing the training process will undoubtedly be preserved and, I hope, they will also be preserved in the republic armies, should they arise.

[Dokuchayev] A desire to prevent any reduction in training intensity is understandable. But what is the actual state of affairs where combat training is concerned today? The Western press writes that our Armed Forces are being degraded, that no training drills or exercises are being held.

[Vorobyov] And our own press too, in pursuit of "cooked" facts, often presents one-sided coverage of the life and activities of the army and navy. People are getting the impression that the troops are sitting in their barracks and waiting for meat and sausage. I can state in no uncertain terms that combat training is under way in a no less organized fashion than in past years. For example, combat readiness drills have been held everywhere. Training sessions with combined unit and unit commanders are now being held, and the process of accomplishing individual training assignments is being completed. Take the Western Group of Forces. There subunits have been going out to the training grounds, and detachments have been practicing field firing, firing single rounds, and driving combat vehicles. To the credit of the troop commanders, commanders, and staffs of all levels, plans are being quickly adjusted when necessary.

In units where fuel ceilings have been allocated but there are no current deliveries, some training sessions are employing the "dismounted vehicle" training method. In other words, fitting solutions are being found for the difficulties that are arising.

Without a doubt, when the combat teamwork stage begins, the training situation could become more complicated. But we still expect that rear-service and financial matters will be resolved and that we will carry out the planned measures.

[Dokuchayev] How are relations for the combat training directorates of military districts located on the territories of the Commonwealth states that have announced they are creating their own armies?

[Vorobyov] In the districts on the territory of Ukraine, the reaction to orders from the Main Combat Training Directorate is negative. In order to keep from aggravating the situation, we are not making plans for any service detachments to that area, or to the Belorussian Military District either. We are awaiting a final political decision on the Armed Forces. We have restricted command and control activities as much as possible, including with respect to material supply for combat training exercises. This does not apply to the groups of forces, the Transcaucasian and Turkestan Military Districts, and the military districts located on the territory of Russia.

Needless to say, with the conclusive establishment of armies in certain republics, our relations with the troops that are stationed on their territories will be clarified and will most likely change. However, we are going to look for close forms of cooperation. I think that the work methods of the Ground Troops Main Combat Training Directorate will come in handy not just in the districts that will be subordinate to the command of the Commonwealth Armed Forces.

[Dokuchayev] It is clear from your answer that full responsibility for the quality of combat training must lie with the leadership of a given branch of the Armed Forces. Apparently, the central agency for combat and psychological training and for troop education that has been discussed for the past six months has not been created on account of the uncertainty regarding the Armed Forces' future.

[Vorobyov] Yes, the Commission for Abolishing Military-political Agencies and Creating Combat Training Agencies and Structures for Work with Personnel (I was a member of it) concluded that during the current complex period for the country and army, setting up a new administrative subdivision was hardly justified from any point of view. And events have shown that we were right. At present, the new structures would have been in the formative stage and would in no way influence the course of combat training in the districts, groups of forces, and fleets. And it's possible that it would already have become necessary to reform or abolish them.

[Dokuchayev] Nevertheless, Eduard Arkadyevich, what ways do you see of improving the combat training of the troops that will be part of the CIS general-purpose forces?

[Vorobyov] First, the number of combined units in the Ground Troops will be reduced. Full-fledged divisions staffed at a level of no less than 70 percent will appear. We also hope that the manpower acquisition system will be modified. I have in mind service under contract. We think that the practice of forwarding servicemen from combat units to educational centers will be ruled out. And full staffing will make it possible to carry out all planned tactical drills and exercises and to do so in a quality fashion.

Second, plans call for a viable organizational-staff structure for the units and combined units. They will have effective supply subunits.

We are going to bring combat training programs and firing and driving courses into conformity with the realities of present-day life. We have already drawn up a draft program for combat training during the transition of conscripts to 18-month service and guidelines for the training of junior specialists from among persons who have expressed a desire to serve under contract. The training period at educational centers for some categories of junior specialists will be five and one-half months, and three months for others. Our plan is that each soldier, on leaving the training center, will have a skill rating of at least third class, and that those serving under contract will have a skill rating of at least second class. This means that in the units, the main emphasis will be on promoting teamwork among various subunits. Officers will be able to concentrate on improving company and battalion command and control skills.

[Dokuchayev] Since the conversation has turned to commanding officer training, I'd like to know if anything new is planned in this area.

[Vorobyov] As it has come about, commanding officer training in our country has taken place in a kind of coercive way. But what we need is for the officer himself to strive for a high degree of professionalism. A new way of assessing his skill level is required. In my opinion, an officer's professionalism should become the main criterion in appointing him to a post, conferring ranks, and receiving all privileges from the military. To use a phrase in fashion today, professionalism must become convertible, like hard currency. Only then will the prestige of military professionalism be enhanced.

Certain things are already being done in this area. An order has been issued that grants a unit commander the right to make decisions as to supplementary monetary compensation for servicemen for high indices in combat training. Incidentally, in order to enhance the prestige of the posts of district deputy troop commanders and deputy commanders of groups of forces and armies for combat training, I think that when officers are appointed

to these posts, they should also be made members of the corresponding military councils.

We are also working to bring more order to officer training. After all, look at the current situation. Lieutenants arrive at a unit from their military schools, and there they essentially start attending training sessions intended to clear them for their posts. Short exercises and the simplest methodological drills are held, they are evaluated in terms of physical and drill training, and so on. The fact is that this is degrading for the graduate who has been evaluated by the state through state examinations.

What are we proposing? Immediately prior to graduation from the military schools, to hold training sessions for future officers with respect to the region in which they will be serving. To study with them the distinctive features of the region and the relevant documents and orders—those that the school graduate named to a primary officer post should know. And to work through what might be called the adaptation of young officers right in their units, without any degrading tests and training drills. They have to be given the opportunity—I repeat: the opportunity—to study the orders of the district commander, the distinctive features of combat training in their combined unit and unit, and its class, barracks, and field facilities and procedures for using the latter. They should be introduced at the officers meeting, preferably at some sort of ceremony, for example, at a reception in honor of the young officers. We need to instill in every officer dignity and pride in his profession and in a high degree of professionalism.

A concept to govern the course system is currently being drawn up, one that will permeate command training. A candidate will be required to take the courses at military schools and academies before being assigned to a post.

[Dokuchayev] No matter how well trained young commanders, specialists, and officers may be, a subunit can successfully accomplish its combat missions only on the condition that it has participated in repeated exercises and maneuvers.

[Vorobyov] That's an indisputable truth. Combat teamwork will be practiced in the course of monthly excursions to training grounds for a period of five to six days for field training exercises. In addition, the first battalion, regiment, or division exercises are to be preceded by battalion field drills.

During the year, each company and battalion is to hold two exercises, one involving field firing. In order to cut expenses, regiment and division exercises are not going to be held annually, and eventually division exercises are to be done away with completely.

[Dokuchayev] But what could have an adverse impact on unit and subunit training. And generally speaking, are we prepared for troop training at a time of reduced military spending and cuts in appropriations for combat training?

[Vorobyov] The time has come when we need to not only be prepared to accept a more economical system of troop training, but to establish such a system ourselves. After all, those same division staffs can be trained not just in the course of tactical exercises, but also at command and staff exercises and staff training sessions, which will be significantly cheaper. We are currently introducing on a wide scale in training work laser aiming and firing imitators for all kinds of weapons. Research at a specialized testing facility has shown that with a negligible adjustment in organization-staff structures at a training ground, we can effectively hold two-sided battalion exercises and send through up to 60 motorized infantry and tank battalions a year. The economic effect is apparent: The number of subunit field firing exercises and firing training sessions will be reduced.

Efforts are now under way to devise a comprehensive automated system for the tactical training of motorized infantry and tank battalions. It includes the gathering, processing, storage, and representation of data on the state and nature of actions by troops and staffs in two-sided exercises using third-generation laser aiming and firing imitators, the holding of subunit exercises against the backdrop of command and staff exercises, and the objective assessment of their actions. It is important to prevent a halt to financing of research, which will later provide a significant savings.

[Dokuchayev] You've talked about savings but you haven't cited any concrete figures.

[Vorobyov] To be honest, we have just begun a thorough study of the cost mechanism in organizing combat training measures. We are also developing in more detail a method for estimating the cost of tactical exercises, which will allow staffs to make more effective use of material and financial resources. For example, a company exercise costs, in 1991 prices, 15,500 rubles, and a battalion exercise with a tank company (with field firing) costs 134,800 rubles. A regiment tactical exercise with a tank regiment from a tank division (with field firing) costs 1,231,000 rubles. A division tactical exercise with a motorized-rifle division (with field firing by the motorized-rifle and tank regiments) costs 5,926,000 rubles. Do you understand now why we decided to reduce the number of division and regiment exercises?

We are also using economic levers in other areas. In 1991, we sold 1,800,000 rubles' worth of unused equipment previously intended for combat training from various storage facilities. We have reviewed the construction of planned facilities for 1992. A spend-thrift approach has to be rejected.

[Dokuchayev] There would seem to be a lot of innovations. Are you and your directorate going to be able to carry through on them?

[Vorobyov] We simply have no other option. And eventually the Main Combat Training Directorate will be reconstituted and will take on modern characteristics.

We are setting up departments and groups for psychological and social-humanitarian training, for combat training safety, and others. We are expecting the staff to acquire specialists in combat and psychological training methods, in automated management systems, and in computer systems. We're going to use them not only for developing methods per se, but also for training management specialists.

Convoy Service 'Very Dangerous'

92UM0482A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jan 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "From the Ministry of Internal Affairs Press Center: Convoy Service Has Become Very Dangerous"]

[Text] There's no need to recount once more the very difficult conditions in which internal troops have to serve today. But soldiers and officers are dying not only at "trouble spots" but also in remote areas inside Russia.

For example, at detention facility No. 3 in the city Chelyabinsk, a group of convicts attacked the guards, took them hostage, and barricaded themselves in the visitors' room. About 10 relatives who had come to visit inmates also wound up in the criminals' hands.

Threatening to kill them, the criminals demanded that the facility administration give them vodka, weapons, and a car. A procurator was unable to persuade them to end their unlawful actions. A team was sent in after them. There were no casualties, thanks to the police officers' decisive action and courage.

Or consider the following example. In a detention facility in the city of Rostov-na-Donu, a female guard was taking two people under investigation for serious crimes out for their exercise period. Threatening her with a sharpened instrument, they took her hostage and demanded that the administration give them weapons and a car. Negotiations proved fruitless. In an ensuing clash, one of the criminals was killed and a second gravely wounded. Only by sheer luck did the guard not fall victim to the criminals who had attacked her.

Needless to say, life shows that criminal intentions involving the seizure of hostages do not succeed. However, the criminal world is unwilling to give up these intentions. Each year, dozens of such crimes are committed at colonies and in jails. There are quite a few attacks on police officers and internal troops, mass disturbances with riots, and settling of scores with inmates.

The result of all this is regrettable. In the past two years, 16 servicemen were killed and 89 wounded in detention facilities and jails in the former USSR.

Western Group of Forces Commander Interviewed

92UM0490A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Feb 92 pp 1,2

[Interview with Western Group of Forces Commander Colonel-General Matvey Prokopyevich Burlakov by Colonels S. Pashayev and V. Markushin: "We Are Resolving our Military Problems with the FRG in a Civilized Manner. This Still Has not Happened with the CIS States. It Is Difficult to Overestimate the Value of Counter Steps"]

[Text] WGF [Western Group of Forces]: CHRONICLE OF THE WITHDRAWAL. In January 1992, 165,000 people left the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. They withdrew 34,000 pieces of equipment and weaponry, including 1,200 tanks and 3,158 BTR's [Armored Transport Vehicle] and BMP's [Armored Personnel Vehicle]. They withdrew 780,000 tons of materiel.

[Pashayev/Markushin] Comrade Commander, the Western Group has entered its second year of the withdrawal from Germany. Experience has been accumulated, the withdrawal is proceeding as planned, without an insulting hullabaloo for our people, while on the whole maintaining the normal rhythm of combat training. Although treaty obligations restrain its scope and intensity...

[Burlakov] Yes, all that is true. Last year's schedule has been observed; the withdrawal is being carried out even with a little margin. So to speak, calculating that January and February are by no means the optimum time to transfer people who are simply often leaving for nowhere. Evidently, not everyone knows that troops are very rarely leaving here as part of units and a large portion of them are practically being disbanded.

Experience is being accumulated. But, we nevertheless consider that every specific regiment, brigade, regiment and army will carry out tasks to which they are not accustomed. Consequently, they need help to avoid everyday mistakes. We conducted a mission-specific conference; we created special working groups from officers of directorates who are sent where immediate preparations for the withdrawal is occurring. I stress that they are not taking on the functions of the actual commanders, they are just keeping them from re-inventing the wheel and helping them avoid all types of "snags."

Training of the troops, staffs and command elements must certainly continue as well. But, due to this specific situation, we are placing the stress on individual training of personnel and subunit training. By my order, platoon and company commanders are releasing their personnel, to the maximum extent possible, from details, clean-up and other interruptions. I am convinced that the category of officers, who have passed through the millstones of these duties and who are closest of all to the soldiers and sergeants, properly appreciate such a step. And their mission is to educate and train their subordinates. So

this determines the success of the matter. Indeed, today we have begun to actively involve officers from the operational echelon in the training of commanders at the platoon to battalion level. The main thing for us right now is to maintain the intense rhythm of combat training which is in fact an active army and ensure its organization, discipline and control. Incidentally, German society was interested in the latter. Everyone who lives near our garrisons is interested in that.

[Pashayev/Markushin] Today, the character of our relations with our German partners, specifically with the Bundeswehr, is acquiring a different, more dynamic nature. How ready are we for this?

[Burlakov] You know, life teaches. On the whole, our ties are business-like in nature. It is largely thanks to this that we are managing to comply with the withdrawal schedule and to efficiently resolve a multitude of unexpected problems. Of course, we are sincerely grateful to the local authorities and police in the most tense regions where the embarkation and movement of troops is occurring. I rate highly the work of the Bundeswehr Department for Relations with the WGF headed by Major General H. Ferchem. At the same time, I think that both journalists and experts still do not realize or totally appreciate the military-theoretical and socio-political significance of what is occurring. The troop withdrawals are events on a massive scale. There has been nothing like it since 1945, since the rapid redeployment of division-sized and smaller units of the Western Fronts to defeat the Japanese Kwangtung Army. So today what we are doing is already not restricted by the traditional ties which, incidentally, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has often mentioned. Here is a characteristic example: recently a seminar was conducted for assistant commanders for personnel work at a WGF firing range. Officers from the Bundeswehr and from the American and British groups in the FRG were active participants in the seminar. In my view, it is hard to overestimate the value of these reciprocal steps. It essentially is the beginning of practical movement on the path toward integrating Russia with the Western partners.

[Pashayev/Markushin] Matvey Prokopyevich, while listening to your story, I involuntarily think: the WGF is in a sense a copy of an integrated army. For the time being, it is still the united army of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]...

[Burlakov] I agree. Besides the Russians who are more than half of the personnel in this group of forces, here every fourth person is Ukrainian, every twentieth is Belorussian and nearly every tenth person is a representative of Central Asia. Nevertheless, the WGF is not an assembly of representatives of the multitude of peoples of the former Union. This is an integrated organism. Alive, active and industrious. The All-Army Officers' Assembly once again reminded us of that. In so doing, this group of forces that has been included in the sphere of Russian jurisdiction is not at all ignoring the interests

of the other states of the Commonwealth, is not speculating and is not neglecting them. I think that life itself will judge and will prove that, while advancing toward military cooperation on a global scale, it is absurd, suspicious, and shortsighted to break off relations with those people to whom we are bound by history, economics, traditions and, finally, geopolitical interests.

I will frankly state: as of today, there are no requests on my desk from those people who, having discarded everything, intend to link their fate to the national armed forces that are emerging. Although we are prepared to examine such requests without prejudice and to resolve them positively. Evidently, people have still not lost hope that the politicians will manage to find a solution to the situation that affects the fate of our Armed Forces and of hundreds of thousands of people who have devoted their lives to the service of the Fatherland.

[Pashayev/Markushin] You mentioned the All-Army Officers' Assembly. Did it live up to your expectations?

[Burlakov] I would say this: not entirely. It is a shame that those people who lead the troops of the disintegrated army were practically not permitted to speak. As it turns out, those who are serving are suffering and not those who are dividing the regiments, divisions and combat vessels along ethnic apartments... A really dramatic situation is developing in the army at times. The sons of the peoples who have had a falling out are arriving at the same crew, gun crew and the same company. And they are obtaining weapons. If there is trouble, it is not the representatives of the popular fronts or the presidents, but the commanders who will have to stand before the mothers' weeping eyes.

The politicians will decide how it will be and what will happen in the future.

[Pashayev/Markushin] Russia is becoming the successor to the former Union. How is this affecting WGF activities?

[Burlakov] The Russian flag over the group's directorate is not just a symbol. Russia's jurisdiction over the WGF has removed many uncertainties and simplified the resolution of an entire series of problems. Say, a multi-layered system of coordination of literally every step existed. By way of illustration, not too long ago, an opportunity suddenly arose for us to sell a large shipment of gas masks for a good price. But, while we were knocking on the doors of three unenterprising union departments, the situation changed. As they say, the train left the station. Now we have to lug these gas masks home and considerable resources will be spent on their utilization there.

It seems that the Russian leadership senses the situation. A special mission was sent to the WGF, whose leader was granted the rights of a full minister. I hope that henceforth incidents such as the story of the gas masks will not be repeated.

[Pashayev/Markushin] We have learned that the negotiating process on the problems of the withdrawal, which had been slowing down, is being resumed...

[Burlakov] We are meeting in Bonn during the first few days of February. The delegation will be headed by CIS Armed Forces First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant-General P. Grachev. Issues have accumulated which demand immediate answers. For example, we are very worried about the dead-end situation in selling the WGF's real estate. I think that the FRG Ministry of Finance, which has been tasked to coordinate all of this work, is artificially delaying the sales process. There are many examples. I will cite just one. In Potsdam, we transferred to the Germans a military installation assessed at 3,500,000 marks. A buyer was quickly found who was prepared to pay 5,000,000 marks for it. However, the Ministry of Finance is declaring the military installation to be a facility of special federal interests and the deal is being stopped.

[Pashayev/Markushin] Obviously, the politicians should also dot the i's on the issue of claims for ecological damage inflicted on the environment as a result of the Soviet military presence in East Germany?

[Burlakov] That is completely correct. This question is extremely complicated and therefore it requires a political solution. I think that it is impossible to look at it in isolation. Ecological problems have not suddenly arisen. One can do little more than talk about the considerable space of time—from 1941 to the present. At that time, the Soviet troops who were stationed here were in no way guided by the laws of the FRG. And they arrived here, as one German *burgermeister* stated not long ago, under well known circumstances. Political solutions are required. We ultimately need determination.

Chechen Republic Forming Army

92P50089 Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed untitled report]

[Text] The army of the Chechen Republic is apparently becoming a reality. In all the units and sub-units in the Grozny garrison recently drafted youths, called up from Chechen territory, have solemnly sworn allegiance to their people

Shakhray Press Conference on Withdrawal

92UM0540A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Shakhray Press Conference and Rumors about it".]

[Text] Yesterday, by extraordinary coincidence, Russia's State Advisor on legal policy, Sergey Shakhray, told domestic and foreign journalists about the results of the visit to the Baltic states.

The withdrawal of troops from the Baltics will require about six billion rubles according to the first estimate.

Press Secretary K. Yeliseyev and Sergey Shakhray literally stated the following yesterday concerning the fate of S. Parfenkov: "It is necessary to wait a few days." He said nothing about the supposedly existing agreement between S. Shakhray and A. Gorbunov on the transfer of the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Riga OMON to the Russian authorities.

Russian Presidium on Military Tribunals

92UM0540B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Feb 92 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Tribunals Continue to Operate."]

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has passed a resolution on the military tribunals. In connection with the abolition of the structures of the court authorities of the former Union of SSRs, making provision for these entities, located on the territory of Russia as well as in the groups of forces, was laid on to Russian Federation Ministry of Justice. The legal position of the servicemen and all types of monetary and other benefits are to be preserved for all personnel of the military tribunals as well as the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

CIS: POLICY

Volkogonov Favors Unified Strategic Forces

92UM0422A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 4, 22 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel-General Dmitriy Volkogonov, doctor of philosophical sciences, doctor of historical sciences, and professor: "Theater of Military Operations in the Kremlin and in the Caucasus"]

[Text] In the period of great strife which we have entered, 1992 will probably be the most difficult. Menacing dangers of an economic, social, national, moral, and now military nature await us. True, with the qualification that if we do not allow social upheaval (and this is being prompted not only by the countless troubles with the economy but also by the stinking breath of a fascist threat, one after another), we can reach the bottom point of the crisis by late fall of this year and then slowly, very slowly begin to rise. That is...unless the Bolsheviks "storm the Winter Palace." This is especially so in conditions of the disintegration of the Union and the trend towards creating almost a dozen national armies. All this will cost the republics 1.5-2 times more than before. But the main point is: Against whom do some capitals so persistently want to create their own armies? Against NATO? Turkey? Romania? No? Then why have them? As an attribute of statehood? Very doubtful.

Last week, the army itself tried to have its own say about its own fate. The assembly of officers at the Kremlin left a two-faced impression. On the one hand, we were convinced that if the army entered the political arena as an independent, self-dependent force, it would have the most disastrous consequences. An attempt at diktat and ultimatums can pave the way only for a dictatorship. Outside the hall were forces that would like this scenario to be played out. Need I say that this is ruinous for all of us?

On the other hand, the officers were forced to state loudly, with full voice, to the entire Commonwealth: The army demands definiteness and favors unity of the armed forces. One can understand people with stars on their shoulders, who during these hard times have ended up both morally and materially destitute. There are about 300,000 (!) without apartments; many garrisons are literally under siege; local leaders demand weapons, and regional leaders demand a new oath... During the day the assembly was held, especially at the beginning, the country observed on the screen distressing scenes which, it was hard to believe, were taking place at the officer assembly... Of course, one can say: They reduced the army to a pen, but really one must never forget the officer honor code.

The addresses by the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan, as I expected, were stabilizing and consolidating. Boris Yeltsin confirmed his determination to strive persistently for a solution of all unresolved questions through negotiations with the leaders of the other states and outlined a program of measures for social protection of the army. It made an impression, but it will be quite difficult to carry it out.

Yes, it is ideal for the army to be unified, but then the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] is hardly possible... However, there are still chances for creating Joint Strategic Forces. One way or another, the army served notice to the politicians: If it is torn apart, separated, and demoralized, the last institution of statehood giving moral support and hope for stability to millions of people will disappear.

In my view, the leaders of the CIS should still try to agree on a number of vitally important issues on which the entire fate of a very ephemeral Commonwealth depends to a huge degree.

First. They must clearly and honestly agree on the creation of CIS Joint Strategic Forces, their composition, disposition, and command and control. These must be not only missile forces but also ground, space, air, naval, and air defense forces, and certain special formations. It is best to make the protection of the Commonwealth a common concern. Along with economic ties, this will make the CIS a viable inter-state association.

Second. In my view, they should absolutely begin preparing and concluding a Defense Treaty of Independent Republics that can assign everything by places: designation of the Joint Strategic Forces, command of them,

organizational development, financing, technical support, relations with NATO, and so forth. It is through a treaty that we could seriously reform the army and navy, in concert resolve the basic issues of social protection of service members, personnel training, and all remaining issues. A treaty would not hinder those republics that would wish to have their own national formations, too. It is important to agree in principle on the need for such an inter-state agreement. Perhaps everyone should agree on the existence of a transitional period of 1.5-2 years for resolving all unsettled issues?

Third. Until all these agreements are concluded, they should agree on the impermissibility of unilateral "nationalization" or "privatization" of army and navy large units and formations. National vision can make reason blind. It is time to understand that unilateral hasty steps often under the sound of national kettle-drums sow seeds whose sprouts can darken the lives of many generations. We will not forget that the dominant tendencies in the world today are towards integration of systems (not imperial, of course), toward various associations, communities, common markets, and so forth. The entire world is going into the 21st century. Let us not move backwards into the 19th century. When it became clear that the Union was falling apart, especially after August of last year, the CIS could become a historical compromise between a unitary state and total disunity. If the military issues would have been agreed upon from the very beginning in Minsk and Alma-Ata, the clashes in Sevastopol and other places would not have occurred. We must not forget that there turned out to be considerably more troops, and army and navy property and valuables in other republics, based on the strategy which the former Union had adhered to. You see, assault armies were not stationed in Tyumen, and the most combat-effective units were located in the border districts, and the Groups of Forces were withdrawn to those places.

These are some thoughts on the fate of our army. I think the President of Russia demonstrated more restraint in these disorganized attempts to divide up the "military pie" than some of his colleagues. His statement that Russia will not be among the first to begin creating its own army is well-considered and wise. The path of new militarization, now national, leaves fewer chances for true good-neighbor relations. It is possible that if Russia is forced to do so, it will also create its own army and navy. And in the Black Sea, too. But all this will be a sad, forced decision. In principle, in the future a comparatively small joint professional army of 1.5 million men would be sufficient for all of us in the CIS. In addition to that, perhaps each republic that wanted could have a small national guard.

Let us remember that we are doomed always to live together, next to each other. Not a single republic will be able to fly away to another planet or even across the ocean. When all is said and done, we are not only Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Kazakhs, and people of other nationalities. We are inhabitants of

Earth. In this sense, we have a common home. Let us not fence it off with new partitions, to be guarded by a dozen armies. Let us look at ourselves from the future, from behind the threshold of the 21st century: Are we missing a great universal chance for a common home, wishing to heed the barely audible, for the time being anyway, tramping of national military shoes?

Removal of Weapons, Equipment from Ukraine

92UM0399B Kiev *VECHERNY KIEV* in Russian

2 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov under the rubric "Current Topics!": "Military Property Is Being Sold in the Ukraine and the Money Goes to Moscow"]

[Text] One issue of the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY contained a statement by Russia's Minister of Defense K. Kobets which stated that only one case of military equipment being removed from Ukrainian territory had been established. And that only involved a few bulldozers. In all other cases equipment previously located at Ukrainian plants was allegedly being returned following repairs.

Oh, how one would like to believe this statement, but the facts say otherwise. There have been many disturbing calls from officers serving in the southern Ukraine. Colonel A. Rusin of the Odessa branch of the Union of Ukrainian Officers reported that the Bolgrad Airborne Assault Division was being readied to be airlifted to the area of Chita...

I was told that part of the armored equipment has been removed from a naval infantry brigade based near Sevastopol. Several SU-24s have been ferried to Russia from a Guards air unit based at a small town.

In the present, troubled situation new hotspots are appearing on the nation's map, and a real danger of the theft and illegal sale of military equipment is developing. Lieutenant Colonel G. Temko told how "visitors" from the south had approached him with an offer of 100,000 rubles to introduce them... to the chief of a military supply depot.

It would be absurd to assume that in removing tanks and aircraft from the Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR is attempting to save the equipment for the united armed forces. After all, there have been reports even in the press about thousands of tanks being hauled from garrisons eliminated in Germany, Hungary and Poland and rotting in the vast expanses of Siberia.

So just how does one explain the unusual efforts to relocate equipment in circumvention of the decree passed by the republic's Supreme Soviet "On Military Formations Deployed on the Territory of the Ukraine" if not as an effort to thwart the process of forming the republic's own armed forces?

In mid-November an auction was held in the Kiev military unit commanded by Colonel V. Yavdak to sell motor vehicles, engines and machine tools. It produced a considerable amount of money. Such sales are becoming commonplace in the army, which is looking for ways to enter the market. This raises the question of why the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine was unaware of this auction, however. After all, they were selling equipment located on our territory. Most of the money was transferred to the account of the USSR Ministry of Defense. And how is it fair that a certain percentage of the proceeds came out of the account of our Ministry of Defense?

Unfortunately, neither specific rules nor even any kind of control over this process has been established.

The Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine received a letter from V. Pokharenko in Cherkassy telling how one military unit had sold items worth 1 million rubles. They included 1,000 tires for the GAZ-24.

According to workers with the National Security Service of the Ukraine there have been specific instances in the railway troops in which equipment whose storage life had not elapsed was removed from storage and sold. Furthermore, the sales are conducted in accordance with orders written up in the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the money is transferred to a personal account in Moscow.

The rear service chief of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense cautions us against fully believing all such reports, however. There are many subtleties in this matter.

Russia as Military Successor to USSR Considered

92UM0386A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "The Army Under Fire from the Politicians: Disputes Between Yeltsin and Kravchuk Are Placing Not Only the Future of the Commonwealth in Question But Also the Future of the Peoples of Russia and Ukraine"]

[Text] On 5 January Yeltsin signed a decree on the text of the Russian military oath. The decree was published on 8 January. The first step toward the creation of a Russian army had been taken. It is, however, obvious that other steps should follow. For if servicemen who have sworn different oaths serve in the same combat unit, then it must be considered that that unit is not combat capable.

The competition between oaths and the competition between the independent presidents in offering privileges and monetary payments will quickly transform part of the officer corps into mercenaries, first serving and then fighting on the side of whoever offers them the most pay.

Considerations both of common sense and public safety demand that during the transitional period the Armed Forces of the former USSR be preserved in a unified structure of control, supply, and demand. However, the heads of the independent states themselves obviously cannot reach agreement on this. In any event, the position of Ukraine, which wants to set to immediately to create its own army (and navy), is totally uncompromising.

Efforts will probably still be made at least to reach some agreement, but if the negotiations turn out to be unsuccessful there is every justification for thinking that the Russian leadership is prepared to declare itself the full-fledged successor of the USSR in military matters also.

It has been learned from reliable sources in the Russian leadership that the text of a presidential decree is now being considered (it has the working name of "ON THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY FOR THE STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES"). In particular, the following measures are proposed:

"Pending the creation in accordance with the Agreements between the members states of the Commonwealth of Independent States of a Joint Command for Strategic Forces, and also the creation of the Joint Armed Forces and the resolution of questions concerning the exercise by the former Union republics of their right to create their own armed forces, the Russian Federation is assuming the rights and obligations of the former USSR in respect of its Armed Forces, including those located outside the territory of the Russian Federation.

"Pending the formation of the Joint Command for Strategic Forces, the President of the Russian Federation and the bodies empowered by him will exercise control over strategic forces.

"Until the conclusion of a special agreement on the composition and missions of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and also the staged (on a treaty basis) exercise by individual states of the Commonwealth of their right to create their own armed forces, the command of the Armed Forces of the former USSR will be exercised by the president of the Russian Federation and the bodies empowered by him."

Naturally, in order to implement this program a Russian Federation Ministry of Defense will be set up.

Of course, if signed, this decree (or something similar in intent) will outrage the leaders of many of the independent states. However, it may be the last chance for the political leadership of Russia and the other "Commonwealth member states" to resolve the problem of the Armed Forces of the former USSR independently and using purely political methods.

Moscow Troops Comment on Oath

92UM0447C Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS Correspondent Maksim Pastov: "The Color Is to Their Taste but not the Oath"]

[Text] Our correspondent conducted a series of brief interviews in the Moscow Military District.

Miroslav Dudukh, a colonel, long range aviation:

[Dudukh] I think that we need one Oath. Nothing but misfortune will come to the Ukrainians from dividing the army with Russia. I have two sons, they are also officers, and they have traipsed through garrisons throughout the entire country, right now one is in Anadyr and the other is in the Western Group of Forces.

[Pastov] Excuse me, but have you not become too Russified as they now express it in Ukraine?

[Dudukh] No, at home with the family we speak Ukrainian and with my sons when we meet when we are on leave—we also speak Ukrainian, I read books and I listen to radio in my native language, and I am constantly abreast of events. I have many friends in Ukraine and they have the most varied views. But if we are talking about the army, my opinion is unchanged. And my sons agree with me.

Leonid Lukiyyenko, Lieutenant Colonel of the internal troops (MVD) [Ministry of Internal Affairs]:

I am not prepared to respond about which Oath I will swear.

It seems to me that an officer must swear only once in his life. But if a collision has occurred, then in my opinion, we need some sort of legitimate representative organ to release officers from the previous Oath. But prior to this, the divorce process needs to be humanely completed and we not need tug property and children from various sides...

In contrast to the colonel and lieutenant colonel, the two lieutenants requested that we not cite their names.

Senior Lieutenant N., A tank officer.

It seems to me that right now it is useless to look for Ukrainians in the army, just like it is useless to look for Russians, Uzbeks, or Kazakhs... In the army, more than anywhere else, a man has lost his ethnic identity and has become a unit of the "Soviet people." Right now this ethnic identity is only beginning to appear among conscripts and among junior officers... Ukraine is doing it correctly, creating its own army, since it wants to free itself from the proteges and relatives of the Moscow generals and wants to insure itself in the event of a new

putsch of the advocates of the "united and indivisible"—both Leninists and also national-patriots of Russia. The trouble is that Kravchuk and his communist company, who just yesterday were insulting the "nationalist" yellow-light blue flag, today want to be holier than the Roman Pope, have replaced the minus with a plus, but they are acting with communist crudity and callousness.

Lieutenant K., a motorized rifleman:

I like the idea of the Ukrainian Army and the Ukrainian Oath and I will probably soon submit my request for release. But as for the Black Sea Fleet, it has always been Russian and we need to face the truth. Khrushchev "changed history." It is simply that right now in Ukraine it is very difficult to speak the truth aloud and not be spit on.

Officers Appeal to People

92UM0398A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 92 p 1

[Appeal to the Peoples, Parliaments and Heads of Government of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Personnel of the Armed Forces]

[Text] We participants in the All-Union Officers' Assembly express our profound concern, pain and alarm over the breakup of the armed forces which is underway. The hasty and poorly conceived division of the army and navy, which have existed as a single, powerful organism, in our situation of an unstable political situation and economic chaos can have tragic consequences. This will drastically worsen living conditions for millions of people, have a ruinous effect upon the level of security and the defense capability of all the Commonwealth states, and damage cooperation with nations of the world community.

The army has always had a great consolidating basis. The sacred traditions of unity and combat fraternity of our peoples in the defense of the homeland developed over centuries. Regardless of nationality, fightingmen of the army and navy are brothers in spirit and brothers in blood. We do not want the political aspirations, personal interests and ambitions of some national leaders to alienate us and place us on different sides of the barricades. We are linked by a common past, a difficult present and concern for the homeland's future.

We appeal to all peoples of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. It is primarily human beings who will be consumed in the flames of the unintended conflagrations which the hasty dismemberment of the armed forces could produce. We therefore ask you to make your considerable statement to the politicians and speak out for preserving the united armed forces until normative acts assuring the security of each state and the Commonwealth as a whole are put into effect. To do so is our duty and a guarantee of freedom and democracy.

Fightingmen of the army and navy took an oath to their multinational people and are prepared honorably to fulfill it.

We call upon the parliaments and heads of state of the Commonwealth during the transitional period to preserve the integrity of state borders, a single security system, a single strategic military territory and a single system of command and control of the armed forces. We appeal to the authorities in states belonging to the CIS immediately to engage in talks on the future of the armed forces of the former USSR. We recommend that during the talks they refrain from any unilateral actions which could destabilize the situation. We call upon them to exercise prudence. For the sake of their peoples. For the sake of our children and grandchildren. For the sake of prosperity, progress and democracy.

We expect civilized and thoroughly considered decisions reinforced with legislative enactments which would totally rule out confrontation between future republic armies. The agreements signed in Minsk on matters of military policy must be scrupulously observed.

We have frequently paid with and are still paying with our blood for the inaction of some state officials and the political ambitions of others. We therefore have the right to demand passage of the following coordinated laws as rapidly as possible at the inter-state level within the Commonwealth: a law on defense; a law on the procedure for serving and on the status of servicemen; a law on the citizenship of servicemen and their families; a law on housing, personal services, material and financial support for servicemen presently serving and those discharged into the reserve, as well as pensioners of the former USSR Ministry of Defense, the border, internal and railway troops.

We are appealing to you, our combat friends and comrades-in-arms. It is our duty not to permit the army to be broken up, to secure the integrity of the states and the shaping of a free society, and to help the peoples weather this turning point in history.

We call for you to respect the laws of the Commonwealth's independent states, to demonstrate endurance, solidarity, organization and order, and to protect the interests of every serviceman against denigration and social despotism. Do not succumb to acts of provocation, but retain your loyalty to the military oath until all the issues have been settled by legal, legislative means.

We are not attempting to interfere in politics or to determine the system or authority of the independent states. This is a matter for the people. It is our job to protect their interests, sparing neither our blood nor our very lives. The army and navy are still organized, disciplined and combat-ready. The preservation of a united armed force is a guarantee of stability for the reforms being carried out in the CIS.

Groups Oppose Military Collapse

War Veterans Appeal

92UM0377A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jan 92 p 2

["From an appeal by the 'War Veterans For Peace' Movement"]

[Text] It is a fact virtually without historic precedent: For the sake of falsely interpreted sovereignty, the Armed Forces—a product of more than one generation of all peoples of our country—are torn into pieces that are subsequently dragged off into separate national quarters, says, among other things, the War Veterans For Peace movement's appeal to the participants of the All-Army Conference of Representatives of Officer Assemblies. What is happening is an open, shameless capitalization on the calamitous situation in which officers, warrant officers, and their family members find themselves. The leadership of some states is for the second time administering to the troops the oath of allegiance to one and the same people. Those who refuse to take an oath under such circumstances are sent outside the state's borders—for which purpose the state manages to find both fuel and aircraft.

We believe that the Army and the Navy must stay under a single command until normative acts agreed upon by all CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] members are put into effect—acts that will guarantee reliable security for each sovereign state and the commonwealth as a whole, and protection of the human rights and dignity of those servicemen who maintain allegiance to the previously taken oath and duty, protection from humiliation and social arbitrariness.

Internationalist Soldiers' Appeal

92UM0377B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

["From an Appeal by the Armed Forces Internationalist Soldiers"]

[Text] The Committee for Internationalist Soldiers Affairs, the unions of internationalist soldiers in the military institutions of higher education, airborne troops, and the Moscow Military District have appealed to the leadership of independent states with a plea not to allow the Commonwealth's unified defense system to collapse, and to preserve the unified Armed Forces in accord with the Minsk and Alma-Ata agreements. Officers of the Army and the Navy are reminded of their common responsibility for the security of the Commonwealth nations.

Military Transport Officers Appeal

92UM0377C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

["From an Appeal of the Military Transport Aviation Officers Meeting"]

[Text] We are concerned about the future of the military transport aviation (VTA) as a single operational-strategic

unit—the appeal says, among other things. Our formations and units are deployed on the territory of five independent states of the Commonwealth; the material and technical supply is provided by 11 military districts. The fragmentation and change of subordination for the VTA units and formations, bringing them under own jurisdiction by the states on whose territory these units are deployed, and the illusory opportunity to gain a momentary advantage from using them for commercial freight place in doubt not only the units' combat readiness and flight safety, but also the future ability of using the aircraft fleet.

We demand a stop to any unilateral decisions of sovereign states in respect to nationalization of military property, armaments, and military formations, and administering an oath to the personnel requiring allegiance to the peoples of their republics.

We appeal to the soldiers, sergeants, ensigns, officers, and generals who have previously taken an oath of allegiance to their people and their motherland to exercise self-restraint and to preserve the honor and dignity of each serviceman.

Strategic Forces Appeal

92UM0377D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

["From an Appeal by a Space Unit Officers Meeting (Strategic Deterrence Forces)"]

[Text] We call on all servicemen, the appeal says, to refrain from taking an oath until legislative acts are developed and adopted that will define the status of the Armed Forces and the procedures for serving the military service in which there will be a provision to allow for a possibility for officers to serve on a contract basis on the territory of another state without taking a military oath of that republic.

Officer's Opinions Gauged by Poll

92UM0404A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "And These Are the Sentiments of the Officers"]

[Text] The acute problems facing the officer corps as a result of the restructuring of the Armed Forces at the current stage were brought up at the All-Army Officers' Assembly. Through the speeches of many participants, we learned about their attitudes toward the questions under consideration and their proposals on how to emerge from the situation that has developed. But nearly two dozen people spoke at the assembly. Did the other Officers' Assembly representatives support them? The Armed Forces Center for Military-Sociological, Psychological and Legal Research conducted a sociological

survey of the officers who were gathered at the January 17th officers' congresses at the Kremlin Palace. What does it reveal?

First of all, we learned how officers assess the situation in society and how it influences the life and activities of military collectives.

In the opinion of 90% of the officers polled, the increasingly complicated socio-economic situation in regions where troops are stationed, the disruption of material support of division-sized and smaller units, and the lack of socio-legal guarantees for servicemen negatively influence the state of combat readiness and military discipline. Ninety five percent noted a deterioration of the moral-psychological climate in military collectives. According to the assessment of 81% of those questioned, the attitudes of officers toward fulfilling their military duty is worsening, uncertainty about tomorrow is appearing among them, and pessimism is growing. Junior officers primarily point out the deterioration of the material- everyday life situation.

Warnings about the possibility of unleashing a civil war, about uncontrolled nuclear weapons and the threat of their use, and about the loss of many of the Russian Army's traditions on the education of the officer corps were heard in response to questions. More than 80% of those interviewed stated that the possible division of the Armed Forces among the former Union republics only worsens the situation of servicemen and proponents of this opinion are, for the most part, in Belarus (95%) and the Transcaucasus (93%), and least of all in Ukraine and Moldova (71%).

The attitude of Officers' Assemblies representatives towards the creation of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] was explored. Two positions are being traced in assessing the fact of the CIS's creation. Of those polled, 52% approve this event, 35% opposed it, and 13% did not have a definite opinion on this issue. Higher-ranking officers (48%) expressed a more negative position with regard to the formation of the CIS and younger officers expressed a less negative position. The greatest approval toward the fact of the CIS's creation is noted among rear services officers (64%) and engineering-technical personnel (58%). The command staff takes a more restrained position: 53% approve CIS's creation and 35% are opposed. Among officers in organizations working with personnel, a negative attitude predominates with regard to the fact of the formation of CIS: 46% of them opposed the Commonwealth and only 40% support its creation.

The nationality of the officers does not influence their position on this issue: among Russians, 51% are supporters of the CIS and 35% are opposed; among Ukrainians, the percentages are 58% and 32%, respectively; and, among Belorussians, 54% and 38%.

Officers' attitudes toward the formation of the Commonwealth depend primarily on their duty location. It is

the deployment location that is the factor that determines officers' attitudes toward events in political life. So, the greatest support for the fact of the CIS's creation was found among officers serving in Ukraine and Moldova (62%) and also in Belarus (56%). Officers from Lithuania (52%), Russia (51%) and Estonia (50%) occupy the middle position. Officers serving in the groups of forces in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Transcaucasus basically opposed the creation of the Commonwealth.

The service of the Armed Forces in which an officer serves also influences his attitude toward the creation of the CIS. Thus, where the question of the future is subject to practical resolution, officers take a more loyal position with regard to the Commonwealth. In particular, among officers from the RVSN [Strategic Rocket Forces], advocates of the CIS total 57% (30% are opposed), whereas among VDV [Airborne Troops] officers, 41% and 54%, respectively. Less than 50% of Air Force and Naval officers approve the formation of the CIS.

And how do officers feel about the division of the Armed Forces? The overwhelming majority of those polled (95%) think that a transition period is absolutely necessary to resolve issues associated with the division of the Armed Forces among the CIS states (if that political decision is made). In that case, in the opinion of 88% of the officers, the Armed Forces should be subordinate to a Commonwealth coordinating organ during the transition period. At the same time, 17% of the officers interviewed, who are serving in Ukraine and Moldova, advocate the leadership of the Armed Forces by the governments of these independent states during the transition period. Eleven percent of the officers serving on the territory of Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia advocated leadership of the Armed Forces by the government of the Russian Federation.

Officers revealed their attitude toward taking a new military oath. Of those polled, 86% think that there should be a single oath for the CIS Armed Forces. A similar view point is held by 77% of the Russian, 73% of the Ukrainian and 76% of the Belorussian officers. Hence, an officer's nationality does not affect his position on this issue. However, 11% of the officers and generals interviewed expressed their readiness to personally take the new military oath.

We should note that the opinions of officers serving on the territory of Ukraine and Moldova is significantly different than the opinion of officers serving in other CIS states. Thus, 80% of the officers polled who are serving in Ukraine and Moldova think it is necessary to personally take a new military oath. Twenty four percent see it as only necessary with regard to regular servicemen.

Breaking down the personnel polled by categories: six percent were generals (admirals), 87% senior officers and seven percent junior officers; by composition: 53% were command personnel, 20% engineering-technical personnel, two percent rear services and 16% were officers

in organizations working with personnel; by nationality: 75% were Russians, 15% Ukrainians, six percent Belorussians and four percent were other nationalities.

Reform "Impossible" Without Doctrine

92UM0468A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel (Retired) I. Yerokhin, doctor of military sciences, professor; Colonel (Retired) B. Zyazev, doctor of military sciences, professor; and Colonel (Retired) V. Sayenko, doctor of military sciences, professor, under rubric "Viewpoint": "Reasonable Military Reform Is Impossible Without Military Doctrine"]

[Text] Speaking about military reform today is no simple matter, as there are many vague areas concerning the future of the Armed Forces, but there are things on which we must determine our position without delay. In our view, what is most important is that we only can begin reforming based on official doctrinal provisions after having determined our position on how we are to defend the homeland and having clarified the nature of a future war and the role therein of branches and combat arms insofar as is comprehensible.

Four problems as a minimum have clearly appeared. First of all, do we know whom we plan to defend and with whose safety will we be concerned: the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia, or Moscow inside Sadovoye Ring?

Further, is it clear to us against whom we plan to defend ourselves? According to some politicians, not only do we have no real enemies, but not even "potential enemies and adversaries in the civilized world." Can such conclusions be given credence?

The third problem is with whom to defend—unified armed forces (and specifically what kind) or republic armed forces? How will they coordinate with each other and under what military doctrines and systems will they be manned and trained? How will they be reformed—centrally or separately?

And finally, in what manner will we defend ourselves? The opinion exists that "it is necessary to create collective security systems at the lowest level of sufficiency: a national, a Soviet-European, and a Soviet-European-American security system." But how will these three systems be correlated among themselves, toward whose security and toward defense against whom are they directed, how will they be implemented, and what is the role and place of the present Armed Forces in them?

More radical ideas also are being advanced at the present time. While the presence of "potential enemies and adversaries" is recognized, it is proposed not to prepare to defend against them, since that is very difficult and costly, but to turn them into our allies by wise politics. But a very instructive historical excursion is possible here as well.

Beginning military reform without an appropriate doctrine and without clarifying the above problems means unfolding a second perestroika, this time purely military. It means bringing defensive capability to that state to which we brought the economy and statehood and then beginning to correct mistakes, only it will be unbelievably difficult to do this. While people now treat us with a certain caution, but on the whole condescendingly, unceremoniousness is possible later. Problems troubling the West connected above all with our nuclear potential will be resolved not only in the form of a diplomatic expression of "concern," but also by directly "putting us in order."

Without losing sight of that prospect and at the very same time taking into account our catastrophic domestic state, it would appear that military reform must be carried out in at least two stages. In the first merely relax the burden of military expenditures sensibly, keeping in mind the overall prospect for solving the problem of military security in the future. It is possible to take up full-scale military reform in the second stage after this future becomes clear. Military scientists have specific recommendations on this score. We also wish to mention some of our own considerations.

Unfortunately, politicians have tenacious ideas about the "infantry" nature of modern wars: they presume an invasion by ground forces after their strategic deployment, and military operations conducted only in border and coastal areas to the depth of fronts. But both theoretical studies and the experience of local wars speak of an air invasion to the full depth of the territory that preempts the strategic deployment of ground forces. The goal is to disrupt this enemy deployment and his organized entry into the war. Aircraft and missile weapons have become the principal ones. Ground forces either are committed after guaranteed assurance of their success (recall the one-and-one-half month air offensive against Iraq) or are not used at all (Vietnam, Libya). This also shifts the beginning of a repulse of aggression from field troops covering state borders to forces earmarked for combating offensive air weapons—Air Defense Forces, air defense weapons of the Ground Forces and Navy, and Air Force fighter aviation.

Greater covertness of preparation and greater surprise of an air attack do not permit offensive forces of the side which has come under attack to disrupt or even significantly lessen results of the enemy's first strikes. The defensive nature of our military doctrine (which has not been officially confirmed) precludes preemptive operations.

This means we intend to fight only the air adversary's weapons in flight without destroying them in base locations or destroying the structure itself. But this mission, too, can be performed only with advance deployment of necessary defensive forces. It is necessary to create a combat-ready, organizationally formalized national air (aerospace) defense system; only under its cover is it possible to promptly make all armed forces and the state

as a whole ready to wage war. Therefore talk about possibly eliminating the Air Defense Forces as a branch of the Armed Forces is bewildering. By eliminating the Air Defense Forces and thereby destroying the defense system, "reformers" propose to eliminate protection against the principal weapons of war. The alarm should be sounded above all not by those who provide air defense today, but by those whom it protects.

The Persian Gulf war made the warning expressed in the book "In the Force Field of Great Air Powers" by German military analyst Khempke (transliteration) even more pertinent: "Of course, a war will not be won by air defense, but without air defense it certainly will be lost."

The overall structure of our Armed Forces unquestionably must be changed substantially, but it must be done by connecting the branches with functions, not with the medium in which they are employed (land, water, air, space). In our view, a structure seems logical which includes three kinds or groups of personnel and equipment (do not confuse them with branches of armed forces) and three levels (degrees) of their deployment.

1. Combat-ready offensive forces for deterrence and retaliation fully deployed in peacetime, with a portion of them in constant readiness: the present Strategic Missile Forces, a missile-armed Navy, and Long-Range Aviation.
2. The combat-ready part of defensive forces for repelling the air commencement of aggression: personnel and equipment of the Air Defense Forces, air defense of the Ground Forces and fleets, and Air Force fighter aviation. They ensure that the national aerospace security system is kept in a combat-ready state. Some forces perform alert duty, supporting air traffic according to established rules and stopping aggressive acts. They are to begin repelling an air attack.
3. General purposes forces of all branches of the Armed Forces except the Strategic Missile Forces for conducting full-scale military operations in all spheres for final repulse of aggression. Prior to a surprise attack or the appearance of its direct threat, they will be kept under peacetime tables of organization in numbers and in degrees of reduced strength sufficient for ensuring mobilization and strategic deployment of all Armed Forces.

An organizational structure of Armed Forces must be worked out and the number and makeup of their branches must be determined. Personnel and equipment can change in conformity with the situation, but definitely with preservation of structures ensuring that they are brought up to military requirements fully and promptly. Herein lies the possibility of a safe reduction of the burden of military expenditures.

Today it is being proposed to join the Strategic Missile Forces with a portion of the present Air Defense Forces—a missile-space defense made up of missile attack warning and outer space monitoring systems as well as an ABM defense system. "A new branch of the

Armed Forces" is formed, with the other two parts of the triad of strategic nuclear forces—a missile-armed Navy and Long-Range Aviation—operationally subordinate to it.

It is not known for now what other branches of Armed Forces there will be, what they will include and in particular where the largest part of the Air Defense Forces will be placed. It is incomprehensible why such a mishmash should be created from individual branches of offensive and defensive forces belonging to four different departments. They are stationed in separate groupings scattered throughout the country with no unified concept (for which there never has been a need nor is there now a need), they have specific purposes, they have a completely different character of missions and different structures, forms and methods of employment, and they operate in different stages and in different sequences. This is an unnatural hybrid.

American traditions, for example, order administrators never to get ahead of the scientists. Reliance on the latter is mandatory and prestigious there. Every military concept and program is subjected to numerous or even many years of broad discussions and evaluations not just in the government, the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex, and not just in their own country. As a result, without in the least disregarding reasonable classification, the United States gains the opportunity of taking into account the most varied opinions of military circles and the public. It is not embarrassed when concepts and programs for their realization are made public. This reduces the likelihood of "awkward" outcomes and secret projects and decisions and at the same time of discrediting self-confident administrators with not so vigorous minds. It is also time for us to sum up the history of rash and ill-conceived decisions (there have been such) and their sad consequences and change the style of military transformations, bringing them closer to science and common sense.

Officers in Ukraine Seek Posts Elsewhere

92UM0484B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Officers Maintaining Loyalty to Their First Oath Forced to Travel Against Their Will"]

[Text] Lvov—Many officers and warrant officers from among those who did not take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine are now making a journey from garrison to garrison of the former Union, trying to find a place for performing further service.

In general it would seem that they are not being driven out. But as Vera Lyaskovskaya, deputy chairman of the Lvov Oblast Executive Committee, expressed it in the newspaper VYSOKIY ZAMOK: "Our Army does not need people who fiercely hate everything Ukrainian." In other words, if a general, officer, or warrant officer says

something not quite the right way, he may fall into the ranks of those for whom there is no place in the Ukrainian Army.

Colonel V. Martirosyan, chairman of the Committee on Social Protection for Servicemen, reiterates Mrs. Lyaskovskaya's thought almost in unison. He believes that those regimental and division commanders who have not taken the Ukrainian oath will be removed from their positions in the very near future. And so officers and warrant officers are rushing about from one CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] garrison to another.

Finding themselves today in this position are Lieutenant Colonel V. Plashchevoy, a regimental commander, Majors Yu. Dubchenko, O. Trifonov, L. Lebedev, and other officers.

Speculation on Creation of 'Officers' Party'

92UM0496A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 29 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Kravtsov: "Presidents, Compete! Will the CIS Have its own Commissar?"]

[Text] The Coordinating Council formed at the All-Army Officers' Assembly begins work tomorrow and will probably elect its chairman (or co-chairmen) soon. Thus, a new political party, a military one, will finally stand on its own feet. No one doubts the fact that the military has become an independent force now, after the notorious officer's assembly. But, can we talk about a party?

The mandatory attribute of a party is the presence of a class, social stratum or social group that is united by definite ideas and goals. The entire world has seen and heard what kind of social group the generals and colonels are who assembled at the KDS [not found] on January 17 and what ideas unite them. The main goal is to be a great-power and the ideology is imperial. To call the presidents to account for the collapse, to unite at all costs, to return everyone to the USSR, etc.

As for the party's signs—its organization, hierarchical structure and financial situation, it is superfluous to comment here. There were 5,000 generals and officers at the congress and 120-130 are members of the Coordinating Council—the Central Committee and the chairman elected by them—the general secretary. This general secretary will apparently sit among the heads of the CIS states, fulfilling the role of commissar. Was it really for no purpose that they repeatedly demanded to transform the Coordinating Council into the twelfth subject of CIS at the assembly. Why? To, just like an ordinary political party, try to dictate its will on the political leaders.

And we should not deceive ourselves that the Coordinating Council and its chairman will allegedly be some sort of professional union to protect servicemen's social rights and vital interests. It was not by accident that they did not talk about soldiers, sergeants or warrant officers

at the VOS [All-Army Officers' Assembly], nor did they talk about how military reform, through the efforts of the persons present at the marshals' and generals' assembly, has turned out to be a lot of talk that has led us to catastrophe.

And now, let us recall what the odiously well-known Shlyaga (former head of the GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate]) and Surkov (former Secretary of the All-Army Party Committee) boasted about, especially often on the eve of the August putsch. But they boasted that 90 percent of the officer corps are CPSU members (I will add that 100 percent of the generals are CPSU members). And let us recall something very fresh: at VOS, nearly every delegate had in his hand Prokhanov's "Nasha Rossiya" [Our Russia] with Varennikov's interview from "Matrosskaya Tishina" Jail and leaflets—appeals for an assembly of communists. And let us recall that Anpilov, leader of the Moscow communists, and his "ally" Alksnis, used their allotted time to speak with something to spare. And that Mitropolit Konstantin, in addition to every allotted time to speak, uttered inflammatory, remarkably persuasive, but fine great power rhetoric and rubbed every political worker's nose in it.

Thus, a political party was formed. This then was not a paper or midget party, but a powerful, organized party. And armed.

Baltic Assembly Discusses Troop Withdrawals with Russia

92UM0495A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Zubkov: "The Withdrawal of Troops from the Baltic Republics is a Problem Not Only for Russia; An Attempt at a Constructive Dialog"]

[Text] Within the framework of the first plenary session of the Baltic Assembly in Riga, members of the External Affairs Committee and the Presidium of the Baltic Assembly met with the superior command of the Russian Armed Forces and the command of the Northwestern Group of Forces.

The Chairman of the Russian State Defense Committee, Vladimir Lopatin, stated after the meeting that the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic nations is a matter not only for Russia but also for all the involved states, and for resolving the situation, it is essential to create guarantees for the social protection of the servicemen in order to prevent a constantly growing tension among them.

Vladimir Lopatin also pointed out that an elucidation of the status of the troops—were they occupation troops or not—was not the main thing. He as well as the commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, Valeriy Mironov, at the meeting with the Assembly delegates voiced doubt as to the assertion that these troops were occupation ones. Lopatin, in taking advantage of the presence of representatives from the Northern Council,

made the withdrawal of his troops directly dependent upon the amount of humanitarian aid from the Western nations, and this, judging from the response of the adviser/counselor of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the deputy to the Supreme Soviet, Mavriks Volfsons, would cause a negative reaction in the official circles of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

The Commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, Valeriy Mironov, pointed out that the question of troop withdrawal would involve the various interests of many countries and not just Russia and the Baltic, and could be resolved only during international talks by all the involved parties. The parties—both the delegates of the Baltic Assembly as well as the representatives of the troops of the former USSR—also stated that the self-defense forces of the Baltic states in the near future will be unable to ensure the defense of the state frontiers of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

A preliminary agreement was reached that over the next several years, the sea frontier of the Baltic states will be guarded jointly by the troops of the former USSR, and for this, agreement is still to be reached with the official bodies of Russia.

Independent observers assessed the meeting as an attempt to commence a constructive dialog between the state structures of the Baltic states and the troops of the former USSR.

One of the main final documents from the session was an appeal to the President and Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and in which the Baltic Assembly expressed its hope that the troop withdrawal talks, the first round of which is to be held on 28-30 January separately in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn, "will be conducted in a spirit of goodwill."

Participant Blasts Moscow Officer Assembly

92UM0511C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 22 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Major V. G. Sadovyy in the "Call to the Editors" column: "No Response"]

[Text] The editors of NARODNAYA ARMIYA received a telephone call from Major Vladimir Grigoryevich Sadovyy, who had attended the All-Army Officers' Assembly in Moscow. What he said follows.

The impressions I brought back with me from my trip to Moscow were mostly negative. Poor planning and lack of coordination became evident immediately after the plane landed at Chkalovskiy Airport. Alas! there was no one there to welcome us. There was not even any motor transport to take us to Moscow. We were given quarters at Naro-Fominsk, and had to wait two hours for buses to arrive.

However, the lack of organization was nothing compared to what was in store for us. On the evening before the

assembly, we attended a meeting held by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, where G. Kh. Popov spoke in addition to the Commander-in-Chief. Many promises were made, but many officers doubted that they will be fulfilled.

Now for the conference proper. It created the impression that the planners had a definite outcome in mind. A case in point is the way the delegations were seated. The best seats were occupied by representatives of the Moscow Military District, pilots, and Navy men. We were assigned seats in the gallery. There was no intention to hear what we would have to say.

On the other hand, conversations I had with other officers—not only with those of Ukrainian origin—from other districts led me to form highly favorable impressions. Most of those with whom I spoke accept the construction of the Ukraine Armed Forces as a matter of course; they are in favor of the laws passed relative to legal and social protection for servicemen in the republic. Many questions were asked about how to transfer into the Ukraine Army.

It seems to me that Moscow has written the three military districts located in the Ukraine off the books, something about which it was not seen fit to provide factual information from the Ukraine. Much of the fuss has to do with the Black Sea Fleet.

I generally do not know what purpose will be served by the decisions made at the assembly. And attempts to write the assembly's attainments into law seem strange, to say the least.

Officer Assembly Results-Aftermath Viewed

92UM0460D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Following the All-Army Assembly": "Both General Questions and the Fate of Each"]

[Text] "I support the proposal to keep the armed forces united. I shall gladly accept the family of a serviceman from a 'hot spot.'—War and labor veteran Vera Mikhaylovna Grishchenko, Saligorsk. This unusual telegram arrived at the All-Army Officers' Assembly. And there were several hundred appeals, letters and telegrams, some of them addressed to various directorates of the Main Commissariat of the Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Most of them were from officers' groups or individual servicemen. They represented an accumulation of views on the reformation of the armed forces and on how to get out of the difficult situation in which the army and navy find themselves, and contained requests and announcements. What becomes of them?

The commander in chief of the armed forces has established a group of representatives of directorates and

services to consider questions posed by participants in the officers' assembly and provide answers. Mar Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov made the decision that each of them would be answered in writing. But the central agencies received correspondence not only from those who were active in the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses on 17 January.

"Every appeal is being carefully reviewed," I was told by Col Nikolay Ivanov, deputy chief of the committee's Directorate for Personnel. Incidentally, the committee has assumed the bulk of this work. For one thing, because the commander in chief charged this agency with arranging and conducting the All-Army Assembly. And also because, it was explained to me there, the main job of the committee was and is precisely that of looking after the concerns of and working with the people. A study is presently being made of all the mail, decisions are being made on which directorates should receive the appeals for review, and the letters are being dealt with. The General Staff is actively involved in this.

Today, 10 days after the military community's forum, one can say that the officers' assemblies held in the units and at military educational institutions, and the All-Army Assembly itself brought out many questions to which the officer corps expects answers. The main cause of distress, concern and alarm over the breakup of the armed forces was expressed in an Appeal to the Peoples, Parliaments and Heads of Government of the CIS and Personnel of the Armed Forces. The officers hope that the words of the military will be heard and reflected in decisions adopted by the politicians who will meet in Minsk in February.

The Main Commissariat of the Armed Forces has already written up draft laws: On Defense; On the Procedure for Performing Military Service and on the Status of Servicemen. A number of draft agreements have been prepared. They include an agreement among members of the CIS on the legal basis for the functioning of the armed forces, an agreement on the system for training military cadres for the armed forces of the CIS, an agreement on the makeup of a single defense budget for maintaining strategic and general-purpose forces and the procedure for financing them, and others. On 14 February all of these documents will be submitted to the heads of the Commonwealth states for consideration.

Decisions were made on the main proposals urgently submitted by the officer groups of units stationed in the Baltic area and Georgia, whose status is completely undefined. B. Yeltsin addressed the All-Army Assembly and announced that Russia was assuming jurisdiction over the troops stationed in the Baltic area and Georgia, as well as those outside the territory of the former Union, and simultaneously proposed that talks be initiated on their fate.

Following the assembly a socially oriented military budget was approved in Russia for the first time in the entire history of our army. A full 60% of the budget will

go for maintaining the people in the shoulder boards. A decision was adopted to free prices and to raise their pay by 90%. The indexing of salaries for servicemen is being introduced in 1992. An adjustment is to be made at least once a quarter to accommodate price increases. These measures and amounts will hardly secure prestige for the military service, of course, as many officers are advocating, but they will at least help a little bit to relieve the material difficulties being experienced by the military.

It is also clear today how the housing problem will be resolved. Good decisions have been adopted at the level of Russia's government. During the first half of this year the Russian Federation has committed itself to liquidate its housing debt to all the families of officers: 120,000 apartments. Proceeds from the sale of excess military equipment and weapons will also be invested in housing construction for the families of officers. Alternatives are also being worked out. The measures are indeed good ones, but will they be implemented? I feel that this is a broad field of action not only for Main Commissariat of the Armed Forces but also, and primarily, for the Coordinating Committee of the All-Army Officers' Assembly.

In short, the decisions adopted will relieve numerous problems. Clearly far from all of them, however. A lot of problems have built up in the army.

Lt Col Oleg Luzhinykh of the Committee for Personnel showed us a telegram from a military doctor in the Leningrad Military District: "I have been a doctor for the military construction workers going on five years," the officer stated, "but I cannot get beyond even the first level of specialization. Numerous appeals to the medical service of the Leningrad Military District have not produced results." The Main Medical Directorate reports that officer Astakhov's request will be satisfied.

The Main Billeting Directorate will provide an exhaustive reply to Major N. Buturlakin of the Transbaykal Military District. The Committee for Personnel has asked that his letter be published, however—for the heads of government of the Commonwealth. Major Buturlakin brings up a problem which would have been simple in the past but which is extremely difficult today. "An officer serves in the Transbaykal Military District but has an apartment in Zakarpatskaya Oblast, which he rents out. In two years he will be discharged into the reserve. This officer, a Russian, wants to settle permanently in Zakarpatskaya Oblast. What is his course of action in the present situation? Will he retain the right to the reserved housing for his remaining two years? Or does he need to transfer to the army of the Ukraine or perhaps retire immediately to avoid losing the apartment after 26 years in the armed forces? How will the matter of a pension be resolved for an officer who has served in the Soviet Army but is returning to the Ukraine"? Clearly there are others besides Major Buturlakin in this situation.

Questions from Colonel A. Kurbanov, Chita Oblast commissar, have been sent to authorities at various

levels, and none of them has been specific. The officer wants to know the procedure by which military commissariats are transferred to Russia's jurisdiction, the procedure for training mobilization reserves, where and how the youth will be trained for the service. He also wants some answers to questions in the social area. The TDY allowance is 20 rubles per day, the officer writes, but it costs 100-150 rubles to stay in a hotel. Will this matter be worked out? Military personnel frequently change stations. The cost of moving has increased many times over. What do the central agencies think about this matter?

These questions are not just for the Central Finance Directorate and the Central Directorate of Military Communications, but also for members of the Coordinating Committee of the All-Army Officers' Assembly, which will meet for its first session, according to the preliminary schedule, on 30 January. This meeting is charged with defending the rights of the servicemen.

Meeting of Officers' Assemblies Coordinating Council

92UM0521A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Feb 92 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "The Officers' Assemblies Coordinating Council Is Functioning"]

[Text] The Coordinating Council, that was elected by the All-Army Officers' Assemblies on January 17, worked at the TsDSA [Central House of the Soviet Army] imeni M. Frunze in Moscow on January 30 and 31. Fierce debates flared and sharp discussion occurred from the first minutes.

A group of specialists (Coordinating Council members), under the leadership of Professional Lawyer, Humanitarian Academy department head, Colonel of Justice Vyacheslav Seregin, managed to work out, in my opinion, an effective interim provision on the Officers' Assemblies Coordinating Council of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces, Border, Internal and Railroad Troops, and other military formations and to attain the Council's support for its approval, although, as they say, there were more than enough proposals.

The Council, whose interim status will be announced by an order of the commander-in-chief, is an Officers' Assemblies executive organ. It is guided in its work by legislation that is in force, by decisions of the All-Army Officers' Assemblies, and by elaborated provisions and the council structures its work in accordance with the orders and directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Council does not interfere in the operational activities of military command and control organs and does not participate in the work of political parties and movements. It is elected for a two-year term at the CIS Armed Forces All-Army Assembly.

The Council is tasked to implement the decisions of All-Army Assemblies, participate in the development and implementation of military reform, unification of efforts to realize and protect civil, socio-economic, cultural and individual rights and freedoms, protection of the honor and dignity of servicemen and their family members, and support of a high sense of responsibility to the peoples of the Commonwealth countries among the officer corps to fulfill their military duties.

The Council's permanently operating working organ is the Presidium, which is elected for a two-year term. It is headed by a chairman. Presumably, the chairman or co-chairmen will be relieved from fulfilling their official duties and other presidium members will have to spend part of their time working at their units and institutions, and some of them—with their council colleagues, while utilizing the temporary duty assignment principle.

Well, and what does the coordinating council ask of itself, as they say, from the first session? A total of 126 people were elected at the All-Army Assembly and 114 people participated in the work. Representatives of officers' collectives from various positions and from all services of the Armed Forces, military districts, fleets, groups of forces, and border, internal, and railroad troops, and other military formations arrived in Moscow. Lieutenant Vladislav Serebryakov from the Western Group of Forces is the youngest council member—he is a little over 20 years old. He is a social teacher-psychologist by profession. He serves as assistant company commander for work with personnel. He has been an officer for a total of five months. He was elected to the council on an alternative basis. The main idea which brought Lieutenant Serebryakov to Moscow is active socio-legal protection of servicemen.

And Deputy Chief of the General Staff Central Command Post Major-General Yevgeniy Razinkov has so many years of officer service behind him that his career covers his colleague Lieutenant Vladislav Serebryakov's entire life. He has been in the army since 1959. He has served in the western half of the former USSR, on Kamchatka, and in the desert near Sary-Shagan. The General jokes that he has daughters from different poles: one was born in Kaliningrad and the other on Kamchatka. Yevgeniy Razinkov has experienced the missile complexes at Strategic Rocket Forces units, served in space units, and on the General Staff. He was duty general at the General Staff TsKP [Central Command Post] for nearly three years—three years in the "hottest" seat in the Armed Forces. But then again, he has a no less demanding position right now.

Military Construction Detachment Commander Major Ivan Safonik has spent practically his entire career at Plesetsk Cosmodrome where he arrived in 1976 as a junior sergeant. He has handled many space objects. And here is Captain 1st Rank Ivan Aleksandrov. Today he is a Black Sea Fleet directorate chief. Prior to this, he served on the most modern ships and he knows all the pain of Black Sea seamen who have found themselves in

the center of a political struggle today. Lieutenant Colonel Grigoriy Pereverziy represents air defense missileers at the council who serve on Novaya Zemlya and the PVO [Air Defense] soldiers of our North.

The Coordinating Council considered it necessary to appeal to the peoples, parliaments, the heads of the Commonwealth states, and Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with a statement which specifically notes that stability of the Armed Forces is the guarantor of the successful implementation of political and economic reforms of all of the sovereign states (the statement will be published in future issues). It noted that the council supports the decision on the creation of the united CIS Armed Forces along with the Commonwealth countries' own armies and introduction of a transition period.

The documents prepared by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for the meeting of the Commonwealth heads were painstakingly analyzed at the session, of course, not due to distrust of the developers or experienced experts. The misfortunes that have come crashing down on the officer corps and servicemen's family members are simply too great. As one of the speakers noted, no one, other than we ourselves, is concerned about social protection of people wearing shoulder boards. That is why, having become acquainted with the package of draft documents for the conference of the heads of state on February 14, the coordinating council noted that on the whole their spirit and support meets both the interests of guaranteeing collective security of the Commonwealth states and also the interests of the peoples and soldiers of the Armed Forces, however, the council considered it advisable to supplement the package of documents that has been developed.

Council members proposed the development and adoption of an additional five agreements:

- an interstate agreement on the citizenship of servicemen;
- an agreement on the guaranteed provision of housing to servicemen when they are reassigned in the service from one Commonwealth state to another and when released into the reserve or retired for years served, illness, or for organizational measures;
- an agreement on a servicemen's pension support system, including those people who are performing service and who have remained for permanent residence in the states that are not part of the CIS;
- an agreement on a transition period for reform of the Armed Forces; and,
- an agreement on providing a plot of land (up to one hectare) to servicemen when released into the reserve or retired for years served, illness, or for organizational measures.

This is an interesting detail. A sharp discussion flared up on the need to develop the latter of the documents cited. Voices were being heard, do we need to throw out the whole thing because of one paragraph? The majority considered it—necessary. The Commonwealth countries have entered the market and this is a fierce thing.

Wholesale privatization is already occurring in many regions. What will the serviceman obtain as a result of it? Clearly—nothing, and therefore it would be just if, just like in many NATO countries, officers received land free of charge upon release.

The Commander-in-Chief's directorate proposed supplementing and amending previously developed draft laws and agreements. Here are some of them. Grant servicemen released into the reserve or retired and their family members a priority right to acquire military equipment being sold using the prescribed procedure for organizational measures. Determine the amount of a pension for a servicemen from the calculation of 20 years service—50 percent and, for each subsequent month from the calculation of three percent annually, but not more than a total of 75 percent, during the transition period as a result of the reorganization of the Armed Forces. Three years prior to termination of service, grant officers the right to select the location of their future residence and provide them with housing for a year upon release or pay them the cost of housing based on market prices for this region. Using a one-time use only document, prescribe the following benefits for officers who have been released into the reserve or retired in 1992: for those who have served up to 10 years—payment of the entire salary for the last position held for a year and acquisition of a civilian specialty free of charge and, for those who have 10 or more years of service—award a pension in the amount of 20 percent of the monetary salary and an additional three percent for each additional year of service. Increase the monetary departure allowance when released from the Armed Forces to 12 monthly salaries. Prescribe the sum of insurance in the event of death of a servicemen in the amount of 120 monthly salaries and also compensation to servicemen for damage due to injury caused during the performance of military service.

These and other proposals are undergoing an expert assessment right now and, as the council members hope, will enter into the drafts of the appropriate documents. Of course, the discussed was conducted not only around the socio-legal situation of servicemen. So, well thought-out, in my view, proposals have been stated on the issues of training military cadres and the status of the Armed Forces.

The Council supported the appeal of Committee for Soldiers-Internationalists Affairs Chairman Major-General Ruslan Aushev to strive so that all Commonwealth countries assume the responsibility for concern about those people who participated in large and small wars.

Well, and what is the course of the coordinating council's future actions? It was decided to petition the CIS Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief to include representatives of army society in his delegation for work at Minsk on February 14. And thus to disseminate to the heads of states their pain, concern, and proposals to emerge from the crisis situation in which the army and navy have

found themselves. But the council presidium members will obviously also represent the interests of servicemen at various forums in the coming days and will not be restricted to just this. A meeting is planned with the heads of the CIS states, with the leadership of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and with authorities of other states and is scheduled in the first ten days of February in Moscow.

By the way, the coordinating council requested that Russian Parliament Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov help implement a series of measures. The main ones are: to approve the transfer of Armed Forces military formations of the former USSR that are located beyond the borders of the CIS to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation through a parliament resolution; and, to extend all normative legal acts on social protection of servicemen and their family members that were active in the former USSR at the moment of the CIS's formation to the territory of Russia.

In conclusion, I will tell the readers that the coordinating council presidium and chairman have been elected (a total of 15 people).

The Council Chairman is Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Gennadyevich Mochaykin, assistant to the commander for work with personnel of a division of strategic nuclear missile submarines.

Co-chairman from the Strategic Missile Troops—Major Andrey Yuryevich Royantsev, deputy subunit commander.

Co-chairman from the Ground Troops—Colonel Aleksandr Viktorovich Gorodnichev, assistant to the military district commander for work with personnel.

Co-chairman from the PVO Troops—Colonel Viktor Georgiyevich Solodkiy, military school department head.

Co-chairman from the Air Forces—Colonel Petr Savich Sadovoy, military school department deputy chief.

Co-chairman from the Navy—Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Petrov, head of the military unit department (Navy central staff).

The Presidium members are:

From the Ground Troops—Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Leontyuk, independent helicopter regiment deputy commander.

From the Ground Troops—Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Petrovich Trofimov, independent helicopter regiment commander.

From the Air Force—Colonel Nikolay Nikolayevich Butenko, engineering—aviation service division deputy commander.

From the CIS Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief's central staff—Major-General Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Razinkov, General Staff TsKP deputy chief.

From military educational institutions—Colonel Nikolay Filippovich Strubchevskiy, Air Force Engineering Academy imeni Professor N.Ye. Zhukovskiy curriculum chief.

From military construction units—Major Ivan Vasilyevich Safonik, military construction detachment commander.

From the Border Troops—Colonel Viktor Kuzmich Kudryavtsev, CIS Committee for Protection of the Borders socio-legal work center deputy chief.

From the Internal Troops—Colonel Stanislav Fedorovich Kavun, deputy chief of the Volga Internal Troops Personnel Directorate.

From the Railroad Troops—Colonel Vitaliy Mikhaylovich Azarov, assistant chief of railroad troops for work with personnel.

In a future KRASNAYA ZVEZDA issue, we will report the address and office telephones through which you can appeal to the coordinating council presidium.

I want to wish the coordinating council and its presidium successful work in such a difficult time for our Homeland and Armed Forces, and also endurance and resoluteness.

Officers' Committee Forwards Recommendations to Shaposhnikov

92UM0497A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 8

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Nikolay Burbyga: "Officers Have Prepared Recommendations for Marshal Shaposhnikov"]

[Text] The Coordinating Council, elected by the All-Army Officers' Assembly, worked at the TsDSA [Central Club of the Soviet Army] imeni M. Frunze on January 30 and 31 in Moscow.

The All-Army Officers' Assembly, which took place in the Kremlin on January 17, adopted a resolution which stated that haste and rashness in dividing the Armed Forces might result in tragic consequences. The assembly requested that the heads of the Commonwealth states begin negotiations on the fate of the army and navy of the former USSR. At that time, the Coordinating Council was also elected which was tasked to disseminate the problems of the officer corps to the peoples of the Commonwealth, to the heads of states and governments, to ensure the realization of the decisions that have been adopted, and to combine their efforts to protect the socio-economic rights and freedoms of servicemen.

There were 126 persons elected to the Coordinating Council and 114 participated in the meeting. These are the main issues that were submitted for discussion: the draft of the packet of documents at the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] heads of state conference which will occur in Minsk on February 14.

The Coordinating Council is an independent organization. Armed Forces First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Pavel Gravich thinks it can play a positive role only in the event that its members refuse to criticize the heads of states, as it was at the All-Army Assembly, and shift to constructive work.

We need to say that this time the officers were proceeding based on common sense. Thirteen documents were discussed during the Coordinating Council, the primary of which was a draft agreement of the CIS states on socio-legal protection of servicemen.

Colonel of Justice V. Seregin, head of the Humanitarian Academy's Law Department, said: "We deviated from what went on at that time at the Kremlin, at the All-Officers' Assembly. We considered reality in our decisions. The main thing for us is to strive so that the normative-legal acts on socio-legal protection of servicemen, that were previously adopted in the USSR and that were in force when the CIS was formed, have not been repealed as, say, occurred in the Baltic Region. Our goal is to strive so that rights in the sphere of social protection of servicemen are not only not restricted, but on the contrary, expanded. And we have a reference point in this question, the standards of international law."

The Coordinating Council decision was sent to Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, who will represent the army's interests at the meeting of the CIS Heads of State in Minsk.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Report on Tallinn Nuclear Submarine Training Base

LD0112234491 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 1130 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Text] The criticized nuclear reactors in the Soviet naval base of Paldiski outside Tallinn, which have been used to educate and train the crews of the Soviet nuclear submarines, are now shut. This is reported by our correspondent, who was allowed to make a unique visit to the strictly closed base.

[Correspondent Remdahl] In a big lead-grey building on the extensive base area, there is a full-scale model of one of the big Soviet nuclear submarines. This is the only construction of its kind in the whole of the Soviet Navy and here submarine crews are trained to manage the operation of a nuclear power reactor which they will then take care of at sea. After being equipped with protective clothing and passed through a radiation detector, we are

taken inside the establishment; we climb through some of the watertight bulkheads in the submarine's hull and arrive in the reactor room.

The Rear-Admiral (Boris Ivanovich Borisov) points to the reactor which can be seen through a porthole-style window in the upper building. There are two reactors of this kind, the commander says, but neither of them is now in operation. The reactor here was shut down two years ago and it will not be put into use again. But the strong radiation in the reactor [word indistinct] makes the construction dangerous for a 100 years.

The whole construction of the submarine, with generator and the driving machinery, is copied in detail, and one floor up from the engine room is the center for maneuvering. There is a control panel for the student here, and one next to it for the instructor. The training is done, for example, by simulating accidents and shipwrecks to train the crews to also manage such situations.

The exercises were more realistic and effective when they could be carried out in reality, with the reactor in full operation, than now when everything happens with the help of simulators, one of the officers says in the maneuver room.

One third of all crews on the nuclear-powered Soviet submarines undergo regular training here in Paldiski. The base is strictly closed from the surrounding world. You are the first visitors, one of the accompanying officers says. Only one of the ministers of the Estonian government has been allowed to put his foot in here.

Paldiski is a town of 10,000 inhabitants, most of them Russians. Relatives of those Estonians who live and work here are not allowed to visit Paldiski without written permission from a Soviet commandant. There is much anxiety among the Estonian population about the things that happen here, especially in the view of many accidents with Soviet nuclear submarines.

But admiral (Borisov) (?dismisses) the question of serious near-accidents. Paldiski is a naval training center, he says. We put a great deal of importance on security and have a satisfactory control of the structures. Whether Admiral (Borisov) and his colleagues present the truth about the security on the base is impossible to say. But the Admiral says that he is prepared to accept international inspection of the now closed nuclear power reactors. And he also says that he is positive toward the fact that the Soviet Navy leaves Paldiski. Boerje Remdahl, Tallinn.

Tartu Declared Nuclear-Free

92UN0703A Tallinn MAALEHT in Estonian.
19 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by Agnes Jürgens: "Commander of TU Long-Range Bomber Asserts: 'There Is no Arsenal of Nuclear Rockets in Tartu'"]

[Text]

This makes for a nice Christmas message MAALEHT readers, too, have had their anxieties aroused by all the talk about Tartu's nuclear forces. Should they believe Jüri Liim, who talks about a nuclear arsenal stored right on Tartu's military airfield, or the fliers based there, who assert the opposite?

Dropping in at our editorial office recently was KALJU SEENEMAA, who offered to shed additional light on the story. He has served in the air force unit located in Tartu for nine years. He is a flier first class and an air force major, and has flown as commander of the TU-type long-range bombers.

"It would be more correct to say as commander of airships," Mr. Seenemaa explained, "since these giants tank up on 40,000 liters of fuel at a time, and then keep flying for seven hours straight."

So much for that. Now, let's turn to Jüri Liim's story that appeared in RAHVA HAAL on November 22.

"I am not against Liim's article," Kalju Seenemaa says. It was as timely as it was necessary. I am sure it will hasten the departure of the Soviet air force from Tartu. But some of the points emphasized can, in my opinion, be toppled.

And the retired major refers to where Mr. Liim writes:

"It has been asked if there is a nuclear arsenal in Tartu. I can say that it is right there on the airfield. The preliminary information received has been confirmed by further detailed data. I have kept my silence up until now because the object had to be documented first."

The arsenal is housed in three underground hangars, where nuclear warheads and bombs for the rockets are kept in separate rooms. Both kinds of "merchandise" are encased in lead and kept in separate containers. Naturally, the rooms are also furnished and secured accordingly. The information I have indicates that there is an arsenal of close to 300 units."

On that, Kalju Seenemaa comments:

"During my service years, there was no such storage facility neither in or around Tartu, nor at the military airfield. I am not an expert in these matters but, according to my calculations, the storage of a 300-unit nuclear arsenal will call for an area the size of Tartu. Nuclear warheads require strict adherence to safety precautions (dividing walls four meters thick, appropriate equipment for atmospheric conditioning, etc.), they cannot be stacked up like firewood, much less kept outside under a tarpaulin.

"I visited the Tartu military airfield as recently as last year, but did not notice any signs of construction. Construction of that kind of a storage facility could not be missed.

"No, there is no such facility in Tartu."

But Jüri Liim did take pictures. What do his pictures show?

"T-22 long distance bombers, transport planes and training rockets. Because the air force units based in Tartu have a storage area for training rockets, Mr. Liim's photos do indeed show training rockets, both appended to the planes and outside under the tarp. Think for yourself: Soldiers with low skill levels will not be given missiles with real warheads to practice with.

"Tartu's military fliers were right, when they asserted in the November 26 issue of POSTIMEES that there are no nuclear weapons at the Tartu military airfield."

Thus speaks Kalju Seenemaa, who has served in the Soviet air force for a total of 20 years—hence, has a thorough knowledge of these things. Regarding the TU-type planes, however, he deems it important to add: "It is clear that such giants are designed to destroy large targets in the rear of the supposed enemy's territory, and it is also clear that this will be done with nuclear weapons. After all, there is no point hauling an ordinary load for thousands of kilometers."

It is just this kind of a task that Tartu's military fliers are preparing themselves for. Airships take off and land there every day, with missiles the size of destroyer planes under their wings. Do these really carry just an ordinary load, or no load at all?

"That depends. I am sure that all Tartu military fliers have made flights with nuclear rockets. And so have I, I am sure. Except, one never knows what kind of a payload is tucked under the wings. Because such rockets will be brought in from somewhere else, or appended to the planes somewhere else, not at Tartu."

Mr. Seenemaa did not deem it necessary to disclose such locations. He did emphasize, however, that no nuclear payloads are stored in the woods, or elsewhere within the territory of the state of Estonia on a permanent basis. He has been flying over Estonia, and says that no secrets could be kept from a military flier.

"It is entirely possible for situations to occur, where nuclear weapons happen to get within our territory. This could be due to an emergency landing of an airplane, or some other contingency," the experienced combat flier adds.

A nuclear weapon is known to be very powerful. It makes very little difference just where in Estonia, or in its vicinity, it would be located? If something should happen to it, a large portion of our country would be destroyed anyway ...

"A permanent storage location for nuclear weapons is a necessity," Kalju Seenemaa asserts. "And that especially in times of war. Such storage facilities would then be one of the first things to be bombed. With a nuclear arsenal, of course, there is always a chance for a recurrence of Chernobyl. What would become of Tartu, and Estonia as

a whole, if a storage facility like the one described by Jüri Liim was really located in Tartu?"

But the military air field is located in Tartu. What will become of that?

"It would be cheaper to build the city of Tartu elsewhere, than to relocate the airfield. The Scandinavian countries, for example, do not have an airfield like that. Any plane in the world could make a landing in Tartu. I believe that even the Yankee space shuttle could make a landing on that field. The same, however, cannot be said of the Tallinn airport," Mr. Seenemaa says. He adds that not too many states could maintain long-range bombers like the ones he used to fly.

It's a worth-while airfield we have at Tartu. What are the plans made for it by the USSR air force or the Republic of Estonia, is not known to the public. But is there anything we do know about the plans of our state to defend its air space?

"The air space of our state is totally defenseless, and no defense has been called for in the defense concept of the Republic of Estonia. There's only talk about helicopters," the air force major laments.

"The enemy can invade the Republic of Estonia through the air without any resistance, and carry out its activities without being punished. It would suffice, for example, to drop down a transport plane full of soldiers armed to their teeth, along with some armored technology and ... Savisaar's government would be toppled."

Kalju Seenemaa thinks that Mr. Savisaar deserves a Cross of Freedom for having the courage to sit at the defenseless Toompea. Or is it fool's courage?

Air Force Major Kalju Seenemaa Interviewed
92UN0703B Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,
19 Dec 91 p 4

[Interview with Kalju Seenemaa, Retired Air Force Major and Commander of a TU-16 Missile Carrier, by Tiit Tambi: "Taaratown and Nuclear Weaponry"]

[Text] A debate is going on in the media: Is there nuclear weaponry at the airbase in Tartu or is there not. At any case, military authorities deny even the possibility. We have asked an independent expert to clarify the situation.

Kalju Seenemaa is a military pilot first class, with a rank of major. He has served as commander of a TU-16 aircraft for nine years.

[TAMBI] You flew a TU-16. Now there are reportedly TU-22's and transport planes. Does that mean that your one-time flying machine has become obsolete.

[SEENEMAA] I could not say for sure if there are any of them left in Tartu or not. They are still considered part of the arsenal, even though the TU-22 is a more modern

version. I would think that they are divided equally. There are a lot of restrictions to the use of TU-22's.

[TAMBI] What is a TU-16?

[SEENEMAA] A strategic missile carrier. It can take a cruise missile with a nuclear warhead under each of its wings. Or one big nuclear bomb. Or a cassette with two smaller, tactical nuclear weapons. The crew consists of six people. It has an active range of up to 6,000 or 7,000 kilometers, and even more when refueled in the air. The endurance of the pilot sets the limits. Back then we would sometimes fly to the American continent and back. I later flew for Aeroflot. There, for example, the same crew would not fly beyond Novosibirsk. On the flights to Vladivostok, the crews were changed on the way.

TU-16 is a powerful plane. One bomb (not to mention the missiles) can wipe out a city like Tartu.

The cruise missile flies independently for 500 kilometers. It is like a small plane with its own motor, navigation equipment and locator. It would be either radio-guided or equipped with automatic guidance—fixed on the target. The missile has its own program, and so does the plane.

[TAMBI] Whose hand is on the nuclear button?

[SEENEMAA] On the high seas there is a saying: Captain rules the ship, God rules the heavens. It is not any different on the airships. The commander decides. Usually, it's the mate who releases the weapon, but only after getting clearance from the commander. Under war conditions, it would be unthinkable to maintain communications over thousands of kilometers, one has to make that decision right there.

[TAMBI] Is Tartu's air force base militarily necessary and justified?

[SEENEMAA] Every air force base is necessary. The more airbases we have, the more difficult it will be for the enemy to destroy them. Justified ... certainly not! At one time it probably was, but not now ... Too close to the border. Not to mention the fact that it is located on the territory of a foreign state. Defense is weak. Some of the pilots live in town. The guidance systems are too scattered. The fuel line is vulnerable. The bombs are in the woods, away from the air base. The energy system can be knocked out. The fire-fighting system works on liquid carbon dioxide. That, too, is brought in from somewhere else. Fuel storage is also at a distance.

Hence, the Tartu airbase is not justified militarily. Politically, of course, it is sheer absurdity. It should also be causing concern to the leadership of the air force—because of its defenselessness.

[TAMBI] Do the planes pose a hazard to either the state or the civilians? I am also thinking of possible disasters.

[SEENEMAA] There is no military threat. An attack on Estonia would be suicidal to the airfield. A small and well prepared diversionary group could easily put it out of commission. One could say that the defenses of the airfield are weaker than those of the Republic of Estonia. There have been disasters, but I am not inclined to talk about them. Whoever is interested, can go to the military cemetery and look up the dates. I have been there myself to lay some of my former comrades to rest.

[TAMBI] How do accidents happen?

[SEENEMAA] The biggest danger is at landing. Especially when one of the missiles has been fired in training, and the other one remains. It tilts the plane, the fuel has to be repumped etc. The weather can make things worse, too, like a strong wind from the side ...

[TAMBI] Would an explosion wipe out Tartu?

[SEENEMAA] There will be no nuclear explosion. The bomb does not explode that way. But an ordinary explosion can release radioactive substances into the air.

[TAMBI] Is there nuclear weaponry in Tartu or is there not?

[SEENEMAA] Both General Dudayev, the former commander of the Tartu Division, and the officers' meeting of Tartu have asserted: There is not. I have to accept that. Anyway, the way it was written up in the paper, saying that there is a storage—that really cannot be. Nuclear weapons are not like jelly jars that you can hide in the cellar. A nuclear storage facility would be a gigantic underground structure, with layers of concrete and iron, control systems, entries and exits. Construction of something like that would not go unnoticed.

A temporary presence of a nuclear weapon, however, cannot be ruled out, but even that is doubtful. Should a plane with such a weapon come to Tartu and land there, the nuclear weapon may well be staying there for a couple of days. For temporary use, obviously, there is an underground storage area of a lighter type.

Militarily, it would be dangerous to keep nuclear weapons in a foreign state. On the other hand, these planes are nuclear carriers, designed for that purpose.

[TAMBI] Is it true that there are several planes constantly patrolling the air?

[SEENEMAA] This is not conceivable, it would be too much of a drain on both the technology and the people. And expensive, to boot. This may happen only when the forces are put on a *higher level of alert*. And even then, the crews would be near the plane or in the cabin. I have been in such a situation myself, but not in Tartu.

Technical surveillance equipment gives adequate warning of an enemy attack. The plane can always take off. It's a matter of a few minutes.

[TAMBI] How much fuel does the long-range aircraft use?

[SEENEMAA] The T-16 takes on 40,000 liters. The fuel is stored away from the airfield. Actually, this could also be considered as an emergency supply for the Republic of Estonia. The high quality aviation fuel could always be mixed with something else, and then used for automotive or other purposes.

[TAMBI] Officers demand that the Republic of Estonia build new housing for them elsewhere, in case they should leave. Does that make sense?

[SEENEMAA] Apparently yes. Building is cheaper than buying. Besides, their present housing will be left behind, and that could even be auctioned off.

[TAMBI] Does the Republic of Estonia need planes such as the ones in Tartu?

[SEENEMAA] That depends on our defense concept. These are technically very complex and also very expensive. Of the European states, only England has long-range aircraft. A few have also been sold to the Gulf states, but they have a lot of money.

Moscow Secret Metro Line Rumor Explored

924C0578A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 5, Feb 92 p 8

[Untitled letter to the editor by O. Gracheva, Moscow, date not given]

[Text] An acquaintance of mine has said that she worked at the KGB as a cleaning woman in the middle 1980's and that they were transported to facilities by several special Metro lines.

[Signed] O. Gracheva, Moscow

The history of secret underground passages in Moscow dates back into the depths of centuries. Legends state that the dungeons of Executioner Malyuta Skuratov, which were in Zamoskvorechye, were connected by an underground passage to the Kremlin. They assert that Stalin's dacha in Kuntsev was connected by an underground road with a house on Kirov Street (currently, number 37 Myasnitskaya, in which the CIS Ministry of the Armed Forces waiting room is located).

In our time, the intelligence services have also dug themselves deep into the ground. A map-diagram was published in the 1991 edition of the U.S. Department of Defense annual publication "The Soviet Armed Forces." Three special Metro lines are depicted in it that connect an underground facility under the Kremlin with several suburban command posts and one city command post that are located at a depth of 200- 300 meters beneath the ground.

The first (southwestern) line leads to the government airport Vnukovo, located 27 kilometers from Moscow,

and passes through Ramenki Command Post and alongside the residence of the former president of the former USSR. The second (southern) line ends 60 km from the city at the Armed Forces General Staff and country leadership bunkers. The third (eastern) line connects the center with the main PVO [Air Defense] command complex that is located 25 km from Moscow.

Two months ago, we requested that the Russian Federation Ministry of Security comment on the diagram, however, we have not yet received a reply.

New Sub Sails Under Flag of St. Andrew

92UM0494B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Flag of St. Andrew Raised on New Submarine"]

[Text] A submarine of a new series production has left a northern machine building enterprise under St. Andrew's banner. Built on the shipbuilding berths of a city on the White Sea, the nuclear-powered submarine has entered the Northern Fleet. For the first time, a modern submarine has received the blessing of an orthodox priest. Father Vladimir, arch priest of the Archangel St. Elijah Cathedral, gave each member of the submarine crew a cross and medallion with the image of St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker.

'Catastrophic' Shortage of Personnel in Missile Subunits

92UM0525A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Feb 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain A. Veklich, under the rubric: "From Omsk": "There Are not Enough Soldiers and Officer-Missileers Have Sat Behind the Steering Wheels of Special Vehicles"]

[Text] A catastrophic shortage of personnel is being experienced in missile subunits that are deployed on the territory of the Siberian Military District. The reason is that young replacements have not arrived at the units from a number of regions of the Commonwealth states and this especially concerns sovereign Tajikistan from which not one conscript arrived to serve at missile subunits.

But then again, the missile troops also did not anticipate the required number of young specialists not only from Tajikistan but also from the Volga-Ural region.

In the words of Major-General F. Byakov, the personnel shortage has substantially impacted the performance of alert duty. The number of shifts has been reduced due to the shortage of specialists and the alert duty workload that people perform has doubled and tripled.

One more alarming circumstance has been added to this. A catastrophic shortage of special vehicle drivers has occurred at units. This has placed their planned egress

from the motor pool under the threat of disruption. Officers and warrant officers have had to stop performing their primary duties and have been forced to sit behind the steering wheels in the vehicle cabs. They have also been forced to service vehicles while conducting fleet-housekeeping days.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Inspection of MT-T Tractor

92UM0234A Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 7, Jul 91 (Signed to press 28 Aug 91)
p 11

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel M. Bobrov: "The MT-T Tractor: The Visual Inspection"]

[Text] The MT-T tractor crew gives the MT-T a visual inspection prior to each departure from the motor pool and at stops and halts. In so doing, they verify the vehicle's readiness to move regardless of its mechanical condition while carrying out all operations stipulated in the MT-T operating manual. Prior to departing the motor pool, an inspection is conducted for 18-30 minutes and for 12-18 minutes at stops and halts. In the first case, they perform the visual inspection where the vehicles are parked or in the daily maintenance area and, in the second case, at the subunit deployment area.

At the motor pool, they begin the tractor inspection by verifying the presence and reliability of the entrenching device mounts and the fire-extinguisher, and they check for oil and fuel leaks. In addition, they inspect the emplacement-excavation equipment mount, the condition of undercarriage assemblies, and the integrity of the lights and canvas top. For operations during the winter when there is ice and mud on the support rollers and the track shoes of the tracks, they must be cleaned with a crowbar or shovel from the vehicle's spare parts kit.

After this, they ensure that the power plant and transmission cooling systems are full. So, the water or anti-freeze levels in the engine cooling system should be at marks V or A, respectively, of the dipstick. If they check it with a ruler, then when filled with water, the cooling system should be 45-55 millimeters below the privolnochnyy [not found] surface of the filler neck flange, and antifreeze should be 55-65 millimeters below it.

To check the oil in the engine lubrication system, they remove the lid of the hatch located near the left battery housing in the vehicle body and place the probe into the mouth of the oil tank. If the tank is full, there should be traces of oil at the 100 liter mark and, at its minimum quantity, at the 35 liter mark (in which case the system must be refilled with oil).

They insure the functional reliability of the engine lubrication system. If the engine is in good repair with the crankshaft rotating at 800 rpm^{-1} , the oil pressure should be 2 kg/cm^2 and, in the operating mode ($1,600\text{-}1,900$

rpm^{-1}), $5\text{-}10 \text{ kg/cm}^2$. When the oil temperature is below $+75$ degrees centigrade, you are allowed to increase the oil pressure to as much as 12 kg/cm^2 . If the engine has more than 300 hours running time, the oil pressure might be as low as 4 kg/cm^2 when it is operating.

In the transmission tank, they check the amount of oil using a dipstick through the filler neck which is located under the engine hatch lid. Its level should be 68-78 liters. If the tractor is parked for a long time (more than 24 hours), its level might drop due to oil overflowing into the MT-T's transmission units and assemblies. Therefore, before beginning the inspection, it is necessary to perform a double pumping out of oil from the transmission and reduction gear boxes. It should be remembered that the oil pressure in the transmission lubrication system should be $2\text{-}2.5 \text{ kg/cm}^2$, and during movement in the 6th and 7th gears, 3 kg/cm^2 .

They check the fuel level in the tanks using an electric fuel gauge. To do this, they turn on the "Mass" switch and set the knob on the electronic instrument probe on "Tank F-M-R" in the position corresponding to the group of tanks being checked (forward, middle or rear). They measure the fuel quantity on the instrument dial. Remember that the capacity of the forward group of tanks is 450 liters, the middle—620 liters and, the rear—800 liters.

While inspecting the tractor's electrical equipment, they insure the operability of the electrical wiring and the reliability of the connecting terminal mounts. In addition, they inspect the condition of the batteries using voltmeter readings. If the charging current reading is 50-150 amps, this attests to the fact that the batteries are badly run down. Then they check to see that the lights and turn signals work. To do this, they switch the turn signal lever to the right or to the left and insure that the corresponding lights of the front and rear side lamps blink.

They check to see whether the brake lights work by pressing the brake pedal, and they check the headlights by pressing the foot switch to check the dimmer function. To check the operation of the windshield wipers, they turn on the switch on the instrument panel and use their foot to press the starting valve button that is located on the floor of the cab.

They test to see whether the fire-fighting equipment (PPO) system works by turning on the "Mass" switch. In so doing, the "OPVT-PPO" [Underwater driving equipment/fire-fighting equipment] switch on the P11-5 control panel should be placed in the "PPO" position. Lamps 1B, 2B, and 3B burn dimly when the electrical circuits to the flare cartridges are in good working order.

After this, they check the mobility of the fuel pump control levers and control linkage rods. To do this, they put the manually operated gas supply lever in the "Off" position and press the gas pedal. It should move easily as far as the adjusting bolt and return to the starting position without sticking. Lastly, they test the operability

of the radio and the intercom equipment. They are tuned in accordance with the tractor operating instructions.

At stops and halts, they inspect the extent of heat build-up of the on-board reduction gears, of the hubs of the support and drive wheels, and of the vehicle's support wheels and hydraulic shock absorbers. Their temperature is measured by touch, by touching the rear side of each element with the palm of the hand. If the hand withstands the temperature, the mechanism is operational. Otherwise, they determine the damage and eliminate it. However, you must bear in mind that if the hydraulic shock absorber housing is cold, it is not working.

Then they inspect the track shoes of the tracks. If damage to the rubber hinge is detected, it need not be replaced but they should continue to their designated termination point where required repairs will be performed. On the emplacement- excavation equipment, they inspect the attachment of the blade. In the travel position, its bolts must be reliably tightened and locked and safety slings must be secured to the blade.

In the engine-transmission compartment, they inspect to insure that operating liquids are not leaking from engine and transmission assemblies and systems. Besides this, they insure that the spare parts kit, authorized equipment, filler cap lids and dipsticks are present and are reliably secured. If there is cargo in the body, they also inspect its location and security.

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CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Leningrad MD Helicopter Crash Near Olenogorsk

92UM0480A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 30 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Helicopter Still Missing"]

[Text] A helicopter from a mixed squadron of the Leningrad Military District failed to return from its routine flight of 27 January south of Olenogorsk. The craft was piloted by Colonel Titov, district aviation chief. A group of military aviators was aboard the helicopter.

The craft took off at 1950. It sent its last message at 2000.

A two-day air and ground search carried out by the Unified State Search and Rescue Service was unsuccessful.

Dependents Evacuated from Grozny PVO Site

91UM0566A Moscow *ROSSISKAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 10 Feb 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Evacuation of Servicemen's Families"]

[Text] On 7 and 8 February a unit of air defense troops deployed in the area of Grozny suffered an attack. On this occasion numerous armed bands broke through into the territory of the military garrison, and 1080 weapons, 48 tons of ammunition were stolen and expensive equipment was destroyed. Excesses around the military facilities continue and are taking on an ever more dangerous character.

CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces command is taking measures to evacuate servicemen's families, who have actually become the hostages of criminal groupings. Aircraft from Military-transport Aviation are being sent here for this purpose.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Chernavin Comment on Black Sea Fleet Noted

92UM0469A Moscow *SOVETSKIY PATRIOT*
in Russian No 4, Jan 92 p 4

[Article by Captain First Rank N. Belous: "Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy: 'The Navy Is Displaying Fortitude'"]

[Text] Today, all people of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] are concerned about the fate of the Black Sea Fleet.

It is quite natural that the events that are occurring in the Black Sea Fleet are causing a sharp reaction among the sailors themselves. The issue, in particular, is that the claims of Ukraine to the Black Sea Fleet have introduced seriously destabilizing factors in the formation and very existence of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS.

The fate of the Army and Navy, says Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, has to be decided at the very highest level, and only by political means. Let the parliaments of the independent states of the Commonwealth have their say and decide whether the armed forces will be unified, combined, or pulled apart into national headquarters. But the charged situation around the Army and Navy, and the attempts to bring units and ships under one's own oath, is only leading to chaos, discord, and destabilization.

This is the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander of the fleet, and the admirals. But what do rank-and-file officers and seamen think of the situation that has developed? "We have great doubts," considers officer F. Shklyar from Sevastopol, "about the abilities of the present leaders of Russia and Ukraine to resolve the question of the Black Sea Fleet with historical

wisdom. For example, no one in Ukraine knows: What the fleet is for, what tasks it will resolve, and how it will be supplied? But... give the us fleet! Why? To cut it up for metal and sell it?

But what do the seamen think, when the question comes up about "privatization," resubordination, and division of the fleet, what is their opinion, and to whom do they swear loyal service? Seaman V. Zverkov from Krasnoyarskiy Kray is ready to take an oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth of Independent States, seaman M. Ryzhkov from Sverdlovsk Oblast is ready to take an oath of allegiance to Russia, and senior seaman O. Alekseyenko from Dnepropetrovsk Oblast answered this question briefly: "I will take an oath to Ukraine."

It is difficult to imagine how a ship whose crew consists of sailors with such contradictory opinions will execute an operational task. Does it really make sense to propose to seamen and officers comprising a single crew, a single combat family on a ship that is ready to repel an enemy and withstand gales, that they take a military oath according to the selection: Ukrainian, Russian, or the one that is prepared by the command of the armed forces of a nonexistent state—the CIS. But under what banner? Under the Russian tricolor, under the Ukrainian gold and blue? Under the Andreyevskiy flag?

Understand, Mr. Politicians—this is not a mere trifle. A person posted at a weapon or the control panel of a missile launcher is not indifferent to the color of the cloth that flutters over the deck of the cruiser or aircraft carrier.

At a press conference V. Chernavin responded with understanding to the desire of each state, if it is situated on a seashore, to have its own navy. What is more, the leadership of the Navy displayed initiative in this respect—it came out with a proposal to render assistance to Ukraine in the creation of its own navy.

There was a discussion about the naval forces of those independent states that would be capable of resolving such tasks as protecting the state in maritime sectors, fighting against contraband structures, protecting the economic zone, and, naturally, should it be needed, assisting vessels in distress at sea. Even specific units of the Black Sea Fleet that are based at Izmail, Ochakov... were named.

At the press conference Vladimir Nikolayevich repeatedly referred to the position of Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. After the meeting in Kiev with President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, the admiral expressed the opinion that "emotions are out of place now. The Navy should remain unified and perform tasks in the interests of the Commonwealth." And once more the symbolic phrase could be heard from the mouth of the flag officer in command of the Black Sea Fleet: "The Navy will not discredit the honor of the flag!"

Yes, the Navy flag is a sacred thing to sailors. Under the protection of the flag they won victories and died in the Gangut, Cheshme, Sinop, and other battles. Allegiance to the flag of the Motherland is a remarkable and immortal tradition of military sailors. It is to such unyielding people that the monument to Kazarskiy on Primorskiy Avenue in Sevastopol is dedicated. The inscription on it reads: "An example for posterity!"

A natural question arises: What will we leave as an example for posterity? A wrecked and disfigured navy whose flag is unknown?

Vladimir Nikolayevich emphasized one more thought: Let the politicians, the leaders of the independent states, decide the fate of the Army and Navy. The military should not be dragged into the dispute. The fleet should be engaged in its own work, and the fleet card should not be played by anyone.

A journalist of one very reliable newspaper skeptically and, what is more, simply disrespectfully commented on the Navy as the "legacy" of a collapsed "empire." He declared that he did not understand "why it is necessary to divide the pitiful legacy with such fuss and cries, why the entire population should be involved in shaking out the contents of the trunk, while clearly desiring to play on the national feelings and to drive even a deeper wedge between the people."

Regarding the wedge, I agree that it is unbecoming to play on national feelings—I agree. But concerning the trunk and the rubbish, allow me to take exception. It is hardly possible to categorize as mothballed junk super-modern aircraft carriers, carrying nuclear charges, antisubmarine ships fitted out with the last word in equipment, and also missile-carrying submarines. These are anything but rubbish!

Include the ANT [A.N. Tupolev aircraft] in this rubbish, and he will shake out billions!

Representatives of 70 nationalities, most of all from Russia and Ukraine, serve on ships and in units of the Black Sea Fleet. In order to preserve the integrity and safety of the fleet and its combat capability they are unified as never before. "The Navy is displaying fortitude!" the commander in chief said confidently. At the same time, he referred to a report of the military council from the main base—Sevastopol: "The situation in the Black Sea Fleet," it says, "is healthy as a whole. But the mood of the people is anxious and pessimistic. This is associated with the impulsive and insufficiently considered actions of the Army in general, and of the Black Sea Fleet in particular."

Now, fortunately, the situation on the Black Sea is stabilizing. A sober approach to the problem is taking over, and the interests of both the state as well as of the sailors—officers, petty officers and seamen—are being taken into account. Today, like many centuries before this, military sailors are getting off ships at the Grafskaya

pier—in an orderly manner, smart in appearance, and concerned about the fate of the fleet and the Motherland.

Kravchuk Calls for Kasatonov Resignation

92UM0494A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Feb 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel A. Polyakov: "L. Kravchuk Demands Resignation of Admiral I. Kasatonov"]

[Text] As we reported yesterday, Admiral I. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, for objective reasons was unable to meet with people's deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and representatives of the republic Ministry of Defense.

This elicited animated discussion in the press and sharp criticism from the republic leadership. As republic television reported Thursday evening, Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk sent telegrams to Russian President B. Yeltsin, Air Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces, and Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, commander of the Navy, in which he demanded that Admiral I. Kasatonov be removed from his position for his actions with respect to the parliamentarians and representatives of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk also sent a telegram to Admiral I. Kasatonov, in which he pointed out "the incompatibility of such conduct" with the position of commander of the fleet which, he emphasizes in his telegram, is based in Ukrainian territory.

Deputies Call for Kasatonov Resignation

92UM0488A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Jan 92 p 3

[Report by Igor Skachko: "Better the Black Sea's Northern Shore Than the White Sea's Southern One": People's Council Demanded Resignation of Admiral Kasatonov, Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet command received a telephone message from Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, ordering the administration of the oath of allegiance to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] to the new naval recruits. The fleet commander, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, issued his own order—to administer the oath by 25 January.

At the same time, on 22 January, at the meeting of the Ukraine parliament's Permanent Commission on Defense and State Security, it was reported that two-thirds of the ground troops stationed in Ukraine—that is, 300,000 people—had already taken an oath of allegiance to Ukraine. In Kiev Military District, 99 percent of the servicemen have taken the oath; in Odessa District—84 percent; and in the Carpathian one—87 percent. This has placed the district commanders, Colonel

Generals Chechevatov, Morozov, and Skokov, in a highly ambiguous situation. They have refused to take the oath and found themselves without troops.

Members of the parliament commission came to the conclusion that oath-taking in Ukraine was a voluntary act, and the motives for refusals were not political. Those who refused to take the oath simply wanted to finish their service term in their republic.

Officers who have not taken the oath but would like to serve in Ukraine are to sign a special agreement developed by the republic Ministry of Defense. Ukraine Minister of Defense Konstantin Morozov said that he does not see this situation as hopeless and that he has in his briefcase at least three options for resolving this problem.

On the same day, the leadership of the Ukraine Ministry of Internal Affairs also took the oath. The first to do so was the minister, Colonel General Andrey Vasilishin, and chairmen of parliament's permanent commissions: deputy, Colonel Yaroslav Kondratyev of the Law and Order and the Struggle Against Organized Crime Commission; and General Vasiliy Durdinets, of the commission on defense and security matters.

The issue of the Black Sea Fleet still remains unresolved, however. Judging by all signs, the Ukrainian leadership has no plans to give it up. On 21 January, the deputy delegation that had visited Sevastopol at Leonid Kravchuk's request, held a press conference. Aleksandr Tarasenko, the delegation leader and secretary of the defense commission, and other press conference participants told the journalists that they had only been able to meet with the fleet command, delegations from ships' crews, and units stationed ashore. The deputies had not been permitted to visit the ships. They had been able to visit only one combat ship, with the permission of Ukraine people's deputy, Rear Admiral Viktor Nekrasov who could not refuse his colleagues.

The delegation members were united in their opinion: They had traveled to the sailors not to promote taking the oath to independent Ukraine, but only to explain the fundamentals of military policy and the doctrine of a sovereign state. They also said that they were flabbergasted to find an amazing degree of ignorance among the naval officers and service personnel in respect to all military and other legislative acts adopted by the Ukrainian parliament. For some officers among the fleet higher command, it was a revelation to hear that Ukraine already had a law on citizenship, the existence of which had been previously mentioned by many as a condition for taking an oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

Summarizing the results of the visit, Deputy Nikolay Porovskiy said: "The problem is not with the sailors, but with the fleet command. Had it permitted the oath-taking, we are certain that over 80 percent of the servicemen would have taken the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Many of them frankly told us that they would rather serve on the northern shore of the Black Sea than

on the southern shore of the White Sea. Also, we have learned that there had been two attempts to raise St. Andrew's standard over the ships, but it went nowhere because the sailors threatened to abandon ship."

Les Tanyuk, leader of the parliament opposition, reported that the People's Council has adopted a declaration demanding the resignation of district commanders Chechevatov and Morozov and the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Kasatonov. Ukrainian television openly called on the law enforcement organs to get to the bottom of the phenomenon of "true patriots" of Russia who are threatening violence against the coast guard detachment commander, Alfer'yev, and his family; his unit was the first one in Sevastopol to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

Amelko Leads Discussion on Future of Navy

92UM0454A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 2, 12-19 Jan 92 pp 6-7

[Roundtable discussion moderated by Yuri Teplyakov, MN military analyst: "Ocean. Russia. Navy"; first paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction]

[Text] The Soviet Navy today consists of: 59 strategic submarines carrying 896 ballistic missiles, another 163 multipurpose submarines, including 88 nuclear-powered ones; 151 surface ships, including 17 cruisers (five of them carry aircraft), 87 destroyers, 33 coastal ships, and 298 smaller craft of various purpose; 1,638 warplanes and 561 helicopters. The cost of all that weaponry runs into the hundreds of billions of roubles.

The present discussion at the MN Round Table is devoted to the current headaches and future prospects of the Soviet Navy. The participants are: former commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nikolai Amelko; Chief Navigator of the Soviet Navy, Rear-Admiral Valery Aleksin; one of the top commanders of the submarine fleet, Rear-Admiral Yuri Spirin; military historian Nikolai Berezovsky; and Captains: Sergei Kozyrev, Valery Bulatov, Yuri Shishkin, Anatoly Shlemov, Valery Posazhennikov, Vladimir Zaborsky, Eduard Ryazin, Albert Khrapovich, and Ilya Kolton.

This Round Table highlights different views on matters of Navy development from people who have been entrusted with immensely powerful weapons. It opens with a discussion of what is perhaps the most painful subject: the situation of the Navy now when the state whose interests it was meant to serve is no more.

Sergei Kozyrev: The Navy must continue its existence as one. It would wither away if and when carved up among the national republics. If some president decided to do away with the Navy, the state would die off too, or turn into an abject dwarf (which would be equal to death for such a power).

Albert Khrapovich: They tell us: perhaps the Navy itself is willing its own destruction via disintegration into a

handful of fleets, after all, 75 per cent of the Black Sea Fleet personnel voted for Ukraine's independence. I think that an independent Ukraine was expected to solve at least some of the Navy's problems. The reasoning was: a vote for the continuation of the Union would not relieve the habitual headaches. Here's a fresh example. Our first true aircraft carrier—the *Admiral Kuznetsov*—recently arrived at its permanent base in the North. It was built over 10 years, and from the start it was known where it would be based. So what? Neither the moorage nor any other vital facilities at the base, or the compounds for the personnel have been built yet. This is a political defeat, as well as a strategic set-back. This only helps discredit the idea of aircraft-carrying ships and casts doubts on the feasibility of their exploitation.

Anatoly Shlemov: If the republics drift apart, we may as well abandon the idea of aircraft carriers. As many as 10 republics, including Lithuania and Latvia, are building nuclear-powered submarines now. But Ukraine is now supplying only 10 per cent of the materials and equipment it used to supply for previous projects. This may spell an end to all the submarine-building projects.

Vladimir Zaborsky: A reform of the armed forces is on. What are the plans for the Navy? It is proposed to have it under the command of an autonomous body subordinated to the Strategic Forces Supreme Command. But history teaches us that both in the Soviet epoch and, during the Russian Empire, the Navy was always under direct command of the supreme state structures. The Navy cannot exist in the form currently suggested by politicians. Following the bitter defeat in the 1904 Russo-Japanese war, Russia realized that it could be a great power only with a mighty Navy. I'm afraid we are poised to ruin our own Navy, although this will inevitably bring us down to the level of El Salvador, or lower.

Nikolai Amelko: We must do anything possible to save the Navy from the perilous effect of hasty reforms and from the politicians' itch to have all military-strategic issues solved in one go. But how can these issues be solved now when we are lacking the vital factor of a political state structure? I've been with the Navy for 57 years and had experience in the whole range of commanding posts; from a boat's captain to Deputy Chief of General Staff. I'm deeply convinced that to divide the Navy among the republics would mean to kill it. From the point of view of military strategy, we are living in a completely different world now. We ourselves have changed. So, let's give some definite forms to our state first, and then define the aims and objectives for the Navy—what kind of Navy it must be, whom shall it take orders from, and who will the ships be manned with. Now, we would do best of all if we sort out matters about the quality of the Navy.

Ilya Kolton: No one can know what kind of Navy we will need, since no one knows for sure what kind of Navy we have, meaning its battle-worthiness. It must be put to trial by an independent commission of experts, because the reports reaching and going on from the top Navy

command are far removed from the actual state of things. The nation spends heaps of money in the earnest belief that it gets a powerful Navy in return, which is capable of paring any aggression. But in reality, many of the ships are no more than floating targets. My knowledge of the current state of the Soviet Navy convinces me that it is unable to ensure adequate defence.

Vladimir Zaborsky: The situation is indeed difficult. The Navy is in agony, like it was in 1961 when Khrushchev thoughtlessly scrapped large ships in favour of missiles. The crux of the matter now is the general disintegration of the country.

Valery Aleksin: There are other causes as well. For decades, the Soviet armed forces were built up mainly with a view to land operations. The Army received the most attention, especially after 1945. As a result, the current Soviet Navy has only 50 per cent of the fighting capacity of the US Navy. No wonder, last year, the Soviet Navy got only 13.4 billion roubles from the 90 billion spent for the armed forces in general. As a man sows, so he shall reap.

Nikolai Berezovsky: Russia's geopolitical situation alone proves that the country cannot ensure success without a powerful Navy. But since 1917, we have been oblivious to the fact that the country is surrounded by many seas. Both Frunze and Tukhachevsky hated the Navy. They could accept only an idea of a coastal fleet for Russia. They shared a delusion that the Navy's demand for large ships proceeded from the captains' ambitions, rather than precise strategical assessments. Georgi Zhukov didn't know a thing about the war by sea, and the Navy was "in shallow waters" when he was Minister of Defence. This attitude was handed down from one Chief of General Staff to the next. The recent man in the post, Vladimir Lobov, repeated Tukhachevsky's words. The current Centre for Strategic Studies of the General Staff corroborated the opinion of their chief: the Navy will never be able to solve strategic tasks. Therefore, it has no business in the world's ocean. That was nothing short of a death sentence to the Navy.

Nikolai Amelko: But the sentence is just. The idea of conquering the oceans originated with Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who commanded the Navy for more than a decade. To catch up with the US naval might and outstrip it—that was a bee in his bonnet. The ambition was shared by Dmitry Ustinov, master of the military-industrial complex, that state within the state, a Jugger-naut. But what was the ultimate objective? No one knew. That was how this country got its first aircraft carriers, and four *Kirov*-type missile-carrying cruisers.

I can't exclude the possibility that the *Admiral Kuznetsov* atomic-powered aircraft carrier which recently left its wharf in Nikolayev (after a five-year delay) will turn out equally useless for everyone. I have heard an argument that aircraft carriers impart stability to naval task forces on the high seas. But we don't have such task forces. Suppose the nuclear-powered submarines venture out to

the ocean, they will immediately be covered by anti-sub aviation based on US aircraft carriers. Any sub is an easy prey for them. The *Admiral Kuznetsov* is merely a bluff. A memorandum about its construction was channeled to the CPSU Central Committee in 1976 and returned, two years later, with a resolution: "All work is to be held up, because of the huge cost (4.5 billion roubles) and uncertain destiny of the aircraft carrier." The document is still in the archives. The then Chief of General Staff, Nikolai Ogarkov was satisfied with that decision, but Ustinov pulled his rank of Politburo Member and restarted the project. I was witness to all that, since I was with the General Staff then. What was the result? Billions from the public coffers have been squandered. The effectiveness of that capital investment is nil: if the *Admiral Kuznetsov* takes attack planes on board, it will lose its defence altogether. Six Intruders could easily dispose of it, putting one air-to-ship missile each into its side.

Sergei Kozyrev: Comrade Admiral, you mention that an aircraft carrier costs billions, but to my knowledge, it is only 485 million roubles.

Nikolai Amelko: Tell it to the marines. That 485 million was paid to the assembly plant alone. Add the rest, and you get billions. But the country doesn't need the ship even for 485 million. For defence purposes, the country needs a hovercraft fleet more. Hovercraft are highly effective and comparatively cheap. We were developing them at one time but later abandoned them for the sake of aircraft carriers. Perhaps hovercraft were small potato for the ministry of ship-building.

Sergei Kozyrev: I disagree. In 1976, they spoke of atomic-powered aircraft-carrying cruisers, not ships of the *Admiral Kuznetsov* type.

Vladimir Zaborsky: The esteemed Comrade Admiral proceeds from the defensive doctrine invented mainly for the propaganda purposes. But a defensive doctrine is gibberish. No professional can take it seriously. We have a military doctrine which contains components of offense as well. But both offensive and defensive action—in a far-off place or in a littoral zone—would not be feasible without support from aircraft carriers. For example, an operation landing troop along a 300-km-long coast requires support from 18-20 air force regiments operating from land. But the resources of the regiments would be exhausted in 72 hours. An aircraft carrier does good work for 8-10 days and nights. The General Staff has calculations corroborating this opinion. But for your intervention, Comrade Admiral, we would have at our disposal now as many as four true aircraft carriers. Remember, a Navy-development programme extending for 10 years was discussed in 1980. You said then that there was no need for aircraft carriers, and that the General Staff wouldn't know what to do with them. Your argument was that to combat US submarines, we needed helicopter-carriers converted from transport ships. I call this approach voluntaristic. Only in 1982 did a commission headed by the late

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev conclude that aircraft carriers could be really useful. That was how the *Admiral Kuznetsov* was born. Two more carriers are being built in Nikolayevsk: the *Ulyanovsk* and the *Varyag*. God help them see the ocean. The fate of aircraft carriers was sealed even before WWII. The year 1935 saw the first large governmental programme for the development of a large-scale navy. However, the implementation of the programme was stalled by Hitler's invasion. After Marshal Zhukov's spectacular victories, Army top brass succeeded in advertising the importance of the land armies. Stalin had a very positive attitude towards the Navy but couldn't understand the potential of air strikes. It really pains me to hear discourses about returning the emphasis to torpedo and missile boats, small ships and coast guards. To believe in that means to wish an easy defeat for this country.

Valery Aleksin: The composition of the Navy corresponds to changes in national policy and reidentification of national objectives on the world arena. Therefore we can't speak here about some "petrified" forms. We must follow the example of the US Navy in its dynamic quality and ability to concentrate on a chief objective. The aircraft carrier task force is a versatile weapon in its application. If we don't have something akin to that, we won't ever have an efficient navy. A navy is quite helpless without aircraft carriers, as much so as without a single central command. Once the fleets get split up between the republics, the Navy is doomed: first, in a couple of years, the Black Sea Fleet, then the Baltic Fleet. The Navy will just fall apart, like a keg without bonding. The Centre embodies naval science, academies, factories, and combat training—but all that is going to be dispersed like a morning mist in the sun. Once the Navy is bereft of all that, it is as good as lost. That can well be an outcome of the attempt at sovereignty in defence matters, in which the republics seem to be engaged now on the threshold of the 21st century.

It is up to the experts to discuss the individual advantages and disadvantages of the *Admiral Kuznetsov*. All the same, we don't believe that US aircraft carriers must be allowed to plow the ocean waters unmonitored: it would already be too late after attack planes with nuclear weapons on board took off from the carriers. It would be stupid to leave it to land defence to await their approach. Our naval aviation must be close at hand and ready to deal a disarming blow even before lethal weapons are launched, rather than afterwards. How is that to be achieved? Concrete ways depend upon the actual weapons at the disposal of this country's armed forces don't have anything adequate to the task. As much as 64 per cent of our fleet are coastal ships (the corresponding number for the US naval forces is six per cent). If we wish peace for our country we must maintain military presence in the world oceans. That's why the Navy opts for aircraft carriers. They are like a sword threatening the enemy and simultaneously a shield for our attack submarines.

Ilya Kolton: I fear that the shield may be useless: there will be no submarine fleet to protect. With the start of the hostilities, our subs representing the chief nuclear deterrent strike force and guarantor of nuclear parity would be immediately eliminated. Let me explain. In the 1960s, the USA adopted a new concept of nuclear-powered submarines security: subs were to emit as little noise as possible, in order to remain undetected. The most elite designer and industrial resources of the country were mobilized for the task. We soon appreciated the results of their efforts: Americans were hearing our subs at distances 20-100 times greater than we could theirs. But with subs, it is like this: first spotted, first destroyed. Our underwater ships lost the key edge: secrecy of movement. Our subs with thousands of nuclear warheads on board became utterly vulnerable. I get very upset at the thought that their crews are in fact doomed to death if war (God forbid!) breaks out. They don't have a chance. Our newest subs still under construction have the same fault, because they were designed in line with the same old principles.

Some ten years ago, experts offered us a solution. Tactical training of the Northern and Pacific fleets proved the validity of their theory on how to cut down the noise. What transpired afterwards was outright sabotage. On two occasions, the idea was officially proposed for adoption. But each time the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy, Admiral of the Fleet, Vladimir Chernavin, turned the proposal down, since, as I think, he was interested in having the military-industrial complex palm off bad products, which he would accept as good: the Admiral refused to acknowledge the fatal faults of the pride of the Navy, its submarines.

Yuri Spirin: I agree that our subs are too noisy, but Chernavin is not to blame. One of the causes of the noise is the design of the hull: our subs have double hulls, while US-made ones, single hulls. But decreased buoyancy resources reduce the subs' safety. We can't accept that risk.

Albert Khrapovich: I beg your pardon, but in the last 20 years we lost five "safe" double-hull subs, and the Americans, none at all.

Yuri Spirin: The hull isn't the sole factor of vulnerability. Soviet industry can't always produce what we want: our science and technology lag behind.

Sergei Kozyrev: Ilya Kolton presented here only half of the truth. In fact, the General Staff supported the experts' noise-killing idea. But I myself saw a document with the conclusion of nuclear scientists: implementation of the idea by Ilya Kolton and his group could have led to a situation similar to that which the world faced with Chernobyl. Under the proposed mode of operation, the nuclear reactors could have slipped out of control. That's why the idea was never adopted. The noise would indeed be reduced, but the reactor could slip into an unstable regime. We have about 90 atomic-powered subs

at present. If they blow up, there will be neither fish in the ocean nor humans on land.

Vladimir Zaborsky: The problem of noise is not only the Navy's headache. It is rather a problem for the whole nation as well. It is a challenge for the nation's intellect: once our science becomes more sophisticated, so will be our submarines.

Nikolai Amelko: I disagree. I'm well familiar with the noise problem. True, we can't do things which can be done using US technologies. On the other hand, in the USA, subs' turbines are centre-drilled at a plant in the middle of the Nevada desert, 140 kilometres away from the nearest highway (which is closed for heavy truck traffic) to eliminate ground vibration. But we produce our turbines in St. Petersburg, with street cars and the like running by. In addition, the plant is situated on marshland. That's why the precision is poor. Why not shift the plant elsewhere? In my opinion, it is our foolishness which is to blame.

Eduard Ryazin: I would add that we are caught in the cobweb of mafia-type relations begotten by 70 years of the Soviet power. Only in this country it is possible that even when the monopolist ministry of ship-building has a budget 10 times greater than it is supposed to, it fails to solve its technical problems. What's more, the ministry palms off on the Navy ships which are not battle worthy, and the Navy commander has the ships commissioned.

Nikolai Amelko: The *Akula* submarine, the pride of the Navy (as it was advertised), couldn't in practice join the naval force for three years after it had been officially commissioned. Incidentally, Vladimir Chernavin received a Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union medal.

Vladimir Zaborsky: Indeed, this is sometimes the case. But each time, the government is informed of the faults of such ships, and the government orders us to take the ship anyway. If we deal with fraud, it involves the governmental structures as well: everyone lies to everyone.

Eduard Ryazin: The Criminal Code defines commissioning of faulty production as a crime. We are dealing with mutual protection. Producers are paid bonus money, and certain figures on the top get promotion and awards. But ultimately, the cover-up is paid for by the nation at large. Television shows us beautiful ships plowing through the ocean waters, but few people are aware that the ships are no good at all.

Albert Khrapovich: Many people profit from this situation. This is the source of omnipresent secrecy. The Navy is agonizing, but its reports are rosy. Here's an example. In 1987, Gorbachev visited the North Fleet. Commander-in-Chief, Vladimir Chernavin reported that everything was OK, on par with the world's finest. Afterwards, Gorbachev met with ship-builders and Navy officers in Murmansk and told them he was proud that

the country has the world's best ships. And none ventured to open the eyes of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Perhaps, he still indulges in the illusion that the Soviet Navy can show its American counterpart what's what.

I wrote to Gorbachev once. He asked Yazov to look into the matter. I was summoned to minister Yazov. Also present were Vladimir Chernavin and Vitaly Shabanov (Deputy Minister for Armaments). I said it like it was: fraud. The Navy could not cope with enemy aggression. Yazov turned to Chernavin who said: "Comrade Minister, I acknowledge we have certain shortcomings, but we have overcome quite a few of them lately. Our *Taifun* is on par with the best US submarines."

Then the Minister told me: "I admit you are right. But where is the money to pay for the production of better ships?" I argued: "We would rather have three advanced and noiseless subs than 50 inferior ones. This would also be more humane than to build dozens of ships which are only useful for target practice." Yazov replied: "We can't stop the production lines and leave the workers without pay, even if they produce clay pigeons." What could I say?

Yuri Teplyakov, MN military analyst: Perhaps, we would do better if we halted production of more ships. We've got quite enough of them as it is. The USA is supplying food to us, which means that it probably doesn't wish us death. Why, then, should the USA start a war against us?"

Nikolai Amelko: The press promotes the idea that we have no potential enemy now. This is a pacifist approach. Until a government exists, military forces will be needed. The dose of power is what needs to be controlled.

Valery Aleksin: Tactics can be modified, but a military force must remain. The world is in rapid change. No country is safe from a nuclear attack. We can't rely on belief that there will be no more madmen like Saddam Hussein.

Vladimir Zaborsky: It is pleasant to see a rosy world, like some kind of a dream land. However, there might be a rude awakening. Our neighbour, Japan, has territorial claims on us. I can't rule out the possibility that Germany will advance similar claims in some 15 years. Are you hurt to hear this? We have to think about this and build our Navy. Navies always are built during the peacetime. Americans produce a new series of cruisers every two or three years. We build four ships in five years.

Sergei Kozyrev: Russia's national interests are obvious. They are not only its land border, but also the world's oceans.

Black Sea Flags Unchanged

92UM0403B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "By the Way"]

[Text] Through the fault of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, a heading in yesterday's issue providing information from Sevastopol mistakenly stated that St. Andrew flags had been raised over Black Sea Fleet ships. A clarification of data shows that naval flags continue to fly over the fleet's ships as before. We apologize to our readers.

The main command of the naval staff tells us that St. Andrew flags have not yet been raised on ships of any fleet.

Russian Press 'Hysteria' over Fleet

92UM0500A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
25 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by S. Krivko, shipbuilder: "It Was the Empire, not Russia, that Built the Fleet"]

[Text] The hectic campaign raised by the Moscow mass media over the fate of the Black Sea Fleet and recently carried literally to the point of hysteria (not without the help of certain high-ranking military and Russian leaders) has caused certain tension between Moscow and Kiev. Relieving this tension requires calm, reasonable, detailed work of experts in the field of history and international law, politicians, experts in the defense industry, and the military.

The nostalgic tears of Sobchak, Khasbulatov, Chernavin, and Kapitanets, supposedly saddened by the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, are dripping from the pages of Moscow newspapers and from the screens of Central Television. An assistant to the former president of the USSR has even begun expounding on the "affront to the great nation..." Everyone is talking about the Black Sea Russian Fleet created by Peter the Great, bashfully not calling it by its full name of the "Emperor's Russian Black Sea Fleet," or more simply imperial.

The history of Slavic navigation on the Black Sea originates by no means with the ships of Peter the Great. Anyone who has been to the museum of the Black Sea Fleet has certainly paid attention to the photograph of the remnants of the old hollowed-out canoe found by archaeologists in the 1930s on the banks of the Yuzhnyy Bug in Nikolayev Oblast. The canoe itself is kept in the Central Naval Museum. Its age was also determined—over 3,000 years! This is the origin of navigation in the Northern Black Sea coastal region. And the naval voyages of Oleg to the "gates of Tsargrad!" For some reason, the voyages of the Zaporozhian Cossacks' "chaykas" to the shores of the Crimea and Anatoliya remain in parentheses. Today they have also "forgotten" about the Zaporozhian Cossacks' assistance in taking Azov, when they used their "chaykas" to carry Peter the Great's grenadiers into the rear against the Turks.

Similar assistance was given Suvorov in taking Izmail. Thus, at that time it was Slav helping Slav. Today it is more convenient for some people to begin marking off the history of the Black Sea Fleet from the moment ships entered Akhtiyar Bay.

Ukrainian and Russian peasants settled in and developed both the retaken Crimea and the retaken Northern Black Sea coastal region. They were driven to the shipyards being erected at Kherson and Nikolayev and to the digging of docks of Sevastopol. Thus emerged the empire's Black Sea maritime might. It was an empire that was bulging at the seams, covering one-sixth of the land mass—to the south and to the east, to the west and to the north. And the recruit went—the Ukrainian Ivan side by side with the same recruit Russian Vanya—to obtain glory and new lands for "the emperor of all Rus..., and so on, and so on, and so on."

A fleet was built at the shipyards. A fleet which was built not by Russia but by the entire empire. For example, in 1909 the tsar's treasury allotted 29 million gold rubles to build a Sevastopol-class battleship. But in order to obtain this sum, the empire had to sell 500,000 tons of Ukrainian grain or up to 40,000 Kalmyk or Kazakh horses. All this is being conveyed to those who by their rash statements or deliberate game of words and manipulations of concepts of "Russian—Russian" ["rossiyskiy—russkiy"] are trying to drive a wedge between two great peoples.

For as long as one can remember, the creation of the fleet and the shipbuilding were linked to the cooperation of various production capacities. Someone obtained the ore, smelted steel and cast anchors and chains, and forged fasteners, nails, and shackles. Someone rolled the copper sheathing and cast the bronze cannons and rigging parts. Someone sewed the linen cloth into sails and twisted the hemp ropes.

Everything flowed together like small rivulets to the shipyards of the Black Sea coastal region, where the shipbuilders hewed the wooden hulls and outfitted the ships with all the necessary gear and equipment. This division of labor was retained in the 19th and 20th centuries. Such cooperation bore and continues to bear an international nature. By way of illustration, prior to World War I, several classes of ships (battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) were being built simultaneously at the Nikolayev Shipyards. A good one-third of the armament and equipment (boilers, turbines, diesels, generators, communications equipment, several calibers of artillery, and the like) were supplied from abroad: from England, Sweden, France, and even Germany—the future enemy in the war.

But let us get back to the Black Sea Fleet problem. According to data of Adm V. Chernavin, this fleet, operating on inland seas, consists of squadrons of surface ships, divisions of harbor defense ASW ships, divisions

of assault-landing forces, units of coastal forces, naval aviation, naval bases, and numerous and various types of auxiliary forces and assets.

However, regardless of such an impressive listing, according to information from that same admiral (see *MORSKOY SBORNIK*, No 11, 1991), the Black Sea Fleet consists only of general-purpose forces whose basic missions "come down, first of all, to ensuring the safety and reliable functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system in any situation conditions and, second, creating and maintaining in maritime theaters such operational conditions which would be least favorable for the start and conduct of combat operations by a potential enemy." The statement of the mission is clear in military terms. But the Black Sea Fleet has neither the forces nor assets to carry it out. Today, the state of the fleet is such that it cannot perform the role of a strategic component of the Navy in its area of responsibility, in particular, in the Mediterranean Sea. The most that it is capable of doing during peacetime is to "spy" on the actions of naval forces of the countries of NATO's southern flank and to deliver supplies of fuel, water, and oil for ships of other fleets performing combat duty in this region.

Squadron fleet forces are seriously outdated, and their technical condition does not meet the requirements of today. The average age of ocean-going ships (displacement of 3,000 tons or more) is 17-18 years. Some ships—the helicopter carrier *Moskva*, the missile cruiser *Admiral Golovko*, and others—are already 25 years old. And this fleet, according to *Adm Kapitanets* (see *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*, 11 January 1992), must oppose the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which, incidentally, surpasses the Black Sea Fleet in firepower many times over even without other NATO fleets. Even the tactical nuclear weapons which certain classes of ships and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet can carry (in combination with or in place of conventional munitions) do not make its capabilities equal and do not make it a strategic force in this region. The author believes that there are many false rumors about tactical nuclear weapons. Sometimes they reach the absurd: the 152-mm self-propelled artillery mount, which can also fire nuclear munitions (but at a distance of up to 30 km), is equated to a ballistic missile; a shipborne Ka-25 helicopter, which is capable of carrying a nuclear depth charge, is equated to a Tu-160 strategic bomber. Some "experts" are guided by the same approach in defining the significance of Black Sea Fleet ships. How correctly our President noted, "they know more than they are saying." But it makes sense to hope that after the tactical nuclear munitions (including fleet munitions) are moved out of Ukraine, this problem will also be removed. Therefore, already today the participants in the negotiations with the Russian Federation on the Black Sea Fleet must clearly stipulate the future fate of the ships being considered in the first phase as strategic deterrence forces. The ships must remain registered to the present bases, and this must be stipulated in a law on status of strategic deterrence units stationed on the territory of Ukraine. For

ships under construction or being upgraded at shipyards in the Ukraine, a directive should introduce measures preventing them from accepting or much less using nuclear munitions. Otherwise these ships may also become the subject of haggling and disagreements.

After resubordinating units of the Black Sea Fleet to representatives of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the status of fleet forces must be conducted jointly with industry. If necessary, some must be sold or scrapped to avoid excessive expenditures for maintaining them. In taking inventory of fleet property, we also must not forget another problem—the fleet is aging at a disastrously fast pace. Therefore, on the basis of a carefully developed naval aspect of Ukraine's defensive doctrine, we must re-examine questions of modernizing ships needed by Ukraine and, if necessary, design new ones.

Ukraine's powerful defense industrial complex is capable already in the next few years to create various types of ships—after all, we have on our land not only shipyards but also plants that build naval instruments and ship propulsion systems. It is no longer a secret that in Ukraine today they are designing and manufacturing shipborne radar, navigation, and communication systems, hydroacoustics and combat information direction systems, gas turbines and diesels with control systems, and auxiliary machinery and devices. There are too many to count. In many cases, the scientific research institutes and plants are unique, being the only ones in the former Union. Components that are in short supply can always be obtained through interstate cooperation both from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in exchange for similar deliveries and from other countries. These and other issues can be resolved at the negotiating table. For example, the FRG designs and builds ships for its own navy, using shipborne guns from Italy, electronics from the Netherlands, cruise missiles from France, and gas turbines from the United States.

Quite a number of questions are being asked about what kind of a navy Ukraine should have, what missions it should carry out, and by what forces?

Without having an approved military doctrine, it is difficult to predetermine the role and mission of Ukraine's Navy. But taking into account the statements of statesmen about a future neutral, non-bloc, powerful Ukraine, one can look for analogues throughout the world. Take, for example, Sweden. It is also a country with an inland sea basin with a commensurable coastline. Incidentally, it has a versatile, balanced navy that includes ships from a missile boat to a submarine and guided-missile destroyers (the cruisers that were part of the Swedish Navy were sold to Latin America several years ago), naval aviation, and coastal defense units. Sweden has a developed system of bases and its own military shipbuilding.

Unlike Sweden, Ukraine is located in direct proximity to a region of heightened military confrontation. An analysis of events of recent years "convincingly testifies to the fact that for now, in the majority of cases of resolving conflict situations, relying on political, economic, or diplomatic means is effective only if these means possess a definite component of force." In other words, individual "hotheads" can be cooled off only by military force and, in particular, by integrated UN forces, including naval forces. Ukraine, as an active member of the UN and as a country interested in peace in our region, can be represented in these forces of deterrence by its own escort ships (average displacement) and supply ships. Then no one will be surprised by the appearance and presence of the Ukrainian state flag in the Mediterranean Sea.

'Social Protection' Demands of Ship Crew

92UM0447A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 23 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by V. Pavlyuk: "But He, a Mutineer, Requests a Storm"]

[Text] The Baltic Fleet is close to the point so once again, just like 75 years ago, it will have the reputation of being the most revolutionary fleet. The escort ship Neustrashimyy has become *Avrora's* successor. Despite the decisions of the recent All-Army Assembly, an appeal of the ship's officers was distributed at the Baltic Fleet base at Baltiysk.

The Neustrashimyy's crew proposed conducting a ship squadron officers' assembly and advancing the demand to the government and the command authority of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces on increasing salaries, providing housing, and payments in hard currency for combat service and combat alert.

However, they did not even manage to conduct the assembly of chairmen of the ship squadron's officers' assemblies, planned on board the SKR [escort ship] Neustrashimyy. At first, two senior commanders visited the ship and threatened everyone with punishment. The officers withstood. Then Neustrashimyy received an order to leave the roadstead and put to sea a half hour before the assembly.

Impact of halting Carrier Construction

92UM0520A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
24 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by PRAVDA UKRAINA Correspondent G. Selin, Nikolayev: "The Aircraft Carrier That We Do not Know What to do with!"]

[Text]

As a Result of the Reduction of Financing, Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant Has Halted Construction of the New Generation, Heavy Aircraft Carrier

Those are the facts. And this is how it was printed in MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS: "Construction of aircraft carriers has ceased in the USSR. Indeed, the decision to do this was made, not in Moscow, but in Kiev. Black Sea Plant Director Yu.I. Makarov, acting on the command from the capital of Ukraine which has been aggressively privatizing the property of the army and navy of late, has refused to fulfill the orders of the USSR Naval Main Warship Building Directorate."

This scathing report aroused my interest and I attempted to obtain information firsthand.

"An odious provocation!", commented Yu.I. Makarov. "Kiev has not issued any commands to us. Obviously, someone does not have enough reasons to drive excessive wedges between Ukraine and Russia. They have taken advantage of our misfortune..."

"It is painful for us to part with a new ship and to halt work at the halfway point. How much both heart and mind has been invested in it. Just like in Peter the Great's time, shipbuilding largely remains an art. We 'nurtured' and, one could say, carried the aircraft carrier to the building berth in our hands. And this work—down the drain! Isn't this really a shame? The disintegration of the Union, and the single national economic complex along with it, and interethnic discord are not only not permitting us to build but also to maintain these ships in a combat-ready state. And all the same we are committing an unpardonable error. Without modern aircraft carriers, with their capability of early detection and interception of the enemy, the fleet risks very much even while conducting combat operations with conventional weapons."

"I would not like to once again wound the spirit. But what do you intend to do with the aircraft carrier?"

"The hull—scrap metal. We will sell part of the equipment that has already been installed. This will compensate us to some degree for our losses and we will pay off expenses of enterprises-suppliers for unfinished production. We have borrowed more than 400 million rubles from them. In the situation that has developed when the highest leadership has cast military orders to the whims of fate, I do not see another solution..."

Makarov's enduring and weighty position is worthy of respect. Those people who belabor the obvious and cause other feelings, while speculating on the current economic ruin and misfortunes of the people, are running down the aircraft carrier construction program. That same MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS, which made the unclaimed compliment with regard to the "Ukrainian shipbuilders' decisive actions," categorically states: "This program, that has arisen in the minds of people who have become

delirious about supremacy in the World Ocean, has become the most graphic manifestation of the true intentions of the empire."

But it seems that the aircraft carriers of an altogether different empire have often appeared off foreign shores and have fought there. On the contrary, our aircraft carrying cruisers have not yet been sent anywhere with similar missions. It would be logical to produce serious accusations in rushing toward supremacy in the World Ocean against England, France, Italy, and Argentina... Already not talking about the United States which has more than a dozen aircraft carriers and regularly refurbishes them. President Bush recently stated: "When I hear appeals for the reckless dismantling of our armed forces, I remain deaf to them..."

More information for ascertaining "true intentions." In front of me—is the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA interview with Reserve Captain 1st Class, former nuclear submarine Commander Anatoliy Gorbachev. He assesses the real ratio of the combat capabilities of the USSR and U.S. navies for naval aviation as 1:18. If you believe this independent expert, we have an extremely long way to go to achieve supremacy.

The new aircraft carrying cruiser Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov which, after completing state tests in the Black Sea, was transferred to the Northern Fleet, changes the situation somewhat. The SU-27 and MiG-29K fighter aircraft that are based on this ship do not lag behind foreign carrier aviation aircraft in operating range. The VARYAG looms near the plant embankment and should strengthen the planned parity. Indeed, its completion is being delayed for an indefinite period of time due to a lack of money in the treasury and the temporary closure of this order has not been excluded. But we already know that the nameless aircraft carrier that lies on the building berth is doomed to be scrap. This is how our ships die in our financial Pearl Harbor.

There is no question that the bankrupt country, to which food packages and medicine are being sent from the entire world, cannot afford super-ships. But it is quite reasonable to pose the question in a different way. Are we not acting rashly by sending a nearly completed aircraft carrier hull to the open-hearth furnaces? Experts think that dismantling it for scrap metal—is no less labor-intensive than its assembly was. More than 20,000 tons of metal and it is not lying on the pilings. Many months will be required to "break" the firmly welded steel hulk into pieces. And there is no time to lose.

One of the sector's largest plants—the second in production capacity and the third in number—is working at half-strength. It will not have anything to pay the workers if a turning point is not reached in 2-3 months.

Confidence in the enterprise's economic stability will leave the people. Personnel losses this year alone amount to more than 1,000 people. And primarily experienced workers who know their own worth are leaving.

Here the time is right to grasp at straws and to not ignore even the slightest real variation to rescue the aircraft carrier and carefully study it. For example, it would not be wrong to meet halfway those countries that would desire to purchase a ship, as they say, for seed. As the plant's foreign economic ties department reported to me, China and India have expressed definite interest. The deal would earn a profit for Ukraine which totals in the billions of U.S. dollars. But will the military experts give this their approval?

The Black Sea shipbuilders have become hostages of the former Union's uncompleted defense program. The plant is thoroughly stopped up with naval orders that interfere with beginning construction of major surface ships for export, specifically, three tankers with a displacement of 60,000 tons each for Norway. The recently signed hard currency contracts will permit the enterprise to painlessly enter the market, to keep its highly skilled personnel, and to guarantee fairly good living conditions for workers and their families.

A profitable order will be found to occupy the largest building berth in the country. Unfortunately, Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant Production Association Director Yu.I. Makarov does not have the right to make the ultimate decision to dismantle the aircraft carrier. Only the Defense Council can sanction the elimination of the ship or give the order for its future financing. But obviously its chairman was already not in the mood for aircraft carriers. Who today will assume this responsibility?

Naval Reorganization Proposal Put Forward

92UM0540D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Jan 92 p 2

[Postfactum: "The Navy Should Become a Ministry".]

[Text] As has become known to "PF" [Postfactum] information sources, The Navy's Main Staff has developed and presented to RF [Russian Federation] President Boris Yeltsin and to Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov a plan for the reorganization of the naval command and control structures. According the conceptualization of the plan's authors, a Ministry of Naval Affairs must attend to the development of the fleet and other global problems. Questions of the combat training of the personnel of ships and units will remain under the authority of the Navy's Main Staff.

Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin, who is now Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is proposed for the office of Naval Minister.

Baltic Fleet Commercial Deals

92UM0481A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Captain Second Class V. Gromak: "Cooperatives Are Buying Trawls From Seamen and Reselling the Copper Abroad"]

[Text] Kaliningrad—First the figures. In May of last year, the economic council of a unit stationed in Tallinn sold 34 electromagnetic trawls to the Dena Cooperative for 18,133 rubles. Then Captain Second Rank G. Markov conducted a similar "operation" with the Sistema Enterprise, concluding an agreement to take apart and sell 34 written-off trawls. The military unit earned 12,000 rubles.

But I also know something else: Copper is bringing a very high price in Estonia today, and it is being exported in exchange for hard currency. Things have reached the point where copper tablets are being removed from gravestones in cemeteries. Meanwhile, each trawl that the fleet sold to the cooperatives contained something on the order of 800 kilograms of copper. And a ton of copper on the world market, I was told in the fleet financial service, sells for more than \$1,000.

In October of last year, Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral B. Yegorov ordered Captain First Rank A. Pronkin, chief of the fleet's mine and torpedo department, to investigate the sale of trawls.

"We know what's going on," confirmed Major of Justice N. Patrikey, military prosecutor of the Navy Procuracy general oversight department. "True, the investigation is taking a long time."

In my presence, Nikolay Anisimovich phoned Lieutenant Colonel of Justice N. Lukashenko, chief of the fleet staff's legal group. The latter introduced some clarity: An audit had been conducted with regard to the sale of trawls. The commander of Tallinn Naval Base has been ordered to look into the matter and to hold the culprits accountable. If their actions are found to have been criminal, the matter is to be turned over to the military procuracy.

But I personally doubt, after looking into this situation, that the real culprits behind these illegal deals will be identified. Meanwhile, I calculate the losses incurred by the fleet at between \$30,000 and \$40,000.

Problems of Selling Ships for Scrap

92UM0498A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Viktor Litovkin: "Rusted Gold May Become Real Gold if Their Masters—Military Seamen—Sell the Old Ships"]

[Text] First of all, several figures. During recent years, military seamen have withdrawn 265 ships of various

classes from the fleet and have left them afloat at piers: cruisers, large antisubmarine warfare ships, escort ships, submarines... Their total displacement is 170,000 tons.

Furthermore, another 242 ships with a total displacement of 240,000 tons have been sunk in fleet coastal basing zones. These are the vessels that became disabled before the war and during the war.

The Navy annually writes off ships and boats with a total displacement of 80,000-100,000 tons. Corrosion is consuming 30,000-35,000 tons of high-grade steel in this ship graveyard, while contaminating the water and sea flora and fauna. And a ton of this metal now costs \$130-180 on the world market. The country's metallurgical plants are ceasing operation due to the lack of raw materials to process.

"Unfortunately, resmelting a warship is an extremely difficult and labor-intensive matter," said the Navy's Rear Services Chief Admiral Igor Makhonin. "It must be delivered to the dock, the corrosion must be cleaned off, it must be converted—weaponry, precious metals, instruments, and equipment must be removed—and it must be sealed and prepared for towing to a ship dismantling plant. By way of illustration, the work to prepare a destroyer or a cruiser costs the Navy 350,000-400,000 rubles. To do that, we are compelled to utilize the facilities that are intended for repair of commissioned warships but, having done all of this, there is no guarantee that we have not labored in vain. Wretched and antediluvian ship dismantling equipment is on an industry scale in the country. "Vtorchermet," at its shops in Arkhangelsk, Sevastopol, Saint Petersburg and, until recently, in Riga, is capable of processing just 10,000-12,000 tons annually. And there are still the ships of the former Minmorflot [Ministry of the Maritime Fleet] and Minrybkhkh [Ministry of the Fish Industry]...

What is the solution?

It would seem to be obvious, sell the ships, all the more so since they are paying the kind of money for them today of which both the Navy and Russia have a catastrophic shortage. But everything is not so simple here.

The Navy is juridically not the owner of the ships that it commands and that are on its balance sheet. Merchant seamen, fishermen, and even seamen who serve science own their own vessels but the military seamen do not. They do not have the right of direct access to the international market. "Sovkomflot" (a commercial organization of the former MMF [Ministry of the Maritime Fleet]), "Soyuzregion" which is a Trade-Industry House, "Sudoeksport" and "Sudoimport" (from the former Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry]) state foreign economic associations have that right...

"Vtorchermet"—a concern of the former Ministry of Ferrous and Nonferrous Metallurgy and "Interscrap," the Soviet-American joint venture which was created in Minrybkhkh especially to process ships into scrap, do not

have the legal right to sell our obsolete warships and ships but... they are actively engaged in such work.

According to the country's Council of Ministers 1989 resolution, "Interskrup" was to have built four ship dismantling plants in Kozmino Bay near Nakhodka, in the area of the city of Polyarnyy on the Kola Peninsula, and on the Black and Baltic seas.

But today there is only one plant in Kozmino Bay. A 300-meter pier and two slips with a capacity of 10,000 and 3,000 tons displacement have been built there. This is only 40 percent of the planned capacity which was calculated on dismantling 100,000-120,000 tons of ship steel. The plant is hardly covering that amount of metal which the corrosion in the ship cemeteries annually "consumes."

But, "Vtorchermet" and "Interskrup," which are incapable of processing the military warships that are turned over to them to process according to the state order, have quickly and slyly learned to sell them at giveaway and dumping prices (\$40 per ton) abroad. In so doing, they are not even concerned about the painstaking and thorough preparation of these vessels for further towing.

"People never value what they get for free," said Military Ship Sales Expert Iosif Avakyants. "Practically all of the submarines, escort ships, and destroyers that have sunk en route to their foreign owner already did not belong to military seamen but to "Vtorchermet" and "Interskrup" and were sold by them as scrap according to the state order..."

But the most amazing thing are the lackadaisical intermediaries who properly "bring together" in the water the ships that have not been prepared for a lengthy ocean crossing under tow and that often do not assume the serious financial and legal responsibility and losses. It is important to insure the ship in a timely manner for a sum that exceeds its cost and the payment for ship-salvaging operations, court costs, and firm-dealer costs and, as a rule, so that we do not even end up losing.

In Avakyants' words, right now business people from "Interskrup," while taking advantage of their longstanding ties with union, and now with Russian ministerial bureaucrats, are attempting to create "Rossudorazdelka" Association, to register it with the Russian government and to completely monopolize the export of all ships for scrap.

"And," says Iosif Serapionovich, "according to their plan, not only would the Navy have to compensate 'Interskrup' for losses borne from the dismantling of 'complex' ships of the nuclear submarine type, but all ships would belong to them immediately after being written off and the military would be deprived of practically the only source of hard currency receipts."

The military has earned nearly \$10 million from the sale of ships and they have been engaged in this since the end of 1988. The sum appears to be miserly if you recall the

reserves of rusted hulks they have and how highly they are valued on the world market. But Ryzhkov's government, having opened the door to hard currency for the Navy, sharply limited their profits. The military gave 85 percent of the SKV [freely convertible currency] to the state. What has been earned has not even been sufficient to compensate for the losses associated with ship salvaging and conversion of the warships at the slips.

In 1990, the Council of Ministers also weakened the tax vise a bit. Fifty percent of the profits began to be left in the Naval budget. And all of this money to the last cent was spent on medicine, to purchase ship dismantling equipment, and technology for earthquake-proofing homes and offices on Kamchatka and also for brick plants and for the construction of housing in the fleets and even in Moscow.

One more "detail": Corrosion of the obsolete ships will become truly gold if a precise legislative base appears and the Navy obtains the right of independent access to the foreign market and if all of the ships that are on its balance sheet remain at the disposal of their masters and are not transferred free of charge into the hands of yesterday's ministerial bureaucrats and currently experienced intermediaries-middle men-buyers, who have sent our ship scrap metal to the world market at giveaway prices.

"We have more than 10 ships that have been prepared, completely converted and registered for export," Admiral N. Makhonin told me. "But we will not sell them. European ship dismantling facilities are overflowing with the ships of our former allies—the Poles and Germans. Yes and the "salvo" discarding of Minmorflot and Minrybkhov vessels on the market has also driven down the price of scrap metal. It is not profitable to sell our goods for those prices—it is just not worth it. We will wait until prices stabilize."

Right now prices have risen and the Navy has just sold five major warships, among which were three cruisers—Zhdanov, Admiral Senyavin, and Vice-Admiral Drozd at a price of \$165 and \$185 per ton. Two of them have already arrived under tow from the Pacific Ocean Fleet for dismantling at the Indian Port of Alang. Negotiations are being conducted on the sale of the other ships.

But the military's profits could be significantly higher if their sale with their foreign partners was proceeding based on commercial interests and common sense and if dilapidated dogmas did not impede it.

A copy of a letter sent by the Austrian firm Dal Sasso Enterprise to the Navy leadership lies in front of me. On behalf of the Vienna city council, it requests that the seamen sell a diesel submarine—"for conducting excursions, receptions, and cruises on the Danube." The Austrians are promising a price that is more than two times higher than the price for ordinary scrap metal.

But the Naval command authority has rejected their offer. The idea that the "Austrians will drink their beer

under a Soviet periscope" appeared to be insurmountable to someone and became the decisive barrier in the path of an extremely profitable sales deal.

The same fate has also befallen the Japanese proposal to sell them the cruiser *Senyavin* as a floating hotel and the American request for the sale of a submarine to the "Life and Life Style of Soviet Submariners" Museum...

In conclusion, several more numbers. Last year military seamen sold 15 ships with a total displacement of 54,000 tons to be dismantled for export. They earned \$7,533,000. One 270-apartment building in Moscow costs one million "greenbacks" today, almost the same as for a written off cruiser. And there are more than 23,000 apartment-less people in the Navy.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Cherkass Housing Conflict Continues

92UM0387A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
12 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Major V. Miroshnichenko, *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* correspondent: "On the Trail of the Dispute—Those Who Stepped Over the Line"]

[Text] Very likely the readers of our newspaper have not forgotten that a little more than a month ago we published a telegram from Cherkass on the front page that disturbed and alarmed more than just us. Lieutenant Colonel P. Lazarenko reported that as a sign of protest against the unfair distribution of housing space, he is taking over an apartment and is declaring a hunger strike there... Within a day, the same kind of a telegram also arrived at *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*, and in another two days it was reported that Lt. Col. P. Lazarenko will be assigned an apartment in December...

It appeared that the dispute was over, but Lt. Col. Lazarenko soon telephoned the editorial office and reported that he is ending the hunger strike, because the officer for whom the apartment was intended kicked the "usurper" out in a fight and beat up his wife and mother-in-law.

This, then, is where the situation stands. I had to go to the Cherkass garrison. During my hours on the road, I did a lot of thinking. I recalled how more than a year ago, while working on an article, I reflected on such a form of economic and political struggle as the strike, and I asked myself the question: But what will happen when the Army also starts to strike? I could not believe that people in military uniform, who never placed material well-being uppermost, will choose strikes, secret deals, demonstrations, and hunger strikes as a means of their defense. And here are the first signs.

In those several days that I spent in Cherkass, I had occasion to meet many people who in one way or another were involved in this story. The situation with housing in

the city is no better and no worse than in other regions of Ukraine. Servicemen wait for housing for five or six years. It must be said that the managers of the city are trying to help the defenders of the Motherland, but... We will not spend time again on an analysis of today's catastrophic situation in the country, in the final analysis, has led to a dispute between colleagues...

After hearing both sides, Major S. Kutsenko, chairman of the officer assembly, other officers, and Junior Sergeant S. Nechepurenko, I came to the conclusion that the officers had approximately the same rights to this apartment, but that they chose ways to acquire it that were far from just. I will not begin to savor the details of this story, proving my point of view, and I will not render any conclusions—the procuracy of the garrison is trying to establish the truth in this affair. I will talk about something else. During conversations with the parties in the dispute, I did not lose the feeling that each of the officers was not telling everything and was trying to put himself in a favorable light.

Why did we get this way? Why did we not pass the test of the difficulties of today's existence, and of economic and socio-economic problems? It is interesting that those who stepped over this line are former political workers. Recalling the recent decision about the abolition of political organs of the Army, I cannot help but note that once again the restructurers of our society are in a hurry, forcing many people to cross the line beyond which there is the degradation of ethics and morality.

Not long ago in a *PRAVDA* article, a journalist discussing our difficult time raised an interesting thought about one of the reasons for our failures. Why are we completely rejecting the many centuries of experience of the Russian peasant? After all, before pulling down an old structure that had outlived its day, he built a new one...

Belarus Housing Construction Reported

92UM0399A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
21 Jan 92 p 4

[Article by Colonel P. Chernenko, *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* correspondent: "The Construction Is Gaining in Scope"]

[Text] Belorussian Military District—Just recently there was only empty space here, beyond the fence of the military post on the outskirts of *Marinaya Gorka*. A large construction site occupies the area now. The Finnish *Haka* joint-stock association, jointly with the Petersburg *Monolitstroy* construction association, is building a housing development here for the families of servicemen withdrawn from Germany.

Construction, begun at the end of September, has already picked up speed. A concrete production unit built here at the site is operating at full capacity. The foundations for eight apartment buildings have already been laid. A total of eleven will be built, containing 780

apartments, as well as a school, a hospital, a kindergarten with a swimming pool, a commercial center and auxiliary facilities. It is planned to build all of this in 15 months. It is to be released, complete and ready for occupancy, by the end of the year.

"How is the work going?" Haka director Miaki Miakinen spreads his hands and says: "In the beginning we fell slightly behind schedule, and the Leningraders let us down with the blueprints. We have now almost made up the lag though. Vladimir Ulyayev's brigade, which is laying the foundations for the apartment buildings, is operating in two shifts. I have to say that the veteran construction workers know their business. The brigade leader as well."

Ulyayev, a powerfully built man of medium height, proved not to be very talkative. "We work just like everyone else. We complete the jobs." He livened up when the talk turned to his comrades. He spoke warmly of welder Vladimir Sivvy, installation workers Anatoliy Panfilov and Vladimir Kovrov, carpenter Nikolay Malakhov.... The brigade includes 15 people, construction workers with experience. There are almost no stoppages.

Vladimir Gubskov's brigade, consisting of construction workers from the joint Soviet-Canadian Alumasystems enterprise, also enjoys a good reputation at the project. It has earned the good reputation with its high level of skill and the excellent quality of the work it performs. Most of the brigade members have experience at construction sites in Canada and in the construction of housing tracts in Moscow, Leningrad, Sochi....

"We are pleased with the pace of work of the brigades and with the quality of the foundations," Miaki Miakinen told us. "The construction workers from the Monolitstroy association are old partners of ours. This is not our first joint construction project. So we know one another well. This helps us in the work and is an absolute guarantee that the housing development will be released on schedule."

Having picked up speed, the construction project at Marinaya Gorka is also growing in scope. I recall that on our first trip here only 200 people were employed at the site. There are now twice that many. And construction brigades keep arriving. Construction of the apartment building frames will begin soon. The flow of construction materials is also growing. The construction schedule is tight, and the workers value every minute of time.

PVO Unit in Dispute With Cooperative

92UM0466A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 18 Jan 92
p 5

[Article by Aleksandr Kharlamov under the rubric "Land and People": "Into a Counter-attack Against Pigs"]

[Text] The command element of the Moscow PVO District has launched a deliberate attack against the

Zvenigorod cooperative, which procures and processes farm products in the village of Fonkovo, Odintsovskiy Rayon. Two and a half years ago the cooperative signed a lease with a construction organization on the territory of a disbanded military unit to be used for producing consumer goods and food products. The cooperative repaired the damaged buildings of the military post and set up a hog farm and weaving shops there.

All of a sudden the command element demanded that all of the army's repaired facilities be turned over before the contract term had elapsed. Citing instructions from Lieutenant General V. Grigorkin, chief of the State Construction Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Butko demanded that the well-developed site be relinquished, ostensibly for locating a PVO installation on the territory. Attempts by the military to use the screen of missile-defense secrecy were flatly rejected, however. The times have changed.

Seeing that the sham would not hold up, the lieutenant colonel cited the need to use the territory for officers and enlisted men being withdrawn from Eastern Europe. This brought the perfectly rational response from A. Borisov, cooperative chairman: "Where would you have settled them, had we not rebuilt the entire post"? The lieutenant colonel then ordered electricity and water to be turned off at the post and threatened to bring in bulldozers and level everything.... Hog murrain set in.

To the soldiers' credit, they spoke out rather unfalteringly about the actions of the command element spreading its maws for the ready-made production facilities and other people's profits. Within a very few years the cooperative has set up the production of sausage, canned goods, smoked poultry, cotton panty hose, socks and polyethylene film, and is planning to increase the output of these products so needed in the Moscow area.

An interesting point is the fact that certain military men, crowding so forcefully onto the cooperative pie, have now been idled, forced into retirement by a reshuffling in the district command element. Apparently having a premonition of this, they were arranging a base of operations for a continued, comfortable existence. Documents prepared in the district are still in effect, however, which clearly make the cooperative's future uncertain. It is time finally to decide what is more advantageous to the people: products which are always in short supply or military equipment?

Moscow Officers Distribute Aid Packages

92UM0403C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel M. Syrtlanov: "Distribution of Packages Entrusted to Officers of the Capital Garrison to Ensure Reliability"]

[Text] Moscow—Humanitarian food assistance is presently being rendered to internationalist soldiers by a

German commercial firm. Among those entrusted with distributing the packages from Germany are officers from the capital garrison. In the opinion of German businessmen, this provides a sound guarantee that the food will reach the proper addressees.

Mr. Gunter Wolff, the firm's administrative director, noted that assistance is also planned to be rendered with respect to consumer goods, primarily refrigerators and washing machines, for Armed Forces veterans and disabled. These and other electrical appliances will be offered at reduced prices.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Weapons Sold, Stolen in Chechen Republic

92UM0416B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Borovkov: "From Grozny—One Hundred Thousand for a Kalashnikov Assault Rifle. This Is the Price Offered Today on the Black Market in the Chechen Republic"]

[Text] This weapon is generally "acquired" in military units deployed on the territory of the republic. The frequency of robbery attacks on servicemen and their families has increased. The murder of officer V. Chichkan was followed by an attack on Junior Sergeant A. Poterukha, a sentry, whose assault rifle was stolen. The pistol of Captain A. Agrashokov, a unit duty officer, was taken under the threat of death.

Although the patience of the military is not unlimited, they have refrained from armed conflicts. But how long will the restraint of the servicemen be tried? This question was discussed in Grozny at a conference of unit commanders of the garrison.

Lieutenant General A. Chernyshev, chief of staff of the North Caucasus Military District, spoke at the conference. Regarding the decision of Major General P. Sokolov, chief of the Grozny garrison, to issue personal weapons to officers, he said that this measure is forced and temporary, and that it will go into effect only after coordination with the procuracy.

But what did the Chechen side propose, after all, representatives of the republic's defense committee and OMON [special purpose militia detachment] were invited? The chief of staff of the defense committee, I. Arsanukayev, called for a restriction on the exit of military vehicles beyond the unit environs and for strengthening the guard system, but he did not advise servicemen to go outside the boundaries of the garrison units when armed.

It is unlikely that the military will succeed in fencing themselves off from the outside world no matter how much they desire this. Indeed, will this help avoid conflicts?

UKRAINE

Kravchuk Views on Military Policy, Prices

92UM0470A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 4, Jan 92 p 4

[Article by Colonel G. Chernomorskiy: "President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk: Nobody Will Set Us Against Each Other!"]

[Text] The first question our correspondent put to Leonid Makarovich touched on the defense policy of

both the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and each state in particular. After all, at present many rebukes are heard addressed to Ukraine, which has embarked on creating its own armed forces.

The President observed: "I have become accustomed to these questions and to accusations leveled against me. A strange situation is emerging. On the one hand, Ukraine has been recognized as a sovereign state, while on the other, its right to have its own army and navy is questioned. Please note that we have not taken a single step in this direction without referring to legal foundations.

The Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine which was unanimously adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the republic as early as the summer of the year before last, says: "The Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] has the right to its own armed forces." Many other documents adopted by our parliament refer to the same thing. In Minsk and Alma-Ata we informed our CIS allies in quite some detail about the intention to create our own armed forces. We even communicated that we would consider 3 January the day of the establishment of the armed forces of the republic. No objections were raised. At the same time, we acknowledged the feasibility of having common strategic nuclear forces under unified control. As far as everything else is concerned, I will repeat that we have not delegated our sovereign rights to anyone.

It would appear that everything is clear. However, the central press and television set up an unhealthy clamor regarding this issue. Never mind the journalists! The ink was not yet dry on the Minsk accords when a telegram came from the commander in chief of the United CIS Forces, Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov, with instructions to take an oath confirmed by the President of Russia. Yet another telegram came soon to the effect that the President of Russia had conferred the rank of general on a group of our servicemen. How is this regular?

Look at an interview with Minister Poltoranin published in the newspaper TRUD. The correspondent asked a quite specific question: Why have centrifugal forces become so active in Russia recently? The thrust of the response may be reduced to the statement that Kravchuk is supposedly a former party leader, that he knows the theory of Communism well, and that now he has stooped to nationalist positions.

Concerning the nationalist position, I will say straightforwardly that people in our republic are not divided into classes. We do not have indigenous or non-indigenous peoples because Russians and Jews, Poles and Bulgarians, Belorussians and Tatars, and representatives of many other nationalities have lived and worked side by side with Ukrainians for centuries. All are equal before the law; all are citizens of our state. Believe me, in just a short while everybody will be able to ascertain that, at a minimum, the Russians in Ukraine fare no worse than in Russia, and the Poles fare no worse

than in Poland. As far as the theory of communism is concerned, I indeed know it; I had this kind of job. However, I also know the theory of chauvinism. I know that in his time Lenin called chauvinists oppressors no matter which disguise they used. This may be rude but it is vivid. Mikhail Poltoranin is not a rank-and-file reader or a private citizen. He is a member of the government...

We put a question to the president regarding his vision of the future of the Black Sea Fleet. What solutions are possible in this matter?

Leonid Makarovich noted: "Ukraine is a maritime power. Its coastline stretches for more than 1,000 kilometers; a quarter of the population of the republic resides in coastal regions. Tell me whether it is not natural for the republic to wish to have its own navy? It is simply necessary for the republic! It is another matter what it is to be. I have stated repeatedly in the press and on republic and central television that our state does not claim the entire Black Sea Fleet. Meanwhile, speaking at the All-Army Officers' Assembly on 17 January, Admiral I. Kasatonov rebuked the President of Ukraine for precisely this. To my mind, Igor Vladimirovich confused something...

All my respect for navy men notwithstanding, I will say that no matter how important the future of the Black Sea Fleet and all fleets combined is for Russia and Ukraine, it is much more important for these states to always live in peace and friendship. If we comply with the agreement, succeed in overcoming our pride, and make mutual concessions without which no compromise is possible, nobody will be able to set us against each other!

Personally I am convinced of that, just as I am convinced that an optimal decision will be made with regard to the Black Sea Fleet furthering the interests of both the Commonwealth of States and the subjects of particular states, primarily sailors, sergeants, warrant officers, officers, and admirals.

In an interview with our correspondent, the President of Ukraine also touched on the issue of price liberalization.

We did not count on this measure being popular, the president said. We knew that the population would suffer serious losses. However, what has happened has gone beyond our worst apprehensions. By now, everybody understands that the command-administrative system failed to prove itself. We have opted for a market economy. De-nationalization and privatization must be implemented in order to accomplish a transition to a market economy, and care should be taken of our own monetary system. However, we have not done this yet; to be sure, we introduced multiple-use coupons on 10 January.

Unfortunately what has happened amounts to an undisguised price increase rather than liberalization. We went for it because we could not do otherwise. Please recall the fall of last year when the Government of Russia, without

warning anybody, raised procurement prices for agricultural products. A considerable segment of agricultural products immediately migrated from the northern and eastern oblasts of our republic to our neighbors. Meanwhile, a common economic space calls not only for the free movement of goods but also for coordinated actions which make it possible to keep the states which belonged to the former Union safe from any type of economic encroachment.

We accuse the Government of Russia of embarking on a reform too early, Kravchuk said, whereas it accuses us of introducing coupons which essentially have already replaced money in trade and will soon crowd out the ruble in the service sector.

Let us be frank about it. The Russian and Ukrainian Governments are inclined to blame each other for their own shortcomings. However, both have made mistakes. Are failures to make agreed-upon deliveries that rare? Both states suffer, but nobody is to blame. However, the coupons are a special case. The government of Vitold Fokin had no other choice. Judge for yourselves. At present, the average wage in Russia is considerably higher than in Ukraine, and the purchasing power of the population is accordingly higher. However, this is not the only point. A decision was made in our country, incidentally, as well as in other CIS states, to increase wages, retirement pay, and benefits in order to at least somehow cushion the unfavorable phenomena of the initial period of price liberalization. However, it is much easier to make a decision than to carry it out. We simply did not have a sufficient money supply to ensure social protection for the residents of the republic. Eighteen billion rubles were required additionally. As is known, Ukraine does not have a money printing press. It is available in Russia. We made a proper request. So what? Instead of R18 billion, we were given only R4 billion.

In general all of this is merely routine confusion. I will not interfere in the internal affairs of another state; I will only allow myself to observe that in this case we also suffered along with the Russians. I would like all CIS states to be able to avoid uncoordinated actions in the future.

Kasatonov Absence from Meeting Explained

92UM0484A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Pasyakin, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Why the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Did Not Receive Ukrainian Parliamentarians"]

[Text] Sevastopol—A report appeared in the mass media that Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, did not receive a group of deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet who had arrived in Sevastopol 29 January because he was busy with other matters. It was published that Admiral Kasatonov ignored the Ukrainian deputies. But the fact of the matter, as

reported to me by Captain 1st Rank Andrey Lazebnikov, chief of the Black Sea Fleet press center, is that the members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet did not reach agreement beforehand on meeting with the fleet commander. And plans for that day called for a session of the fleet military council, whose work is directed by Admiral Kasatonov. The session summation then took place, ending at 1700. At the direction of the Black Sea Fleet commander Rear Admiral Anatoliy Manchenko, first deputy chief of staff of the fleet, explained to the people's deputies why the commander was unable to receive them.

That same day, a group of people's deputies and representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, about 20 individuals in all, visited a marine brigade, where a two-hour meeting took place with marine servicemen.

Ukraine Deputy Defense Minister Discusses Fleet, Military Oath

92UM0502A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
25 Jan 92 p 1

[Press conference with Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan: "We Do Not Need Anyone Else; We Shall Not Surrender Our Own"]

[Text] Ukraine is establishing its own Armed Forces in strict accord with the agreements reached in Minsk at the end of last year. With this statement, Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan began his press conference for domestic and foreign correspondents.

Since 3 January, recalled the Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, the personnel of the troop formations stationed on the territory of the sovereign state has been given the oath of loyalty to its people. As of today, a total of 270,000 servicemen have done this.

Two groups of experts have been set up for resolving an entire range of questions relating to the joint defense of the Commonwealth's states. For the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], it is represented by Colonel-General B. Pyankov and for the Ukrainian side, by myself, continued Lieutenant-General Bizhan. Three joint meetings have been held, with the last one being last Sunday. The chief question for discussion was to set the composition of the CIS strategic forces on Ukrainian territory.

The central mass information media have rushed to accuse our state that, in retreating from the Minsk agreements, it has endeavored, to the benefit of itself and to the detriment of the Commonwealth, to extend its authority to a portion of the strategic forces. Lieutenant-General Bizhan quoted from the Minsk documents that each sovereign state would independently determine the number of strategic forces on its territory.

During the work of the groups of experts, many questions were settled. In particular on the Strategic Rocket Forces stationed in Ukraine. These troops will exist until

1994 and at that date all the nuclear arsenals existing on our territory are to be completely eliminated. There can be no fears as for their continuing existence.

Initially the expert group from the CIS proposed that a portion of the Ground Forces be included in the strategic forces. This ran contrary to the Minsk documents and we were unable to agree with such an approach. A final study of this question is continuing, said Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan. Also not resolved was the question of the subordination of an airborne division. We consider and will firmly defend our position that this formation should be part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

We view negatively the proposal from the CIS to include in the strategic forces a number of the military schools located in Ukraine. On our behalf we are ready to work out documents which would settle the operation of the military VUZes. All this should be done on a basis of agreement.

There has been perplexity over the attempt to include a number of sanatoria, dumps and bases in the strategic forces. It is our position that what remains at the corresponding facilities has been created by the people of Ukraine and should belong to its Armed Forces. Incidentally, continued the deputy minister of defense, these supplies are not so extensive.

On the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine does not lay claim to that portion of it which carries out strategic missions. It is merely a question of guarding the state frontiers of the sovereign power. As of today, there are three basic approaches to the subordination of the Black Sea Fleet. According to one of these proposed by the experts from the CIS, Ukraine is to be assigned only seven percent of the forces...

As for the entire range of questions, including those involving the Fleet, Ukraine will not undertake unilateral actions and hence is ready to demonstrate that it is capable of resolving all questions in a civilized manner.

Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan replied to numerous questions from the correspondents. Participating in the work of the press conference was the adviser of the minister of defense of Ukraine, Colonel V. Lazorkin. In particular he described how the oath is being administered to the troops. He gave examples of when the troop units and subunits making up the strategic forces solemnly took the oath to the people of Ukraine.

Ukraine Military Pensions Draft Law Viewed

92UM0400A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
3 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Smirnov, candidate of technical sciences, and Senior Lieutenant Internal Services L. Kiryanov, deputy chief of the Pensions Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukraine: "It Is Not

the Start Which is Important, But the Finish: On the Course of Development of the Draft Law on Pensions for Servicemen"]

[Text] The Law of the Ukraine on Pensions passed by the Supreme Soviet has already been published for implementation. Quite understandably (due to specific present circumstances), pensions for servicemen were not spelled out in it. Only in Article 4 is there a reference to the fact that the conditions, norms and procedure for the provision of pensions for this category of citizens are established by the Law of the Ukraine on Pensions for Military Personnel and Workers of Internal Affairs Agencies of the Ukraine. This makes it perfectly reasonable to ask what the status of this law is. It presently exists in the form of a draft law. It is truly important that the law be put into the form of a legislative act as soon as possible, since it affects the interests of hundreds of thousands of civilian pensioners and of all servicemen, since the military careers of the latter do not go on forever.

A certain delay in the publication of the law on pensions for military personnel is perfectly valid. The reason is that this law is somewhat subordinate, as it were, to the Law of the Ukraine on Pensions. This is because a fairly large number of the articles in it are based on the provisions of the basic law. Such is the logic for producing laws, and it is not desirable to alter that process. It is also a fact that the interval between the passage of these two laws must be minimal.

From the time the draft Law of the Ukraine on Pensions for Military Personnel and Workers of Internal Affairs Agencies of the Ukraine was published (it was authored by associates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukraine), it has been ceaselessly perfected. This process has gone on for a month and a half.

The conceptual approaches taken to the writing of the draft law were the following. The authors strove to get pensions for servicemen (taken to mean all individuals with military or special ranks) slightly larger, or at least no smaller (in certain instances), than those for civilians. This was always the trend, and it still is today. The same position is taken abroad. This is how they honor people who have devoted their lives to a special form of state service.

We believe that such a clarification, even in general terms, will eliminate many urgent questions which have been raised among the servicemen in discussions in lobbies and possibly at official meetings. There are more than enough grounds for emotional debate. Among other things, a paradoxical situation has developed today in which servicemen retiring from identical positions and with equal rank receive different pensions simply because they have been "caused" to retire at different times. In order to eliminate this glaring injustice, a standard has been added to the draft law for recalculating pensions previously granted based on the amount of the salary for positions and military ranks held on the day the law was passed.

And so, justice triumphs. We should not forget, however, that this act is only a stopgap measure. Within a very short time the "discrepancies" we have discussed will develop once again. To prevent this from happening a special mechanism has been inserted into the draft law (Article 63). It essentially provides for the state to alter pensions annually to conform to the pay of individuals presently serving. Actual, and not rhetorical, social justice should finally triumph as a result of this provision. This should bring us to a point at which all regimental commanders (regardless of the year of their discharge into the reserve) will be receiving the same pension. The pension amounts should differ only in those cases when the former servicemen have different lengths of service or are entitled to certain additional benefits.

I would like to direct particularly close attention to the situation cited above because of its fundamental nature. An attempt to increase pensions by indexing at a time of inflation can be regarded as nothing other than dishonest treatment of pensioners by state power structures. The state is attempting to resolve deficit problems of the state budget at the expense of elderly citizens who cannot defend themselves. It is clear, after all, that indexing for pensioners will be lower than for working citizens. Within a short time one who has been receiving a pension for some time will once again feel deprived when he compares himself with a younger colleague, even though the latter faces the same unenviable fate after a certain period of time.

It follows from what we have said that when the experts who worked on the draft law were forecasting for the future, they did everything possible to prevent the executive bodies from engaging in such a policy. The immediate future will graphically demonstrate how the people's deputies regard this guarantee of equal pensions (regardless of when the pensions are designated for identical categories of servicemen). After all, they and only they will ultimately have to adopt the interim and final decisions.

We have now arrived at the point which we pompously call "public discussion," which is passed off as the pinnacle of democracy. Indeed, there is discussion of the documents, and any person can submit changes, comments and suggestions without restriction. The full truth, however, is that the popular voice has no real force, regardless of the humaneness, the attractiveness and common sense of the suggestions submitted. This is because there is a solidified procedure for making amendments in the draft law approved in the first reading, under which only legal and physical persons vested with the authority of legal initiative can make changes in the draft law. They include the Cabinet of Ministers, ministries, permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet and people's deputies of the Ukraine. Therefore, anyone truly wanting to make certain that his suggestion is noticed—that is, that it go onto a comparative list of the texts of drafts of the law (adopted at the first reading and submitted for discussion by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine)—he has to have his

suggestion introduced by at least a people's deputy. After that, if necessary, he will defend his position at a session of the commission and a plenary session of the Supreme Soviet.

The artificial establishment of the aforementioned provisions makes it very important for all those who want to take part in the lawmaking process to communicate with the people's deputies. Here is our advice to you. Go to your representatives, invite them to visit your collectives and voice your opinion. It is best to write out your opinion, so that you can then follow it to see how it is incorporated into the law. Otherwise, if your proposal is not addressed to a specific place or person, it is perfectly possible that there will be a minimal result or even none at all.

The Law of the Ukraine on Pensions for Servicemen and Workers of Internal Affairs Agencies has now been turned over to the Cabinet of Ministers, which, jointly with the Commission on Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet, will submit it to the Supreme Soviet for passage in the first reading. In all probability this will occur during the second half of January. It would be difficult at this point to give a date for the passage of the law in its final edition.

Despite the professionalism of members of the expert group, they need thoroughly considered suggestions and advice due to the multifaceted nature of the matter of pensions. They have to consider a great number of legal, financial and social questions. We cannot permit anything to be overlooked, even accidentally, in the draft law, the resolution on its passage or the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers on the calculation of length of service and the computation of pensions. We therefore invite you to send your suggestions directly to the group working on the law at the following address: 252009, Kiev-9, ulitsa Bankovskaya (Ordzhonikidze), 6, komnata No. 311; Telephone (044) 291-63-28.

We have two small requests. Try to formulate your suggestion specifically, correlating it with the corresponding provision in the law, and write it in Ukrainian. The latter is extremely important in order to prevent future distortion of the proposed wording. The collective wisdom will thus make it possible to prepare solid documents for passage, which will help to relieve social stress in that part of the society involved in the military service.

Decree on Military-Commercial Center

92UM0449C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Jan 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Presidential Decree signed by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, Kiev, December 31, 1991: "Ukrainian Presidential Decree on the Procedures for the Sale of Material Resources, Equipment, Arms, and Real Estate by Armed Forces Troops"]

[Text] The change of subordination of the Armed Forces of the former USSR that are deployed on the territory of Ukraine causes a change of the procedures of interrelations between the central supply organs of the former USSR Ministry of Defense and the troops and local organs of state power of Ukraine. However, today cases are occurring of the massive export of material resources, arms, and equipment from bases, arsenals, and depots, sale of equipment outside the borders of Ukraine, seizure, transfer for lease, and sale of real estate of the former USSR Ministry of Defense.

For the purpose of preventing the export from the territory of Ukraine of food, military-technical equipment, arms, troop equipment, including everything that is subject to being written off or sold for the needs of the national economy, the prevention of instances of seizure, transfer of chattel or real estate, and other illegal agreements between the representatives of military units and citizens and organizations, and also control of the transfer of monetary assets into the account of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for their future use for the social needs of servicemen in the troops deployed on the territory of Ukraine, I resolve:

1. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense will form a Commercial Center under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for the conduct of commercial operations with chattel and real estate and assets received from the sale of vehicles and equipment which are released as a result of troops and arms reductions.
2. The military district commanders, the Black Sea Fleet commander, and the commanders of armies, division-sized and smaller units, the heads of institutions that were centrally subordinate to the former USSR on the territory of Ukraine will only conduct a transfer for lease or sale of chattel or real estate of the Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine only through the Commercial Center under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.
3. This decree enters into force the day it is signed.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk
December 31, 1991, Kiev

Ukraine Military Assembly Appeal

92UM0449B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Jan 92 p 1

[Appeal by participants of All-Ukrainian Conference on Military Structural Development Issues, Kiev, January 9, 1992: "Appeal of the Participants of the All-Ukrainian Conference on Military Structural Development Issues to Personnel of Military Formations Deployed on the Territory of Ukraine"]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

Participants of the All-Ukrainian Conference on Military Structural Development Issues in Ukraine which occurred, having thoroughly examined the entire series

of issues of the military sphere approve the military policy being conducted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the President of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian government, the creation of its own Armed Forces, Ukrainian Border Troops, and the Ukrainian National Guard, and appeal to all servicemen serving within the borders of the Ukrainian State to support the measures being implemented.

The conference thinks that the leadership of Ukraine, while proceeding from the highest interests of the people of Ukraine, is seeking peaceful coexistence with all states and maintenance of the defense capability of Ukraine at the level of defensive sufficiency for defense from aggression. The Ukrainian Armed Forces that are being created are intended only to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and protection of the interests of the Ukrainian State and the peaceful life of its people. Ukraine will steadfastly abide by international and interstate treaties on issues of the military sphere.

We, the conference participants, completely share and support the provisions and positions set forth in the Ukrainian President's Appeal to servicemen who are serving on the territory of Ukraine and beyond its borders, the social and legal guarantees granted to them by the Ukrainian State and in the complicated socio-political and socio-economic situation that has developed we call upon the personnel of all military formations located in Ukraine to make their choice and to voluntarily take the soldier's oath and to prove their loyalty to the people of Ukraine through their conscientious execution of their military duty.

The problems that were comprehensively examined at the conference for legal resolution of the issues define the procedures for performing military service, material, financial, food, pension support of servicemen, maintenance by the Ukrainian State of all existing types of state pensions, benefits, allowances, and other social guarantees while considering the transition to market relations and also the solution of servicemen's housing problems.

The conference came to the conclusion that the primary legal acts on issues of military structural development and socio-legal protection of servicemen and members of their families have already been adopted. In the near future, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will complete the creation of a legal foundation that provides a solution to the entire series of issues of the military sphere. We suggest that servicemen actively participate in the conclusion of their development in order to fully consider the legal interests of servicemen and their families.

The conference considers that groundless incitement of tensions in recent times and disinformation of society at large as a result of the realization by Ukraine of its right to create its own Armed Forces is complicating the conduct of military reform in Ukraine and is having a negative impact on the moral-psychological state of military collectives.

We appeal to the personnel of all military formations deployed on the territory of Ukraine to manifest restraint and understanding of the processes that are occurring in this difficult time and to observe calm, regulations and military discipline and to honorably and conscientiously perform their military service. Let us do everything through our joint efforts so that the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military formations prescribed by the law of Ukraine will proceed in an organized and weighty manner and in a normal atmosphere.

We express confidence that the servicemen performing duty in Ukraine will perceive our appeal with the proper responsibility and understanding and will do everything required of them for the formation of independent Ukraine, its Armed Forces, Border Troops, and National Guard, and will insure civil peace and calm in Ukraine.

At the same time, we also hope for mutual understanding from the Commonwealth of Independent States member-states and the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the former USSR.

Participants of the All-Ukrainian Conference on Issues of Military Structural Development in Ukraine

January 9, 1992. Kiev

Ukraine Military Leadership Conference

92UM0449A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
11 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "No One Will Protect the Troops in Ukraine Without Ukraine: The All-Ukrainian Conference on Military Structural Development Issues has Occurred"]

[Text] President of Ukraine, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces L.M. Kravchuk conducted the session. Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Chairman V.P. Fokin, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman V.B. Grinev, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on Defense and State Security Issues V.V. Durdinets, ministers of Ukraine, the commanders of the military districts, the Black Sea Fleet, and armies, and commanders of divisions and independent units deployed on the territory of Ukraine participated in its work.

Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K.P. Morozov delivered a report.

Those present were acquainted with the normative acts adopted by parliament and the President of Ukraine that have laid the foundation of military reform, have defined the framework of the structure of the future Armed Forces, and consolidated the procedures for the creation of the mechanism to guarantee the security of the state and military structural development in Ukraine.

Colonel-General K.P. Morozov reported in detail on the content of the reform concept for the Armed Forces formations deployed on the territory of Ukraine which at the conclusion of all reforms during the transition period will become smaller in number but adequate for defense, from aggression, and for the guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The issue of taking the military oath occupied a lot of space in the report. Since January 3, 1992, Ukraine has begun to exercise its right to create its own Armed Forces. For the purpose of imparting legal force to this act in the troops located on the territory of Ukraine, the taking of the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine is being organized based on the Ukrainian Presidential Decree. This process has already begun and will extend throughout the month of January.

Specific numbers of Ukraine's expenditures for the structural development of its own Armed Forces, maintenance of the programs for social and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families, and their pension guarantees were distributed to the conference participants.

Ukrainian Prime Minister V.P. Fokin spoke at the conference and acquainted the generals and officers in detail with the progress of the fulfillment of social programs for servicemen, including the solution of the housing problem.

The military district commanders, the Black Sea Fleet commander, the commanders of military formations and the heads of military educational institutions participated in the discussion of the reports.

At the conclusion of the conference, President of Ukraine, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces L.M. Kravchuk delivered a major speech.

An assessment was given to the fulfillment of the agreements on military issues that were adopted in Minsk by the heads of the independent states and Ukraine's rights and position were clarified. One can briefly sum up the President's position with regard to the socio-legal programs using the following words: no one will protect the troops in Ukraine without Ukraine.

The conference participants adopted the Appeal to the Personnel of Military Formations Deployed on the Territory of Ukraine.

Read the detailed report on the conference's work in the next issue of the newspaper.

Commanders Address Ukraine Conference

92UM0446A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
10 Jan 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by NEZAVISIMOST special correspondent Vadim Dolganov: "Commanders Offer Resistance. Does the President Win?"]

[Text] When Colonel Vilen Martirosyan came up to the podium in the chamber of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine during a conference on issues of military building, it appeared that the moment of triumph would come for all who had called for immediately swearing allegiance to Ukraine. This is precisely what the colonel, disgraced in the not-too-distant past, who is currently chairman of the Union of Officers of Ukraine, called on all those present in the chamber (district, Army, and division commanders, and in general the flower of the generals corps) to do.

However, it was more complex than that. The generals did not take this oath, though they did adopt an address to all servicemen by the end of the conference in which they supported the actions of the leadership of Ukraine aimed at building its own armed forces, and stigmatized "the recent fueling of tension and misinformation of broad circles of the public in conjunction with the exercise of the right of Ukraine to create its own armed forces."

This assembly of the supreme command corps of the present-day (or future?) Ukrainian Army has been compelled by dramatic events involving the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union which have kept the whole world tense in recent days. Let us recall that the beginning of the exercise of the right of Ukraine to create its own army, specified in the Minsk accords of the heads of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries, became the bone of contention. The struggle between Ukraine and Russia for the Black Sea Fleet became the spark that started the fire. This is why the appearance of an admiral in Kiev, in the building of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, was viewed as a sensation. Dozens of journalists from various countries of the world immediately rushed toward him. However, Admiral Kasatonov refused to give interviews that day. He expressed everything he wanted to say in his presentation.

Admiral Kasatonov observed that passions are being needlessly inflamed on account of the Black Sea Fleet. The creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is a regular process. We are ready to assist in the formation of the Ukrainian Navy. However, the situation in the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet is ambiguous. Hastily made decisions will impair the combat readiness of units and vessels.

Indeed, the apotheosis of creating the Ukrainian Army did not come about, especially given the fact that, following Kasatonov, the commanders of all three military districts situated in Ukraine came up to the podium. Each of them referred to haste in administering the oath to units and large units, and the unreadiness of the political, legal, and legislative foundation for the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Therefore, the commanders suddenly offered resistance to Kravchuk.

However, let us give due credit to the great political talent of Kravchuk. He is always able to turn the course of any conference in a direction advantageous to himself.

The same happened yesterday. The main arguments used by our president follow.

We are not violating the Minsk accords, as Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov is trying to convince us. (Incidentally, Kravchuk said that he made a mistake in agreeing to the appointment of Shaposhnikov as commander of the CIS Armed Forces, and communicated that he would try to correct this mistake.) In Kravchuk's opinion, the command of the CIS troops is striving to reclassify all troops in Ukraine as strategic. However, in this case, Ukraine could not have its own troops at all (according to international agreements with the United States and other countries). This is a crafty policy. The president expressed his displeasure over the fact that many generals condition the issue of taking the oath on solving the social problems of servicemen. All of the people are living poorly, not just the Army. The oath should be taken voluntarily, and nobody will bring any pressure to bear on the people; nor will they be expelled from the Army.

As far as the Black Sea Fleet is concerned, the position of the leadership of Ukraine in this matter is unambiguous: The Red Banner Black Sea Fleet cannot be classified as a strategic force. Otherwise, nuclear weapons will have to be installed on board the vessels; this will run counter to the nuclear-free status for which Ukraine strives. Finally, the military budget of Ukraine was released for the first time. As Minister of Defense of the republic K. Morozov announced, it will come to more than 28 billion rubles this year, and will grow to 30 billion rubles by 1994, to fall to 15 billion as soon as 1995. The question is: At the expense of what?

Ukraine Conference on Military Viewed

92UM0445A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
11 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Valentin Labunskiy, GOLOS UKRAINY military columnist: "Encroaching Again on What Is Foreign"]

[Text] The all-Ukrainian Conference on Questions of Military Development in Ukraine was held in the plenary hall of meetings of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, with the participation of President L. Kravchuk. In attendance were Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Fokin, chairmen of the permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet, members of the government, people's deputies, commanders of districts, fleets, armies, corps, divisions, chiefs of military schools, and officials of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

That same day in Ulyanovsk, President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, forgetting his nice words about respect for the sovereignty of the republics of the former Union, yelled into a megaphone: "Do not take any oath to Ukraine. The Black Sea Fleet was, is, and will be Russian!" So there you are! As the saying goes, what a big letdown! That which was carefully veiled by the abbreviation CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] proved to be an

empire which had only changed its title. The Russian leader openly demonstrated what the "older brother's" assurances mean. This policy of the Russian Federation stands out especially clearly in the example of the Black Sea Fleet. Trying in every way possible to retain it, Russia started a shameful anti-Ukraine campaign. At the same time the cogency of the argument was like that under Brezhnev-Suslov propaganda during the occupation of neighboring sovereign states, when the answer to the indignation of the world community to aggression was: "All of you are counterrevolutionaries."

The fifth column of the Russian "democrats" in Sevastopol was headed by Admiral I. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who spoke to the conference yesterday. After crying that the General Staff will not let him, poor fellow, out of its embrace, the admiral began to engage in verbal equilibristics, emphasizing that only 25 percent of those serving on ships of the Black Sea Fleet are Ukrainian. "But what can the rest do," asked Igor Vladimirovich pathetically. It cannot be that, after earning three admiral stars on his epaulets, the commander still does not understand that representatives of a hundred nationalities live in Ukraine, and that our country is a multinational state, where all people and nations are equal, that Kasatonov's immediate chief, whose orders he refuses to execute, is Colonel General K. Morozov, who is also Russian.

It is with his report that the conference actually started. The minister talked about the phases of military reform during the creation of Ukraine's own armed forces. Today, the number and tasks for the troops deployed in our state contradicts the military doctrine of Ukraine. We do not need so many troops, especially with little combat capability. It is being planned to eliminate military districts and to establish mobile operational commands in their stead. Ground troops will number only 200,000 persons in tomorrow's Ukrainian Army. The entire army will consist of 400,000-450,000 servicemen. Also being reformed are the Air Force (four Air Force groups are being established—I, II, III, and naval), the Navy (it is planned to have 16 brigades, naval aviation, and coastal defense), Railroad Troops, and the entire network of military training institutions. The reform will be implemented in three phases. The beginning of the first is administering to the troops the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. The former Ministry of Defense of the former Union and the Moscow generals, fearing for their positions, immediately came out against this measure. Encrypted telegrams sped to the troops.

L. Kravchuk read one of these at the conference. In it, Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov orders the troops deployed in Ukraine to swear an oath of allegiance during the period 10-12 January... to Russia. A serviceman who lives and serves in Ukraine must, the marshal orders, read these words: I swear to observe the laws of Russia and to defend the state interests of the Russian Federation..."

If anyone before this in the hall doubted the real intentions of Russia and Marshal Shaposhnikov, whose role you cannot envy now, it became clear after the text of the encrypted telegram was publicized that the former Union Ministry of Defense is simply taking its last gasp. It is necessary to do one's duty without paying attention to these convulsions. One of these, incidentally, is the so-called All-Army Conference in Moscow, scheduled to be held on 14 January.

Lieutenant V. Gubenko, commander of the Border Troops of Ukraine, made an appeal to the generals and officers to support the efforts of President L. Kravchuk directed at confirming the genuine independence of our state. It is a great honor for all of us, he said, to take an oath to the people of Ukraine. In the Baltics the troops are being expelled beyond the borders of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, but the Ukrainian people consider us their defenders. The Army will be able to resolve all problems, most of all social problems, only after taking an oath to the people that maintain it.

It was exactly about the sociolegal defense of servicemen that Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Fokin talked in his speech. Ukraine will give its army everything possible, he said. Not one of the republics of the former Union has yet adopted laws on the social protection of people in military uniform. Ukraine has done this. The republic also does not refuse to receive on its territory some of the troops that are being withdrawn from Germany and Poland. An Austrian firm is already completing construction of a military compound for them in Krivoy Rog. All told, it is planned to build 17 such compounds, if we succeed in finding the last of the 7.8 billion marks allocated to accommodate military from Germany.

Major General V. Grechanninov, commander of a motorized infantry division of the Carpathian Military district, said at the conference that the arguments of B. Yeltsin and Ye. Shaposhnikov that unified armed forces will reliably defend the countries of the Commonwealth cannot withstand any kind of criticism. The Armed Forces of the former Union are absolutely not combat capable. Over the years a system of influence, protectionism, and cronyism took hold.

V. Martirosyan, chairman of the Union of Officers of Ukraine, recalled at the conference the memory of deceased Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko who taught "military art" to officers with the liberal use of foul language. In the Ukrainian Army the spirit of cruelty to and humiliation of the individual will disappear, if in the first days of its creation there is a rejection of the Gulag orders of the "legendary and invincible." Colonel Martirosyan also turned to the president with a request to award the name Taras Shevchenko to the regiment he commands.

The conference concluded with an appeal to personnel of military formations deployed on the territory of Ukraine which contains words such as: "The groundless inciting of tensions and misinforming the public in connection

with the implementation by Ukraine of the right to create its own armed forces has a negative influence on the morale and psychological condition of all Ukraine. But, nevertheless, who and when did anyone beyond Khutor Mikhaylovskiy pay any attention to our condition? History has taught us enough lessons for us finally to understand that our security, freedom, and future are in our hands."

Ukraine Parliament Panel Deals With Creation of Army

92UM0505A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
25 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Major M. Poselenev: "Much Accomplished, Much Remains: Ukraine Creating its Army"]

[Text] We feel that the progress being made in construction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is a topic of great interest to our readers. Therefore, to satisfy the demand for information, we present below coverage of what transpired in the latest session of the Ukraine Parliamentary Commission on Defense and State Security.

I will begin my report by listing the topics of the agenda. On the list were discussion of the draft Ukraine Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service; the second item was the draft Law on Retirement Benefits for Military Servicemen and Members of Internal Affairs Agencies; in third place was a proposal to examine the progress made in construction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Border Troops of the SNBU [Ukrainian National Security Service], and the National Guard, and the military oath; lastly, there were draft changes to the Constitution of the Ukraine as introduced by the President of the Ukraine, proposals put forth by the commission relating to a package of laws on economic reform, and the draft Ukraine Law on Criminal Investigation Activity.

The above was the agenda as first proposed. However, it happened that the commission initiated its work—most likely rightly so—by taking up the third item. People's Deputy Lieutenant-General V. Durdinets, commission chairman, turned over the floor to Ukraine Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov.

The minister of defense's report contained much that was of interest to the deputies regarding progress made in construction of the Armed Forces and the procedure followed to man the emerging structures. An example of this was the Ministry of Defense Review Commission's acting on an application listing 338 servicemen requesting acceptance into the Ukraine Armed Forces. Included were 17 generals and 10 warrant officers. Three hundred seven men were accepted, 31 rejected due to professional ineligibility. Duty orders were cut for 233 men, of which 12 hold the rank of general, 211 of officer, and 10 of warrant officer.

The Ukraine Ministry of Defense has created its own troop command system, severed Moscow control channels, and set up a system for alerting the troops to various degrees of combat alertness.

The minister of defense also related how the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people was drawn up. In general, a great piece of work was accomplished, and the result can be nothing less than gratifying, especially in light of the very strong emotions evoked relative to taking of the oath. In this regard, it is sufficient to recall how Marshall Ye. Shaposhnikov bombarded the troops (including those of the Ukraine) with all kinds of "documents": taking of the oath of allegiance to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]; cancellation of that telegram; proposing that troops take the pledge via wording approved by the Russian President; cancellation of the latter, with no mention of the oath...

The audience listened with satisfaction to the news that, as of 21 January, more than two-thirds of all personnel had taken the oath. In the case of the Kiev Military District, the acceptance figure was 99.4 percent; in the Odessa district, 84 percent; in the Carpathian, 87 percent. But there clearly is a paradox here. There are no district commanders among those who took the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine. The situation is extraordinary, to say the least.

As Colonel-General K. Morozov informed the audience, the situation cries out for solution, the same as the case of servicemen who wish to leave the Ukraine. Expressed in numbers, this amounts to 8 percent of officers and 21 percent of conscript enlisted and noncommissioned personnel. The Ministry of Defense has drafted a document (obligation) attesting to the fact that the person signing agrees to serve his duty in a conscientious manner, with the service obligated to assist the signer to obtain a transfer to another country. This is a temporary solution, of course, but that is something on the minds of people. All the more so in light of the draft document drawn up by the Ministry of Defense related to the procedure for transferring from one area to another that will be presented on 14 February, which is the day of the meeting with high representatives of the CIS.

In a word, work is under way. The problems being worked on include that of fuels and lubricants for troops, clothing, spare parts for materiel, materiel proper, food supplies, and others. It is planned to review the tax structure of enterprises supplying the troops with their products, with a view toward lightening their tax burden. The issue of alternative service is being looked at. Three approaches to the problems of the Black Sea Fleet have been proposed. Also, efforts related to implementing programs designed to remove nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil are under way. A timetable for withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons has been drawn up. As of now it is at the 30-percent completion mark; its implementation is an item of intense interest. Under

discussion are problems related to strategic nuclear weapons. By 1994 they will no longer exist on Ukrainian soil.

May it be concluded that construction of the Ukraine Armed Forces is proceeding smoothly, without problems? Surely, there is no shortage of problems here. One problem which persists is that of evasion of military service. Whereas previously there were cases of individuals who refused to carry out their tour of duty outside the borders of the Ukraine, today there are persons unwilling to serve the people of their own country.

Topics dealing with the National Guard, Border Troops, and the Ukraine National Security Service were presented by Major-Generals V. Kukharets and Yu. Babanskiy, and by Colonel A. Skipalskiy. They were all heard with a great deal of interest on the part of the Ukraine Parliament Commission on Problems of Defense and State Security. Also dealt with attentively were other issues listed in the agenda.

Sixth Guards Tank Army Oath Taking

92UM0511D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
22 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "We Take the Oath"']

[Text] This day is a landmark in the glorious annals of the 6th Guards Tank Army. The latter's units and subunits have started to take the oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine.

Pledging first were generals, officers, and warrant officers of Army Headquarters, with Army Commander Lieutenant-General V. Radetskiy leading. Swearing to serve the people of our sovereign state were Ukrainians, Russians, Armenians, and persons of other ethnic origins.

Present here to congratulate everyone on this memorable day were Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Soviet Chairman N. Zadoya, other oblast officials, and representatives from local public organizations, enterprises, and municipal institutions.

The pledge was also made on other nonduty days by officials of Army formations.

Kiev Communications School Oath Taking

92UM0511B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
22 Jan 92 p 1

[Photo caption by S. Titov: "Communications Troops Taking the Oath"']

[Text] Standing in solemn formation this frosty morning are officers, warrant officers, and cadets. A march heralds the introduction of the standard of the Kiev Higher Military Engineering Twice Red Banner Communications School imeni M. I. Kalinin. Every man standing in

the square made the proper decision: to take the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people.

First to pledge is Colonel K. V. Panasik, chief of the school.

One of those taking the oath of allegiance to his independent state is Senior Sergeant Aleksandr Postolatiy, an exemplary third year cadet. He enrolled in the school after serving in the Army, where he served with the communications troops. On the day of the pledge, he received congratulations from his parents, who reside in the village of Yalonets in Vinnitsa Oblast. His mother, Zinaida Alekseyevna, works as a nurse in the local polyclinic, while his father, Nikolay Ivanovich, is an electrician in a communications center.

The servicemen were congratulated by a large number of guests at the festivities, one of whom was Colonel V. S. Mulyava, who is chief of the Social and Psychological Service of the Ukraine Armed Forces.

The photo shows Senior Sergeant A. Postolatiy taking the oath.

[Photo not reproduced]

Figures on Acceptance of Ukrainian Loyalty Oath

92UM0511A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
22 Jan 92 p 1

[Text] A solemn ceremony was held, in which allegiance to the people of the Ukraine was sworn by generals, officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men of the staff, directorates, and services of the Kiev Military District. The pledge was sealed by 99.4 percent of military personnel as they affixed their signatures to the document.

As communicated to us by the Main Staff of the Ukraine Armed Forces, the oath was taken in the Odessa Military District by 70.2 percent of the officers and 85 percent of warrant officers. Nineteen percent of the officers and 9.9 percent of warrant officers did not participate in this solemn occasion for various reasons. Virtually all generals and officers of the staff and headquarters of the Odessa Military District accepted the oath, with the exception of the chief of staff, People's Deputy of Russia Lieutenant-General L. Kovalev.

In the Carpathian Military District, the taking of the oath is also nearing completion. The pledge was taken there by 77.7 percent of the officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men.

Pilots Prepared To Take Ukraine Oath

92UM0447B Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 14 Jan 92 p 2

[Interfax report: "Military Pilots at the Crossroads"]

[Text] On January 10, an operational team headed by Major-General Aleksandr Konev to track the situation in division-sized aviation units of the former USSR began

working at the Air Force Main Headquarters. According to this team's data, up to 70 percent of military aviators, who are serving in Ukraine and who are not experiencing any social-everyday life difficulties in life and service, are ready to swear their loyalty to the Ukrainian people. As for the junior officers who arrived in Ukraine from other regions of the former Union, they would like to refrain from taking the oath by January 17 when the All-Army Conference of Officers' Assembly representatives will make a decision.

At the same time, a group of officers and cadets from Kiev Higher Military Aviation School has sent a telegram to the Air Force command authority which states that it is an illegal act for servicemen to take the oath in the absence of the Constitution of Ukraine.

In Lvov, Loyalty Oath Taken, Lenin Removed

92UM0416C Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*
in Russian 23 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel S. Dneprov: "From Lvov: While Taking the Oath of Loyalty to Ukraine, the Military Decided Not to Annoy Anyone with the Color Red and Monuments to Lenin"]

[Text] As recently as a week or two ago you could still see the red-blue republic flag or a monument to V.I. Lenin only in military units in the Lvov region. But the situation has begun to change even here. A few days before personnel were to take the oath of loyalty to Ukraine, the arrival of representatives of the city and oblast authorities was expected in the motorized infantry regiment deployed in Lvov. It was decided here that it would be better if the guests did not see the red color on the territory of the regiment at all. And Lenin's monument was removed from its pedestal.

At the Lvov Military Institute of Culture—the former Lvov Higher Military Political School—an attempt was made to knock the multi-ton figure of Lenin from its pedestal with an armored personnel carrier. But it failed. Then someone got the bright idea of covering the monument with a tent. It was decided in the Military Institute of Culture that it was "logical" not to take the oath against the background of the sculpture of the leader of the world proletariat.

Crimean Tatars Appeal to Ukraine on Military Service

92UM0475B Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 23 Jan 92 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Crimea"]

[Text] The Medzhlis (Parliament) of the Crimean Tatar Nation has issued a decree entitled "Military Service of Crimean Tatars," the wording of which is as follows: "Whereas the integral USSR no longer exists, with independent sovereign states having formed on its territory and involved in the process of forming their own armed

forces; taking into account the fact that the vast majority of Crimean Tatars still residing outside their homeland aspire to return to the Crimea to continue to work for restoration of their national statehood as a part of the Ukraine; and acting on the medzhlis resolutions pertaining to Crimean Tatar military service within the borders of their homeland, and, if they so elect, in Muslim units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Medzhlis of the Crimean Tatar Nation does hereby declare to:

1. Appeal to all Crimean Tatars on active duty outside the boundaries of the Ukraine to abstain from taking the military oath.

2. Request that all heads of independent states that have formed in the area of the former Soviet Union demobilize on a voluntary basis all Crimean Tatars in military service in the area and assist them and their families to return to the Crimea.

3. Appeal to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to pass without delay resolutions responsive to the extremely difficult situation being experienced by the Crimean Tatar people, whereby Crimean Tatars would be permitted to join the Army during the period of their return and establishment in their homeland, with the recruits offered the opportunity of serving their tour of duty within the confines of the Crimea and, if they so elect, in Muslim units.

4. Provide the text of this decree to the Ukrainian President and minister of defense and to the heads of states that have formed in the area of the former USSR; and publish said decree in the newspaper."

[Signed] Mustafa Dzhamiliev Medzhlis President Crimean Tatar Nation

Ukrainian Army in Search of Military Tradition

92UM0477A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Warrant Officer Ye. Podobed under the "Topical Subject" rubric: "What Kind of Traditions for Ukrainian Army?"]

[Text] Tens of thousands of enlisted personnel, warrant officers, and officers of the former Union Army have sworn allegiance to the Ukraine. Feelings on the subject may differ, but it must be admitted that this is a fact, a reality. This raises the logical question: All right, the Ukraine will have its own army, but what kind of army will it be? Discussions so far deal with technical aspects of the military; of no less importance is the question of the non-material basis that will be adopted to create the Armed Forces—the traditions that will be incorporated. There is much here that is not clear.

In this regard, Colonel General K. Morozov, the Republic's minister of defense, has stated emphatically on a number of occasions that the Armed Forces will restore

the traditions of the Ukraine's best sons. Some time ago, when he was a presidential candidate, Lvov Oblast Soviet Chairman V. Chornovil put the question in definite terms when he said that the army must be brought up in the glory of the *druzhinniki* of Kievan Russia, the Zaporozhye Cossacks, armed formations of the Ukrainian Insurrection Army, and the *Sech Streletsy*. Republic People's Deputy N. Porovskiy, on the other hand, told the press that the Ukraine's armed forces will be patterned after the Petlyurians and followers of Bandera.

And so, to whom will the Ukrainian military look as a model? This is not a matter of mere rhetoric. This most likely will command as much attention as the taking of an oath of loyalty to the Ukraine or social protection for servicemen.

It is clear that no one in the enlisted, warrant officer, and officer ranks doubts that the national army can and should be built around the military traditions of the warriors of Kievan Russia and the Zaporozhtsy. However, should we reject the best traditions acquired by the Army of our former common power, an army in which residents of the Ukraine made up a substantial part? Should we forget the extremely rich military history from the time of Peter I to Marshal G. Zhukov?

It is common knowledge that we were encouraged to forget the Battle of Poltava, the reason being that some Cossacks supported Hetman Mazepa in going over to the side of Charles XII. This year the entire world will celebrate the Patriotic War of 1812. Meanwhile, voices are already being heard in our country stating that this event should not be accorded any special significance because it is Russian, not Ukrainian, history. These people either do not know, or perhaps wish to keep others from knowing, that participating in the conflict at Borodino were regiments of Kievan grenadiers and dragoons, Glukhov cuirassiers, Kharkov dragoons, men from Akhtyrka, Sumy, Mariupol hussars, Nezhensk mounted chasseurs, Odessa infantry, etc.

Much is being written about Petlyurian units and large units. They are referred to as the Ukrainian National Army, forgetting that Soviet Ukraine had its national units—the Red Cossacks—that defended and liberated the Ukraine from the Germans, followers of Denikin, and White Poles.

It seems to me that the military history of Russia and the Ukraine should not be looked upon as separate items—this is yours, that is mine. Likewise, there should be no justification of the murder of Army General N. Batunin by the followers of Bandera, whom the same Deputy N. Porovskiy wishes to set up as a model for the Ukrainian Army.

Which traditions will the Ukrainian Army take on? It is still difficult to say. I would like to see these issues approached in a calm and even-tempered manner,

without discarding the glorious military fraternal bonds that always served to bring together Russian and Ukrainian fighting men.

Officers Call for All-Ukrainian Officers Assembly
92UM0506A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
22 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Dmitriyev under the "Express Interview" rubric: "There Will Be an All-Ukrainian Officers Assembly"]

[Text] The All-Army Officers Assembly which took place recently in Moscow did nothing to resolve the problems being experienced by the Armed Forces. On the contrary, it has created even more confusion in the minds of many servicemen. Collectives are presently discussing what transpired there. Opinions differ as to its merits. Our correspondent telephoned officers on active duty in line units, VUZ's, and installations of the Kiev Military District to ascertain their impressions of the All-Army Assembly.

Senior Lieutenant Sergey Khazanov, unit assistant executive officer:

I watched the All-American Officers Assembly on television. I did not see any appreciable progress made. What I did see was a complete absence of any information pertaining to construction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as such. All the bigwigs talked around the problem. Groundless remarks were made on disintegration of the Army. No specific names were mentioned as being at fault.

It is my feeling that we should call together our own meeting, an All-Ukrainian Officers Assembly, so that we can make plans and determine the future of each officer serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In our unit there were very few commissioned officers who did not take the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. That says quite a lot. It is a fact that cannot be ignored.

Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Zamyatkin, deputy company commander for work with personnel:

I noted the wide divergence of opinions expressed by the participants of the All-Army Officers Assembly. It should not come as a surprise that the meeting did not produce a single decision that would bring about any appreciable change in the situation. A comrade of ours, Senior Lieutenant Andrey Ivanov, who participated in the Assembly, is speaking in the unit. What he says may be of some help to me and my fellow servicemen in understanding what went on in Moscow.

Captain Aleksandr Zhidkov, section chief senior assistant, Shevchenkovskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, Kiev:

I also watched the television coverage. It is my impression that they in Moscow would do anything to stop the processes occurring in the Ukraine. It is a fact that every

speaker levelled accusations at the Ukraine. Representatives from all districts had something to say about the situation there. However, attempts were made to prevent officers serving in the Ukraine from having the floor. For that reason, I feel that we must call together an All-Ukrainian Officers Assembly to tell the truth about construction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces via resolution and the mass media, to speak about what the future holds for those who have taken the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people.

Colonel Vladimir Ishchenko, Occupation Selection Group, Vasilkov Military Aviation Technical School:

It was strange to hear what some speakers had to say at the All-Army Officers Assembly. I feel that they lack a complete understanding of the situation as it exists in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, they still assumed that they have the right to decide whether or not the Ukraine should have her own Armed Forces. And they stated so with a tone of finality.

A representative of the collective was in attendance in Moscow. We had assumed that there would be no television coverage. That is why we decided to obtain accurate coverage from our comrade.

The Moscow assembly accomplished virtually nothing. As far as that goes, what authority did it possess? What happened there was predictable. There would have been quite a different outcome if we officers who took the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people had held our own meeting before that one. I believe that that would have dispensed with many problems faced by those who have made and are about to make a critical decision in their lives—taking the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. However, a number of new problems has arisen. I intend to discuss them at the All-Ukrainian Officers Assembly. It must be convened without delay!

Telephone survey conducted by V. Dmitriyev

New Odessa MD Commander Interviewed

92UM0499A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
25 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Vitaliy Grigoryevich Radetskiy by Major S. Nagoryanskiy: "I Serve the People Who Raised Me"]

[Text] Fedor Fedorovich Radetskiy ranks high in the history of the fatherland. Already at the age of 29 he graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1849. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Gen Inf Radetskiy proved himself a talented military leader, for which he was appointed commander of the VIII Army Corps. He took part in battles near Shipka, Sheynovo, and Andrianopol. After the war, he commanded a corps and later the Kiev Military District. He became a member of the State Soviet in 1889.

The family roots of Lieutenant General Vitaliy Radetskiy, commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army, go back to Fedor Radetskiy. The roots are deep, fostering morality, military duty, and patriotism. In short, that eternal which the emerging army of sovereign Ukraine should inherit.

[Nagoryanskiy] Vitaliy Grigoryevich, the other day you swore to serve its people with faith and truth. It is customary to congratulate one on this occasion. Please tell me, how did you come to it?

[Radetskiy] First of all, thank you. Taking an oath is a truly special occasion. How did I come to it? I would be deceitful if I said that everything was simple and clear for me and that no difficult questions arose. Should I be surprised: the very fact that I have taken an oath twice speaks for itself. You know, lately I have even begun to reread Kuprin and Likul. I wanted to have a deeper understanding of what honor, dignity, duty, and the oath mean to a military man. And at the same time, for me there was no question whether or not I would take an oath to Ukraine. How can I not pledge allegiance to and serve the people who raised me. I ask that you not take this for banality. I am a native of Cherkasshchina. I went to school and a tekhnikum here in Ukraine. I also received my military education in my native land—at the Kiev Combined-Arms School. I also served in my native land both in past years and now after a short break. So, pledging allegiance to this land and its people for me personally is not simply a responsibility but a filial duty, if you will.

[Nagoryanskiy] Other generals, officers, and warrant officers with whom I have been meeting with these days say approximately the same thing. Nevertheless, I must admit to you that taking an oath the second time has caused moral discomfort among some.

[Radetskiy] You know, this is a temporary condition for them. People have served 15-20 years in the USSR Armed Forces, and I fully understand their nostalgic thoughts. In addition to everything else, others are thinking in old categories in the new situation. But let us not reproach them for this. Giving a new meaning to an existence is not as simple as reading the text of a military oath. And people today have already given a new meaning to many things. Just the other day I visited several garrisons and talked with many service members. The overall mood was better than a month ago. In addition to everything else, this is due to your newspaper. Much has become clear to people with the publication of a number of laws and draft laws in NAROD-NAYA ARMIYA. The tension and uncertainty of the situation were largely removed. Although service members are tired of being patient and listening to promises, they continue to perform their duties conscientiously. I will say without exaggeration: I take off my hat to my subordinates. There are many of the most decent people among them, and the young Ukrainian Armed Forces can be proud of them already today. I will name only a few individuals, but I could name thousands. For example, Lieutenant Colonel I. Ploskonos, a motorized

rifle regiment commander. And not because he is a Hero of the Soviet Union and an Afghanistan veteran known to everyone. It is not his past glory that is important, but it is the fact that the regiment which Igor Nikolayevich commands is considered the best among the district's motorized rifle units and has been awarded the challenge Red Banner of the Kiev Military District Military Soviet. It is with satisfaction that I name several more progressive officers—Lieutenant Colonel A. Proskurnov and Lieutenant Colonel V. Kozlov.

[Nagoryanskiy] I learned from your chief of staff that you recently signed a number of commendation orders for officers, warrant officers, as well as compulsory service soldiers and that even today valuable gifts were presented to outstanding performers in one of the regiments.

[Radetskiy] A commander who respects himself also respects his subordinates. All the more, he thanks them for conscientious labor. As far as the recent order to which you referred, I would like to dwell on it in more detail. Recently I had a talk with officers of one of the garrisons. I asked them how the soldiers were serving. Fine, they replied. I was interested in how they had been commended. It turned out that those cited were basically the ones who would be taking the oath. Are the rest of them, I continued to ask, not worthy of commendation? Yes, they said, they could also have been commended, but... That is when I began thinking that those who, even though they have not pledged allegiance to the people of Ukraine, continue to perform their military duty honestly, have not remained on the sidelines, striving for new success. (Between the lines I would note that not all soldiers inducted from Ukraine serve conscientiously.) Military labor must be evaluated not on the basis of nationality but on the real results of people's labor. That is when I got the idea to cite, so to speak, on one list those had achieved the greatest success, regardless of whether they would be taking the oath. Thus, in addition to the Ukrainian Pvt V. Kislenko, the order also included the Russian Pvt A. Potapov, the Kazakh Pvt A. Toleukhanov, and the Uygur Jr Sgt D. Imirov. In general, I should note that every soldier should be in the field of view of commanders of any level. Maybe even more attention should be given to those who have not taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine and are planning to return home to finish their service in the near future. Why? There are instances when natives of the Central Asian republics and Transcaucasia go absent without leave. In the final analysis, all this hurts combat readiness.

[Nagoryanskiy] Vitaliy Grigoryevich, you touched upon an important topic—the taking of the oath by compulsory service soldiers. Whereas only a few individuals among the officers and warrant officers have refused to take the oath, the percentage is much higher among soldiers and noncommissioned officers.

[Radetskiy] Let us examine this. If a soldier drafted from another state graduated from a training subunit last fall,

he is thinking about how to return home and serve his native land and not Ukraine. Should we be surprised? It is not just a matter of their personal wish here. I have enough facts that lads, particularly those drafted from Azerbaijan, were being punished before being sent to Ukraine: complete the "training," then you can go home. There are no such subunits on the territory of this sovereign republic. In addition, letters arrive from the former union republics on behalf of national trends and public organizations with an "unobtrusive" hint to return home and finish out their service there.

[Nagoryanskiy] As far as I know, the presidents of the sovereign republics have examined the question of transferring compulsory service soldiers from one state to another...

[Radetskiy] Yes, fundamental decisions have already been made. The terms, time periods, and methods of moving people are being worked out. Taking advantage of the opportunity, I would like to use you, your newspaper, to appeal to soldiers waiting to be shipped home. Do not give in to the temptation to jump at the chance to get home more quickly, do not become deserters. I promise to see to it that each of you are sent to your place of future duty in a civilized manner, not stealthily and cautiously through the train stations.

[Nagoryanskiy] You dwelled on those who have served only for a short time. What about those who have only a few months left before they are transferred into the reserve?

[Radetskiy] To their credit, almost all of them, with rare exceptions, are willing to serve out their time in Ukraine. Instead of taking an oath, they sign an agreement—a sort of pledge to complete their army service here in our state. Earlier I mentioned Jr Sgt D. Imirov, whom I had commended. He was inducted from Kazakhstan together with his brother, who, by the way, is also a leading soldier. They have not pledged allegiance to Ukraine, but firmly intend to serve out their tour in their regiment. And another thing. In recent days I have visited practically all the major army garrisons. And I cautioned them everywhere: If I find out that they are forcing someone to take the oath, I will look into it personally. Each person makes the choice himself. There is a reason they say that love cannot be forced. And you cannot force a person to serve a state if he is not a citizen of that state.

[Nagoryanskiy] Vitaliy Grigoryevich, you mentioned deserters from Ukraine. But there is also a flow in the opposite direction...

[Radetskiy] And one must also regret that. They are returning home from various corners of the former Union, starting with the Maritime Kray and ending with the Baltic Region. At one of the regiments we have set up a transit camp, through which about 1,200 lads have passed recently. I have talked with many of them. All sorts of people... Nearly all of them arrive in civilian clothes. Therefore, besides all the difficulties we have already, the the question of providing them with uniform

arises. And no one has any certificates—no ration certificates, no individual equipment and clothing records. There is still hope that documents will be completed in the very near future, which I mentioned above.

[Nagoryanskiy] Let us go back two weeks to the meeting with the leaders of our three districts and the Black Sea Fleet conducted by Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, the president of Ukraine and commander-in-chief of its armed forces. Your speech in that hall was received differently. Advocates of a Ukrainian army supported it fully, and opponents were outraged. Did you count on this?

[Radetskiy] Of course, I knew who was in the hall and in general who takes what position in real life. Why should I hide my own position? Why should I wait while, as the people say, the passions around the Ukrainian army die down, and then gracefully emerge from the peaceful backwater for all that is prepared? Those who counted on that did not know me very well. I would not like to sink to listing personalities. That is not a manly thing to do. I will merely say that in the big corridors, above all in Moscow, they were very displeased with the "independent general." And the waves of this displeasure came to me. But they bumped against me and surged back. I have made my choice once and for all.

[Nagoryanskiy] What can you wish for those officers and warrant officers, even though they are few, who have not yet determined their position?

[Radetskiy] You know, in the present situation, our desires may be not entirely proper. People no longer need advice but concrete help. They need apartments... In the army headquarters alone, 65 percent of the officers do not have their own housing. And there are quite a few among them who have served for 20 years or more. Things are no better in the garrisons. There are many without apartments among the young officers. True, the line for apartments has moved recently, most noticeably in Krivoy Rog. On New Year's Eve, 600 lucky people received their long-awaited keys. In the near future, it is planned to turn over an apartment building in the urban settlement of Cherkaskiy... We would like to use our own forces to complete, as the builders say, a "box" in one of the areas of Dnepropetrovsk. The problem is that the building itself is built, but the city has no carpenter shop and other building materials to complete everything. We have asked the local authorities to give us at least some of the apartments in this building. We hope that this matter will be resolved favorably... It is no easier with supplying commissaries with goods, including necessities. One can only admire our people, who manage to survive in such a difficult situation. It has turned out that the problems of yesterday have been carried over into the emerging Ukrainian Armed Forces of today. This creates difficulties of an objective order, and we should not count on overcoming them in the near future. We will be realists.

[Nagoryanskiy] Unfortunately, it seems to me that the participants of the All-Army Officer Assembly did not have enough of this realism. As we know, some delegates from our military districts and the Black Sea Fleet also took part in its work.

[Radetskiy] We should have a separate talk about this meeting. But I will say this briefly. It should have been held at least a year ago. Now time has been lost, and the army problems have become disastrously worse. I believe that it will be easier to solve them within the framework of a national army. Frankly, I do not understand why representatives of the armed forces of sovereign Ukraine went to Moscow. I understand that pressure was exerted on many. Well, they also tried to pressure us from above. But the army headquarters and officers in the large units and units expressed themselves clearly: we will not go to the All-Army Conference, we do not want to become hostages of politicians once more. And not a single person from our formation went. But this does not at all mean that officers do not have their own point of view. They are the ones who have something to say. And I thought: Why not hold an All-Ukrainian Officer Assembly? Let both the state in which we are serving and the sovereign states hear the voices of those who have pledged allegiance to Ukraine. Let them hear firsthand, not in the form of a distorted narration that is given in the central mass media.

[Nagoryanskiy] Everything you have said is about thing. Let us talk a little about you. Still, you are a commander of an army, all the more so a guards tank army...

[Radetskiy] Do not take this as false modesty, but my person hardly merits talking about it. Well, for reference purposes, I can say that I was born into a working family. My father worked many years on the railroad. My mother raised us three children. My brother, a warrant officer, is serving in the Carpathian Military District. My sister is married. After graduating from a tekhnikum, I worked at a plant in Odessa. I graduated from the Kiev Combined-Arms School in 1968 and began moving around a lot, which is typical for a military man. I served in the Odessa, Baltic, Far East, and Carpathian military districts and in the former Group of Soviet Forces Germany. I graduated from two academies—the Frunze and General Staff academies. I have been stationed at more than 20 garrisons during my service. I have gone through all command levels. I was at a tank regiment for four years and at a division for the same length of time. My oldest son is an officer candidate at a military school, and my youngest is going to school. We do not have our own apartment.

[Nagoryanskiy] My conversation with Lieutenant General V. Radetskiy was interrupted by a phone call from the "big" office. They were trying to convince Vitaliy Grigoryevich of something and, as I surmised, make him to act contrary to his convictions. But the commander held to his point of view. His life is not easy...

Ukraine Delegation in Sevastopol

92UM0403A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jan 92 p 1

[Report by Captain 2d Rank V. Pasyakin: "Delegation of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Visits Black Sea Fleet. White-Blue Naval Flags Wave As Before Over the Ships"]

[Text] Sevastopol—For two days a group of deputies from the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has been working in the Black Sea Fleet. The definitive position of the delegation holds that the republic fleet will be created on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet. Sailors have responded with a readiness to render assistance to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry in the formation of Ukrainian naval forces. In this regard, Black Sea Fleet personnel continue to advocate retention of the fleet within the composition of the Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces.

Ukraine Committee on Social Protection of Servicemen Formed

92UM0501A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
25 Jan 92 p 1

[Decree of 14 January 1992, No 19, of the Cabinet of Ministers on Forming a Committee on the Questions of the Social Protection for Servicemen Under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers]

[Text] The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers decrees:

1. To form a Committee on the Questions of the Social Protection of Servicemen Under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.
2. To set at 35 persons the maximum number of workers on the central staff of the Committee on the Questions of the Social Protection of Servicemen Under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

To permit the Committee to have one committee deputy chairman.

3. To locate the Committee on the Questions of the Social Protection of Servicemen Under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers in Kiev.

4. As of 15 February 1992, the Committee on the Questions of the Social Protection of Servicemen Under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers is to draw up and submit to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers a properly approved regulation on the Committee as well as proposals on the structure of its central staff.

[Signed] Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Fokin.
State Secretary of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers V. Pekhota

BELARUS

Group To Lobby for Belarus Army

92UM0447D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Correspondent Igor Sinyakevich: "They Must Defend the Homeland: Military Patriots Are Creating 'Leading Cells' at Plants with the Mediation of Strike Committees"]

[Text] As Nega Agency reported, on January 14 at the suggestion of the Belarussian Association of Military Personnel (BOV), a decision was made at a session of the Minsk City Strike Committee to begin creating BOV organizations at city enterprises. A NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent obtained an interview with BOV Chairman Nikolay Statkevich.

Belarus

[Sinyakevich] What is the Belarussian Association of Military Personnel?

[Statkevich] This is not a political patriotic movement in which both servicemen and reserve soldiers participate. Our movement is setting the goal of defending the democracy and independence of Belarus. While proceeding from this primary task, we are fighting for the creation of Belarussian armed forces, we are involved in patriotic education of servicemen and civilian youth and, furthermore, the defense of servicemen's social and political rights. We have the right to work not only in garrisons and at residences but also, like a non-party movement, at plants.

[Sinyakevich] What has dictated the decision of BOV and the Minsk strike committee to begin creating leading cells of the Belarussian Association of Military Personnel at the city's enterprises?

[Statkevich] First of all, the social situation in society is very tense and we are attempting to unite our society on the basis of patriotism. Secondly, we are quite intently tracking the development of events among our neighbors. Statements in the Russian press on the possibility of a federation of Russia and Belarus and that Belarussians allegedly do not want independence and do not want to be separate from Russia frighten us. Therefore, we are afraid that in the event of a crisis among our neighbors, in Russia, people could come to power who will attempt to realize in practice the idea of the unity of Belarus and Russia. And this is tantamount to death for us because we will not be able to preserve Belarussians as an ethnic group without independence. Furthermore, We do not want to be drawn into the next experiment. And the republic must demonstrate its resolve to follow its own path so that we are not drawn into it. Unfortunately, the hope for an army is still not quite enough because the acquisition of armed forces which the

republic has taken under its subordination is an adequately lengthy process. People must become accustomed to the idea that this is their homeland and that we must protect it. We are not accomplishing these psychological turning points rapidly enough. And there may be little time. Therefore, while fulfilling the goal that is recorded in the charter of our organization—the defense of democracy and sovereignty—we are compelled to rely on the people. We have appealed to that organization which has structures at the plants and we have met with the workers. The first reaction at the enterprises—the people are prepared to support us everywhere. Those people who are sick and cannot do this physically are prepared to support us morally. We will create small groups from reserve soldiers and we will be involved in patriotic education and, maybe physical training. I think that in a difficult situation these people will be able to express Belarus' right to independence and to its own path.

[Sinyakevich] Do you permit aggressive actions of the leading cells of your organization in the internal political conflicts in Belarus?

[Statkevich] We think that all of our activities must be directed at the support of legally elected and legally existing authorities. We do not intend to become involved in any conflict with these authorities, and we do not intend to become involved in inter-party conflicts. If a threat is created to the constitutionally elected authorities and structures either from without or from within, we will consider it our duty to take all necessary steps to eliminate this threat. Then we will consider ourselves to have the right to commit any activities.

BALTIC STATES

Latvia Takes Control of Baltic Fleet Ship Repair Facility

92UM0515A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Capt Lt V. Bugayev, Baltic Fleet: "They Threatened To Pay with 'Wooden' Money...: This Is Only One Method of Nationalizing Property of the Army and Navy"]

[Text] The collective of the Liepaya Naval Ship Repair Plant spent all of last year uneasy and in anticipation. The government and Supreme Soviet of Latvia passed one decision after another which nationalized property of the armed forces. Observing this, the ship repair workers were also worried about their own fate. They wrote collective letters to various levels of authority and went to Moscow and Riga, but the series of questions regarding one of the largest naval facilities was still not resolved.

At the end of the year, the chief of the ship repair plant, Capt 1st Rank B. Chaplygin, applied to be discharged from the ranks of the armed forces due to reductions.

The chief engineer, Capt 2d Rank A. Mikhanko, was recommended for the position of chief of the plant, and a commission for assuming and turning over the duties of chief of the ship repair plant was created in the Main Directorate of Ship Repair Plants of the Navy and was headed by Capt 1st Rank V. Khmel. It was to arrive on 15 January. But the day before, the ship repair plant received two telexes from the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Latvian Republic, signed by Mr A. Millers.

The first one reported the appointment of B. Chaplygin as acting director of the Tosmare State Ship Repair Plant effective 15 January 1992. The second was an order of the ministry on transferring the naval ship repair plant to the jurisdiction of Latvia. In so doing, Mr A. Millers referred to the resolution passed last August by the republic's Council of Ministers "On Urgent Measures for Implementation of the Resolution of the Latvian Supreme Soviet On Ensuring an Economic Basis of Statehood of the Latvian Republic. The hurry was understandable—they wanted to be able to nationalize the enterprise before it was turned over to the new chief. The moment they selected was appropriate; it was difficult to find the just advanced resolution. The resolution referred to in the telegram was disseminated only to civilian enterprises, but by no means to those belonging to the former Ministry of Defense and, in addition, under the jurisdiction of Russia.

The government, apparently, also soon understood this, for two days later, at the direction of the chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, I. Godmanis, reference was already being made to the 5 November 1991 resolution of the parliament "On the Transfer to the Ownership of the Latvian Republic Property Under the Management of the USSR Ministry of Defense and Internal and Border Troops of the USSR."

When this resolution was adopted, it was stated that it calls for coordinated actions with the Russian government. The Latvian side was to assume property of the armed forces as it was freed; however, the promise was forgotten. A dispute emerged, initiated by Latvia, for the unilateral steps of its government affect the interests of Russia.

In December of last year, the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Management of State Property deemed it advisable to transform associations of ship repair enterprises of the Navy located on the territory of Russia into a state concern. At ship repair enterprises presently located in sovereign states but belonging to Russia, it was ordered "to conduct work to create a holding company." The Main Directorate of Ship Repair Plants of the Navy was instructed to represent the interests of the state committee.

In connection with the Latvian government's decision, the deputy chief of the Main Directorate of Ship Repair Plants of the Navy, Rear Adm Yu. Petrov, arrived in Liepaya. At a meeting with the plant collective, Yuri

Yelizarovich [Petrov] said: "We have found an interesting solution to the problem—the commission proposes the creation of a joint Latvian-Russian venture on a lease basis..."

However, this proposal did not suit the Latvian side and the city authorities of Liepaya. At a meeting between workers of the plant and the city council, the city chief, I. Vismins, unequivocally stated that a foreign enterprise cannot exist on the territory of Latvia and the quicker the direction of I. Godmanis and the order of the Ministry of Industry and Power are carried out, the better it would be for the plant workers. Much was also said about the bright prospects of developing the port (incidentally, also belonging to the Navy and unilaterally nationalized), the prospects of ship repair, and social guarantees for workers... However, questions from the hall cooled the enthusiasm of the city leaders somewhat.

Joint ventures in the republic are growing like mushrooms after a rain: Latvian-American, Latvian-German, Latvian-Swedish... So, why is the idea of creating a joint Latvian-Russian venture on a base belonging to Russia, incidentally, being rejected right off? The orientation is obvious—the West.

By the way, 91 percent of the plant workers belong to the Russian-speaking population, as they are now called in the republic, but here they are not infected with national egoism; they would like to work for the good of both Latvia and Russia.

Somehow the threats heard from Mr A. Yaunsleynis, deputy city chief, that unless the plant is transferred to Latvia's jurisdiction, when the new currency is introduced in the near future the people will not receive Latvian currency but only Russian "wooden" money. How can you not agree with one woman's retort: "As it turns out, aren't you driving us into a corner?"

I would like to say another thing separately. The former chief of the plant, Capt 1st Rank B. Chaplygin, did much to see that the government's decision took place during January, the day before duties were transferred to his successor. And it is probably no coincidence that Minister A. Millers appointed him and not someone else as "acting director of the Tosmare State Plant" and directed that information be presented to the ministry before 1 February 1992 on the property and financial condition of the enterprise as of 1 January 1992 and also that documents be prepared that "the enterprise be registered in the prescribed manner on the register of enterprises of the Latvian Republic by 15 February 1992."

In general, the situation is unique and perhaps the only one of its kind. Boris Vasilyevich Chaplygin for the Latvian side is an officer of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which according to law of the Latvian state are forces of "occupation." According to the law on citizenship passed on the first reading by the republic's parliament, officers of the Soviet Army and Navy, including those in the reserve or

retired, do not have the right to receive Latvian citizenship. And suddenly...a serviceman of a foreign state's army is accepted into state service.

Of course, Capt 1st Rank B. Chaplygin will be discharged, having received benefits from Russia's military budget as being discharged due to reductions. But this is not the main point now. The main thing is the fate of the large collective of the ship repair plant. The complex series of problems and contradictions requires an immediate solution at the highest levels of the two parties concerned.

The process of negotiations that began the other day between delegations of Russian, on the one side, and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, on the other, on the conditions of deployment and withdrawal of troops of the former Union from the territory of the Baltic states, gives hope that a normal path will be found.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Caucasus Troops Authorized Use of Weapons

92UM0477B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Major P. Karapetyan under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Unit Commanders Now Authorized Use of Weapons if Attacked"]

[Text] The situation in Western Georgia continues to cause alarm. Followers of Z. Gamsakhurdia are carrying out acts of protest and disobedience. Acts of terrorism have occurred. The latter definitely include attacks on units and subunits of the Transcaucasus Military District. Weapons and ammunition have been stolen during the assaults. At a press conference, Acting Republic Prime Minister T. Sigua expressed his concern in this regard, stating that a complaint will be lodged with district military authorities if the military does not take the necessary measures against the attackers.

Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, stated when interviewed by the district newspaper ZAKAVKAZSKIYE VOYEN-NYYE VEDOMOSTI that unit commanders have been authorized to use weapons if assaulted, acting in accordance with the oath and requirements of the regulations. Commanding officers who fail to safeguard their weapons and ammunition will be charged with administrative malfeasance. Colonel General Patrikeyev said emphatically that this cannot go on much longer. He cited an incident whereby 40 servicemen could do nothing to stop six unnamed assailants. This is unacceptable.

The commander pointed out that weapons and ammunition are successfully protected in those units and subunits where the men act with initiative and put up a

defense. A bandit can be of any ethnic origin—Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Ossetian—and should be treated as a bandit.

More Attacks in Poti

92UM0460A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jan 92 p 3

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Bandits Can Be Stopped, but Only With Bullets"]

[Text] And once again, "combat operations" in Poti. During the evening of 26 January two marauder attacks were committed at the Poti Naval Garrison: on the POL and deck-gear depots.

Captain-Lieutenant Aleksandr Kramskov reported the following to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "It all began with the activation of a trip flare protecting military installations not far from the POL depot. This was followed by a report from the duty service that the depot was being attacked.

"A platoon of sailors was alerted. A firefight broke out. There were five or six attackers, who were rapidly driven back from the depot. One of them was even detained. The police have not responded to a call from the military, however, and no one has come for the bandit.

"At approximately the same time several unknown people armed with sawed-off guns attacked the deck-gear depot. A platoon which was alerted drove off these bandits as well. None of the sailors was wounded or harmed."

Poti 'Bandits' Released

92UM0493 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Feb 92 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank V. Pasyakin: "From Poti: After an Exchange of Fire and the Apprehension of the Bandits...They Were Let Go"]

[Text] On 29 January, at approximately 1300 hours at the Poti Garrison, there was a piratical attack carried out on the communications center in the aim of capturing equipment and military supplies. The criminals were armed with firearms.

"Immediately upon the alert," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was informed by Captain Lieutenant Aleksandr Kramskov, "an operational group was organized and headed by the brigade commander, Captain 2d Rank Vasilii Kishchin. A group of officers armed solely with Makarov pistols engaged the bandits in an exchange of fire. As a result of this, one of the bandits was wounded. Among the officers there were no casualties. The criminals were surrounded. Seven persons were captured. In being apprehended, they endeavored to get rid of their weapons. The sailors brought a wounded bandit to the hospital. Evidence was taken from the apprehended men and they were turned over to the procurator's office and

the police. But unfortunately, neither group showed any attention to the apprehended individuals. 'You can execute them,' was the reply to the immeasurably surprised officers, 'but we will not be involved with them.'"

The bandits had to be...released. Need it be said that such impunity and connivance by the local authorities and by the internal affairs and procuracy bodies merely frees the hands of the criminal elements.

MOLDOVA

Dnester Republic Passes Law on Military

92UM0349B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel N. Mulyar, under the rubric: "From Tiraspol": "And in Dnester—Its Own Commander-in-Chief"]

[Text] The Dnester Moldavian Republic [DMR] has adopted laws on defense, the armed forces, and on universal military obligation.

They declare that the republic's armed forces will consist of ground defense and special formation troops. They propose that the Republic President will award military ranks of field grade and senior officers and that the

DMR Security and Defense Administration chief will award military ranks from warrant officer to captain.

Terms of service have also been determined. Compulsory service—one year or, if a contract has been concluded, two years; for warrant officers—three years; and, for officers—five years. Military service may be extended upon completion of these terms.

Right after the others, Dnester has also joined the "parade of oaths"—its oath was approved here. It has been determined that servicemen of division-sized and smaller units that are deployed on the territory of the Dnester Moldavian Republic must take the oath from January 9-14.

Republic President I. Smirnov has assumed the duties of commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Various decrees and decisions are being adopted for now and the officers and generals of the 14th Guards Army have found themselves in a difficult situation.

"How do we live from now on?," Army Rear Services Chief Colonel V. Kutuzov told me with bitterness and alarm. "We have enough food for a month and centralized deliveries have ceased. They are issuing food coupons to the population of the city but not to families of servicemen because the military sales store did not transfer funds to trade organizations. The bath-laundry combine has enough soap for a week and there is enough GSM [Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants] for two weeks. What will happen after that? Yes and what fate awaits the servicemen of units deployed in Dnester?"

ARMS TRADE

Possible Buyers of Former Soviet Weapons in Germany

92UM0456A Moscow KURANTY in Russian No 2,
6 Jan 92 p 6

[Article by Igor Maslov: "Our Little Rubles Wept"]

[Text] According to the latest information 27 countries have expressed a desire to acquire the enormous arms stockpiles inherited by the Bundeswehr from the former GDR's army. Watching our guns and tanks being sold by weight for scrap, I can't help saying "our little rubles wept." Information has also appeared, incidentally, that the GDR's armored legacy is also available on the black market. These accusations hold even today, although it must be said that the larger part of the "toys of death" so generously given to East Berlin by Moscow are being disposed of by auction. A certain part of the auxiliary military equipment was placed at the disposal of American forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. Even Lithuania has expressed interest in the escheated armaments. The newspaper BERLINER ZEITUNG carried an item confirming Lithuania's intentions to acquire "trophy" weapons to outfit the republic's future armed forces.

The Bundeswehr also had fully definite plans regarding the MiG-29, the most recent offspring of Soviet fighter designers.

The fate of airplanes belonging to the "combat fraternity" was decided as early as at the beginning of this year. After completion of its "testing period" a squadron of MiG-29s will be stationed in Brandenburg Land, where it will begin carrying out the missions of defending the country's airspace on an equal footing with other units of the West German air forces.

Judging from everything, 180,000 Soviet-made AK-47 assault rifles will also be procured for the forces. The reputation of these rifles follows them wherever they go.

In addition, hard-working Finland has also displayed interest in the Soviet-GDR legacy. Finnish Defense Ministry Administrative Chief Lieutenant General Aymo Payunen [transliteration] visited Germany, where he studied the possibilities for acquiring escheated arms. "According to the Paris Peace Treaty," HELSINGIN SANOMAT points out, "Finland was still prohibited last year from purchasing weapons in Germany, but in September 1990 Finland unilaterally announced that the military articles of this treaty were no longer in force in connection with unification of the FRG and the GDR."

The FRG is offering the same Soviet military equipment that Finland's defense forces purchased in former times from the Soviet Union directly. The Finnish Defense Ministry communicated to FRG military liaison that it was interested in acquiring antiaircraft guns, infantry weapons and ammunition.

Soviet MiG-29 fighters are also of considerable interest to the Finnish side. However, their purchase involves certain difficulties, inasmuch as the Germans are unable to provide for technical maintenance of these warplanes. T-72 tanks, which Finland had also purchased previously from the Soviet Union, may also be including in the Soviet combat equipment offered to that country for sale.

It still is not clear how former East Germans are to settle accounts with us for generously filling their military depots with expensive death-dealing equipment. But having been short-changed then, we will probably lose this time around as well, because the sale being organized by the Bundeswehr is narrowing the market for our "convertible goods"—modern and effective armaments.

Kazakhstan To Sell Weapons

92P50088A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 92
Morning Edition p 1

[Article by Vladimir Ardaev: "Will Kazakhstan Sell Weapons?"]

[Text] The Kazakh information agency, DANA-PRESS, citing SREDU BISNESMENOV, reports that Kazakhstan intends to sell weapons through a private exchange. It is reported that one of the exchanges, PAKS-ALISA, is already conducting negotiations. Neither official sources nor the exchange PAKS-ALISA have so far refuted the reports.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Conversion at Zheleznogorsk Weapons Plant

92UM0351A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Jan 92 Union Edition pp 1, 8

[Article by Aleksey Tarasov and Dmitriy Khrupov: "Spy Satellites Are Made Here: Report From a Closed Military City"]

[Text] This taiga city—the holy of holies of the military-industrial complex which produces plutonium for arms and spy satellites and, previously, missiles as well—is located not far from the Stolba national preserve, 64 kilometers from Krasnoyarsk. Quite secret, it has had various names—"Devyatka," Krasnoyarsk-26, Zheleznogorsk. But it is most correct to refer to it as Atomgrad. There are two secret enterprises here which previously worked in harmony to forge the country's nuclear missile shield. The missile part of the shield was forged by the Scientific Production Association for Applied Mechanics (general designer—a scientist and colleague of S. Korolev, Academician M. Reshetnev), and the nuclear part—the mining-chemical combine (director—V. Lebedev). Now that the shield has shrunk and seems to be unnecessary, these unique enterprises have one task—to survive.

Deputy Head Engineer of the mining-chemical combine P. Morozov, one of the pioneers of Atomgrad, says:

In conjunction with Soviet and foreign firms we intend to produce polycrystal silicon, monosilicon, and gallium arsenide. An agreement will soon be concluded with the Koreans—they will install at our site a technological line for assembling Samsung television sets. They have already manufactured experimental models that do not require isotopic illuminators. We will extract valuable components from medicinal herbs and fir trees. But in order for us to take a serious approach to these plans we will have to release working hands, which we do not have the right to do—for basic production is not being halted.

Having spent two days in the secret city and driven a car through tunnels and covered what seemed to be a considerable part of the multilevel underground, going through innumerable laboratories, offices, and shops and having visited the very heart of the "kingdom of darkness"—the central reactor hall—when we returned to the light of day we found it difficult to believe the words of our guide: "You have seen barely one-twentieth of it." In the 1970's the volume of excavation of the man-made cavern was compared to that of the Moscow metro. But here we have granite and rock. It took more than 65,000 prisoners and more than 100,000 soldiers to dig it out.

At the beginning of the seventies the atomic energy workers started thinking about what to do with the "tailings"—radioactive wastes (RAO). In 1972 they began to design the RT-2, and they started building it in 1978. Even the workers of the mining and chemical combine knew that an incredible amount of fissionable materials had been accumulated, and the reactors do not last forever. But the RT-2 would make it possible in any political climate not only to preserve the collective of the combine but also to keep the branch competitive. But in 1985 there was a sharp reduction of the financing for the project. Now the elaborate structures are being destroyed. And 200 million rubles [R] have been thrown to the wind. Just preserving the construction would require R30 million (in 1991 the mining and chemical combine was allotted only 1.5 million).

If one is to think seriously about the continuation of the construction of the RT-2, it will be necessary to attract foreign capital. It is clear that Russia will not be able to find the necessary sum. The South Koreans have shown an interest. They have already given us to understand that, although negotiations are not being conducted yet, they are prepared to pay a million dollars for every ton of fuel that is produced and stored at the mining and chemical combine. And in the future they will finance the construction of the RT-2 (so far only the first section is in operation). Nuclear facilities of Japan and India are being considered as possible suppliers of nuclear wastes and hard currency. The British have also expressed an interest in this project. And the leaders of the mining and chemical combine say that this is nothing like any "international waste dump."

What has not happened in the history of Atomgrad?! At the end of the fifties the military decided to place next to the reactors and radiochemical plants Krasnash (Krasnoyarsk machine building plant) as well—for producing cannons and missiles. This "delirious" fantasy of the generals was squelched by Nikita Khrushchev. When he visited the nuclear grave in 1961 he understood that should there be a nuclear attack, to put only production underground was pointless—how many hours it could function, if a strike were delivered and the city that serves the underground destroyed?

The firm's subsequent development proceeded much more logically. They gradually changed over to designing, manufacturing, and testing spy satellites, space vehicles, special communications, and also satellites for the Academy of Sciences. More than one-third of the Kosmos space vehicles are the work of the skilled workers here. Today the Scientific Production Association of Applied Mechanics is the country's leading enterprise for space missile complexes for communications and television broadcasting. In this area the association's output is represented by the Molniya, Raduga, Gorizont, Ekran, Luch, and Radio satellites, navigation (including the Tsikada and Glonass satellites), and geodesy (GeolK and Etalon). Large Western firms are glad to work with the scientific production association. Their assessment of the items and the experimental base of the enterprise are the most enthusiastic.

But today it is hard to distinguish the problems of Academician Reshetnev's firm from those of the mining and chemical combine. The collective of the unique space firm has changed from Kosmoses... to Kuznechiks. And the Kuznechiks are merely children's sports training simulators—a tubular frame with supports for the legs and springs. An enterprise capable of setting up reliable communications throughout the country is reduced to making water bottles and health gadgets.

And this is conversion?

Of course, they are looking for a way out of the situation. Ye. Ashurkov, the deputy general designer, said that in order to provide a wide range of services in space communications the scientific production association is developing a series of geostationary vehicles of a new generation. They include Gelikon, Arkos, Mayak, Gonets, and others. The scientific production association is also the cofounder of the Informkosmos association, which was created for the development, manufacture, and commercial operation of the satellite communications system. Its main task is to replace the obsolete Gorizonts, which for 30 years now have been providing for television broadcasting throughout the entire territory of Russia. The government does not have the money for this. The Vostok commercial bank has undertaken to finance it. It will be necessary to make 10 Ekspress satellites in a hurry.

But, judging from everything, these plans might fall through. Why? The Russian leadership has resolved to

abolish compulsory preservation of existing economic ties based on the unilateral demand of the customers. And the scientific production association of applied mechanics has more than 3,000 associates. Usually the association has concluded 80 percent of its contracts by the beginning of the year. Today only six percent of them have been signed.

It is not difficult to guess what awaits of the collective of the scientific production association in the future. When showing us Glas, the latest television satellite, the enterprise's head engineer, O. Chukanov, said: "This is the first and apparently the last satellite of its kind." The prediction of a corresponding member of the USSR Engineering Academy and deputy general designer of the scientific production association for applied mechanics, K. Smirnov-Vasilyev, was even gloomier: "Our enterprise will be destroyed by one sentence of the ukase. If everything continues to proceed as it has been, in two years the television sets in the country will start to go dark..."

The decree of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] and the USSR Council of Ministers on the construction of the mining and chemical combine and the city was adopted after Beriia visited the banks of the Yenisey. And when the barriers are raised and you are allowed to go into this city, which does not appear on the map, it seems that the spirit of Lavrentiy Pavlovich has still not disappeared. The streets are as straight as the path of a bullet, the buildings are in the empire style, the soldiers marching through the city square, the guards on the platforms of the commuter trains bringing the next shift to the nuclear underground.

Until recently the city of 100,000 lived somewhat differently from the rest of the country. To this day there are no waiting lists for the day nurseries or kindergartens and the schools operate on one shift. Many of the children's institutions have excellent swimming pools. There is even a zoo with exotic animals. The housing is all departmental but the residents of the city have much less of a problem obtaining it than they do on the other side of the barbed wire.

But life with all its problems is becoming oppressive. The former privilege—the city was supplied with everything it needed from the Center—has turned into misfortune. There are no longer any centralized deliveries and the kray budget simply does not include expenditures on Atomgrad. All that is left is barter. But who needs five kilos of plutonium? Or spy satellites?...

The chairman of the city executive committee, I. Chuprina, does not try to conceal the fact that conversion is a catastrophe for a city like that. There are about 10 closed cities like Atomgrad in Russia. Perhaps it really would be worthwhile for the government to think about how to protect them from social explosions, since they serve such dangerous productions.

Atomgrad is not a preserve. Because of the scientific and technical intelligentsia who have been visiting the capitals recently, political life is fairly active. Parties, movements, rallies. Everything is as it is everywhere else. They even had their first strike recently—truck drivers. And it apparently makes no difference to the state that they are striking right next to reactors and mountains of plutonium, that there is not enough work in Atomgrad today, and each day the city executive committee sends a bus load of people wanting jobs to the Krasnoyarsk plant for industrial rubber items.

The city's chance of survival lies in the construction and startup of the second section of the RT-2. But today perhaps nobody can tell how realistic this chance is. The most important reason for this is the lack of both a law on the use of nuclear energy and a state concept for dealing with radioactive wastes (RAO). Obviously, it is necessary to conduct parliamentary hearings and finally clarify what kind of fuel cycle we have. If it is incomplete, as it is, for example, in the United States, there is no point in completing RT-2 and the radioactive wastes should be buried where they were obtained. But if we select a closed cycle, then we cannot get along without RT-2. The state does not have the right to turn a problem of such importance over to the mining and chemical combine.

The opinions of the atomic energy workers, scientists, and deputies of the "greens" concerning the expediency of constructing the plant are fairly diverse and contradictory. It is clear that we must do a thorough study of this. The more so since the question of what to do with the radioactive waste will have to have an answer sooner or later.

It is dark in the hall where the central control panel of the first operating section of the RT-2 is located; there are not enough light bulbs.

There are not enough soldiers to guard the nuclear cellar—there is a shortage of special clothing.

In the tunnel under the Yenisey, which is more than two kilometers long, we traveled slowly, sprayed by water coming down from the concrete arch. It was unbearable to see. So much effort, money, and time had been spent for nothing! The construction of the site intended for burying liquid radioactive wastes had been halted. And here the tunnel was damaged. It would be better to flood it completely. They say that concrete is preserved best when it is wet. Perhaps some day they will have to pump out the water...

Does this taiga city interest any of the leaders of Russia?

And in general does anybody understand what we are doing?

Dnepropetrovsk Missile Design Bureau Struggles for Survival*92UM0405A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 1*

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Correspondent Sergey Ilchenko: "They Took Off to a High Altitude—It Is More Painful To Fall"]

[Text] We were the first in the world to end the missile shortage. And we started to sell them. And now, we are finished with missiles and are beginning to sell the talents which lifted them into the sky. Is it not time to come to our senses?

Until now Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk has been one of the most secret scientific centers on the European territory of the former Union. Founded right after the war by prominent Soviet Rocket Designer and Builder M.K. Yangel, the bureau developed that which until quite recently we called "the Homeland's missile-space shield."

Eighty percent of the ultramodern intercontinental intermediate-range missiles that are on combat alert right now were developed at Dnepropetrovsk. Scuds were manufactured here during the 1970's. There is something better here right now. You can choose from underground space missile complexes to comparatively inexpensive systems that permit the launch of military space vehicles from an ordinary transport aircraft and the rocket platforms of the Energiya system were also developed here.

The design bureau took off rapidly at that time. But now, it is declining just as rapidly.

"Ukraine does not need missiles!", A.K. Lobov, chairman of the Republic Committee on the Defense Industry and Machine Building, declared at a meeting with people from Yuzhnoye. "Look for customers in the strategic command."

The Kievan leader was cunning. He knew very well that Moscow will not give him money right now, Moscow will support its own designers. Plus the fact that Ukraine's signature is not on the CIS member-states agreement on joint activities for the exploration and exploitation of space for the needs of the national economy and defense...

And the bureau is desperately trying to survive, while rushing from the idea of developing an air defense complex for the Ukrainian Army to wind-powered farm energy complexes. The very interesting UMK multi-purpose transportation mini-complex project, which will find an application in both the rural and urban economies, has been completed. The Alma-Atinsk TETs-2 [heat and electric power plant] has become ecologically safer thanks to an emulsifying agent, a device for purifying gaseous dust, that was designed at the bureau. And the main thing is that all this is being done on the level of high-class space technologies.

However, for any normal work at all, the design bureau needs hundreds of millions of rubles of which there will be none in the near future. Little orders will not rectify the situation. And the impoverished are not looking to the sky...

So without the state's help, Yuzhnoye will disappear. The defense enterprise has suddenly become a most unprofitable production. On the market of an impoverished country, intellect is not winning the competition with saucepans, knit goods, and spare parts for Zhigulis. Right now, who cares that the development of promising scientific-technical ideas will cease that largely determine the progress of the entire industry, along with the failure of such collectives?

Today it is easier for civilian plants: all products are in short supply. Although it is even obvious to a fool: a short time will pass and, without constant intelligent replenishment, their goods simply become uncompetitive.

How many times over will it be unfortunate for the state. Just a few months have passed and they have already discharged nearly 1,000 persons "on their own" from the formerly prestigious bureau. They have been swiftly hired by cooperatives, small enterprises and exchanges.

Here is the fate of one of them. Sergey Galas is a young candidate of technical sciences and the head of a special design group. He was working on warheads for a new generation of space missile systems. Now he is working at a cooperative that produces kitchen furniture. Galas' stools are in high demand.

However, many buyers have been found for the ambition of the many talented associates at Yuzhnoye. Very strange joint ventures have appeared in the city that are involved with hiring people to work abroad, including in the Middle East. Having begun with girls "for housework," they are already not hiding their interest in Ukrainian missile designers and builders.

WHILE THIS ISSUE WAS BEING PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION. According to foreign press reports, CIA analysts have prepared a special report for the United States Government which indicates that, not the collapsed USSR's nuclear missiles, but Soviet strategic weapons specialists are the primary threat to peace. In the CIA's opinion, if they remain unemployed, they may end up in the service of certain aggressively-minded regimes of 3rd World countries.

'Butek' Chief Denies Arms Sales Rumor*92UM0457A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jan 92 p 3*

[Interview with Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bocharov, president of the Butek concern, by Sergey Kornilov under the rubric "The Conversion": "Bocharov's Army Is Once Again in Combat"]

[Text] Problems of everyday life continue to be behind the problems involved in forming national armed forces of the sovereign states which have emerged from the ruins of the former USSR. They are becoming increasingly more urgent under the pressure of the rapidly approaching market relations. Every new conflict arising in connection with the withdrawal of forces or another claim by a sovereign state to its slice of the common military pie exacerbates an already difficult situation. This situation requires of the defense department leadership the ability rapidly to work out a specific military reform program and realistic plans for its various aspects. It is also essential to be able to coordinate these plans in the precipitously changing circumstances.

Alas, none of this actually exists. Unfortunately, something which was previously clear only to the initiated with a knowledge of the situation from the inside has now become apparent to everyone. It is that the top level of military leadership thinks about and tries to resolve least of all the problems of the lower-level officers.

Those at the lower level are coming up with initiatives without waiting for the top brass to take action. They understand that it is truly impossible to delay. The officers' assemblies, which previously existed only on paper, have now been activated, and commercial structures have come into being with the purpose of resolving the most acute social problems of the servicemen, those which threaten to get out of hand at any time.

I asked Mikhail Bocharov, people's deputy of Russia and president of the Butek concern, who recently headed another concern, Russo-Balt West, to talk with me and express his views on this subject.

[Bocharov] We did indeed form and register the Russo-Balt West concern in Kaliningrad to perform two main jobs: to build housing and the necessary infrastructure as rapidly as possible for withdrawing troops from the Baltic area and to create jobs and improve the social situation of servicemen and their families. The second was to integrate Russian business into the economies of the sovereign states of the Baltic area and Western Europe.

First I would like to make a small announcement, however. Recently a number of periodicals have carried reports that the Butek and Russo-Balt West concerns are engaged in the sale of weapons in the Baltic area. I hereby refute these fabrications and state that neither of these firms has made a single transaction involving weapons. On the contrary, we have invested several million [rubles] to work out a number of projects, to come up with the necessary documentation and perform an expert appraisal of military property and facilities. The work continues to this day. We have opened a school for managers and purchased computers, and are training officers to work in civilian situations.

[Kornilov] Mikhail Aleksandrovich, are you preparing them to work in your firms?

[Bocharov] Most of them will apparently be working for us, in the structures which we are forming. The Russo-Balt West concern consists of eight private companies: seven Russian and one Ukrainian. We work with Baltic private business from all three independent states. Our work involves converting military into civilian facilities with equal capital shares. Take the port of Liyepaya, for example, where 33% of the capital invested will be Russian, 33% Latvian, and another 33% will be from a Western firm or firms. Russia is interested in having part of the port, while Latvia wants part of the profits and the taxes. In addition, the port is provided with essential raw and processed materials from Russia on a commercial basis. That is, the project is to everyone's advantage.

[Kornilov] Has this proposal been coordinated with the government of Latvia?

[Bocharov] When I conclude an agreement with an Austrian firm, I do not go to the Austrian government to coordinate our plans. There are laws governing these activities in Austria and in our country. We are obligated only to operate within these laws. Extra clarification of the relations may be forthcoming just in those cases in which the mass media spread fabrications. In fact our purpose will be to help enhance cooperation among the sovereign Baltic states, the Ukraine and Russia. Incidentally, I have a criticism, which is that with its inaction the Russian government is intensifying social tensions in the region.

[Kornilov] How do you plan to implement your projects?

[Bocharov] We want to purchase installations, equipment and property from the army and redirect them into building housing, increasing wages, building new enterprises, and other things.

[Kornilov] Could you be more specific. What is being done in this area? And how?

[Bocharov] Well, as an example, we paid for an order to several scientific institutions to develop the technology for dismantling and destroying shells. It is easier to assemble than to dismantle shells. And, after all, shells and mines are made of powder, explosives and non-ferrous metals. That is, they represent money. Munitions depots are filled with shells and mines produced as far back as 1915!

As chairman of Russia's Economic Council I have worked a great deal with Eastern Europe. An enormous amount of technical and military equipment, installations, weapons and property has already been sold.

[Kornilov] According to official data the army sold property and weapons worth 512 million rubles in 1990, even more this year....

[Bocharov] We are still not seeing anything done for the servicemen and their families with these funds, however! Where are they? But this question is more a matter for the Procuracy. A great many people have engaged in this commerce and are still doing so. From unit commanders

on up. Done so outlandishly. The military should not be engaging in commerce at all....

[Kornilov] But a Commerce Center was set up under the Ministry of Defense at the end of last year.

[Bocharov] I am absolutely opposed to this innovation! Everyone must do his own job. The Novikon firm has been set up in the Navy. Businessmen in shoulder boards.... This is nonsense.

This is a very important matter though. If the army and navy officers see the people's property being looted again, with no benefit to the lower-level officers from this commerce, the situation could get out of hand very soon. One should not forget that these are people with weapons. And I can understand an officer, who has traipsed with his family all his life from one garrison to another (the wife frequently has no work), and now he has finally ended up without housing or subsistence.

[Kornilov] Mikhail Aleksandrovich, due to the formation of the Commerce Center, a ban has been declared on the sale of military property. Only the Commerce Center presently has this authority. How do you intend to operate in this situation?

[Bocharov] We have already held talks with the Commerce Center and reached an understanding. I must say, however, that the center's operation is being developed inexcusably slowly. On the other hand, despite the ban, commerce in military property is in full swing throughout. Unit commanders sense that tomorrow no one will need them and are therefore doing things their own way right now. There are methods of writing off property, technical and other equipment, and there is unrecorded property. In short, there are thousands of loopholes.

[Kornilov] How do you plan to control these sales "on the side" in the future?

[Bocharov] The lower-level officers are concerned about this themselves. With our participation the military have set up a Coordinating Council with 25 members. It includes 21 representatives of officers' assemblies from all the branches of troops stationed on the territories of all three Baltic republics. The civilian representatives include workers in the military industry, pensioners and even women. The plan calls for the officers' assemblies to begin monitoring the commercial activities locally.

Our calculations show that the army, if the matter is properly organized, can not only resolve its own social problems but also partially finance the VPK [military-industrial complex]—those plants which are supposed to be shut down and retooled—that is, support 30 million potential unemployed.

I hope that common sense will prevail. We ourselves are ready for action immediately. We have worked out something on the order of 150 projects which we could begin implementing tomorrow.

Reorganization of Nuclear Ministries Viewed

924P0063A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Yevgeniy Panov: "A New Corporation?"]

[Text] A lengthy conference in the Kremlin chaired by President Boris Yeltsin has resolved to transform the USSR Minatomenergoprom [Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry] into the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry of the Russian Federation.

Thus, yet another ministry has appeared in Russia. However, I for one am not disturbed by this. The entire extensive set of issues associated with the production and use of fissionable materials, the construction and operation of nuclear power stations—in short, everything associated with peaceful and military uses of the atom should be controlled by the state. Both the menacing specifics of the sector and the rules adopted by the international community, particularly the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, bind us to do so.

For 40 years the uranium problem in the USSR was handled by Minsredmash [Ministry of Medium Machine Building] on behalf of the state, and subsequently by Minatomenergoprom. Actually it exists to this day. Legally, it does not. Since there is no Union, the Union structures do not exist either. In some areas their disappearance went unnoticed; in some instances, they die off almost painlessly and it is not important whether they expire a month sooner or a month later. One cannot lose sight of nuclear affairs even for a single day. Within a mere two months our nuclear physicists have managed to turn into a worldwide problem. (Even if strongly exaggerated: In addition to brains, incredibly expensive technologies are needed to create the bomb; industry is needed, which develops on fertile, cultured soils rather than in the deserts of totalitarianism.) However, in this case it would be better to exaggerate the danger. After all, lack of control, confusion, and disintegration are its main sources.

Minsredmash was a research and production empire. Such empires are not to be dismantled. Would it occur to anyone to destroy Siemens, Mitsubishi, or General Electric? On the contrary, they are reinforced because they are the foundation of the might of states. The organizational disintegration of Minsredmash has now been stopped. As I see it, it should have been done sooner because universal decay has affected the nuclear complex too. It is not manifested only through the brain drain which the whole world is trumpeting. In private conversations, employees of the sector evaluate the condition of the power and construction complexes as critical. If the construction of nuclear power stations is to be resumed, it will happen no sooner than the beginning of the next millennium.

This is why, I repeat, the appearance of yet another Russian ministry does not frighten me. A ministry is not good or bad in and of itself. The functions entrusted to it

make the difference. Undoubtedly Minsredmash is mightier than such giant corporations as Siemens, Mitsubishi, and General Electric. However, Siemens was a purely economic structure under the kaiser and under the fuhrer, and it remains such at present. As any Soviet ministry, Minsredmash was an organ of state, or rather political management. It operated in an environment of the primacy of politics over economics (and common sense in general), and it never was a purely economic structure. Nonetheless it has acquired the features of a genuine corporation during the 40 years of its development, such as diversification, stability, the ability to make do with its own means and resources—its own metal and concrete, its own potatoes from its own sovkhozes, and its own brains, and the ability to manufacture a final product, having started with an idea. The ratio of military to civilian output here is one to three, or at the level of world standards. The volume of sales in the international market is half a billion dollars a year, and this is not the limit by far.

This means that Minsredmash may successfully use the same strategy and tactics of market behavior which foreign corporations use. I have already written about the fact that the military-industrial complex is precisely the segment of the Soviet economy that is best prepared to enter a market economy, paradoxical as it might seem. Becoming embedded in politics and replacing free economic activities with state management are the greatest obstacles. Understandably, politics and the ever-watchful eye of the state are there wherever weapons are involved. However, corruption, speculation, blackmail, and lobbying are also there, as well as tremendous "defense" expenditures.

Minatomenergoprom began to disentangle this slightly less than a year ago. An organizational form was sought which would make it possible to separate the political and economic control of the country's nuclear complex without losing either. In general terms, two variants were under consideration. The first variant: The sector would be transformed into a state committee and a corporation. The committee would handle military, legal, and normative issues; the corporation would engage in economic operations. The second variant: The ministry would be preserved; departments would appear instead of chief administrations; producing enterprises would become independent and, if they so wish, could form concerns. The first variant represented a quite radical step. In essence, the second variant represented Soviet administrative "classicism," perhaps only with somewhat greater freedom granted to the "lower echelons."

The "bomber" lobby—the leaders of Minsredmash, its institutes, and enterprises whose interests are associated with the development, production, storage, and transportation of weapons—insisted on "classicism." Of course, the "bombers" are financed from the budget. They are influential. This year they received no less than last year from the treasury, and also by way of a separate entry in the budget, as used to be the case. Their task is to preserve this separate entry in perpetuity.

Nonetheless, in December the radical variant was getting the upper hand. A working group consisting of Russian ministers, scientists, and Minsredmash directors set up on instructions by Gennadiy Burbulis prepared its findings and a draft presidential ukase. However on 21 January the president said: Let the ministry with state normative and legal functions remain. Let the ministry itself decide whether it is worthwhile forming a corporation with purely economic functions.

Is this to say that the "committee and corporation" variant has been opted for, and that names are not particularly significant? Let us look at the preliminary structure of the Minatomenergoprom of Russia. It has absolutely necessary elements of, so to speak, a committee-style structure: a department of nuclear armaments or a department of scientific research which is intended to develop and pursue a technical policy, services for personnel training and educational establishments, and for nuclear and ecological safety. There are also elements typical of "classical" production ministries. After all, plans call for 600 out of 800 people to be doing old work in the new establishment. They will be the ones to decide whether a market-oriented corporation is to be or not.

Therefore, have the "bombers" of every description and in all positions triumphed again? Are they still unsinkable and invulnerable?

But first the structure of the Minatomenergoprom of Russia is yet to be confirmed; its incongruity with the tasks of normative and legal regulation is too obvious. Second, new economic structures are appearing within the nuclear complex after all. A concern producing fuel elements for nuclear power stations has been created; one Kazakh and one Estonian plant have joined it. Power generation workers stand ready to form their concern right away. Such a concern already exists in Ukraine; together with the Russian concern, they may form an initial corporation. Third, in anticipation of a not-so-remote energy crisis, entrepreneurs are beginning to take a look at nuclear power stations. Apparently we will not do without attracting private capital to the industry, and for private capital, friendship with the "bombers" is unnatural.

In general, for now we should refer merely to trends rather than to decisions. Which trend prevails will largely depend on who becomes the top leader of the industry.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Rodionov on Value of General Staff Academy, Military Science

92UM0461A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jan 92 pp 1,2

[Interview with General Staff Military Academy Chief Colonel-General Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel G. Miranovich: "Does the CIS Need Military Science? A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent and General Staff Military Academy Chief Colonel-General I. Rodionov Discuss This"]

[Text]

[Miranovich] Igor Nikolayevich, as you know, in the USSR, the General Staff Military Academy was the leading higher military educational institution and primary military-scientific center of an operational-strategic profile. It has the richest traditions. But today we must look at many things in a new way.... Does it not seem to you that some creators of national armies are generally not paying attention to some sort of military science there?

[Rodionov] The General Staff Military Academy trains cadres with higher military operational-strategic education primarily for command and control organs and division-sized units of a strategic and operational-strategic level of our Armed Forces and for armies of other states. Plus basic, exploratory, and applied scientific research and the working out of military-theoretical problems of an operational-strategic level.

It has always been that way. And that is how we are operating even now. With just the difference that under contemporary conditions, we are shifting from the science of winning to the science of security of the Commonwealth of Sovereign States and the world community as a whole. I would also like this to be understood in the states of our Commonwealth, where they are creating their own armed forces right now. Maybe then there would be fewer rash, hasty decisions, conflict situations, or new expenditures that can in no way justify themselves?

[Miranovich] And what steps, from your point of view, do we need to take right now so that this shift is carried out with the least, let us put it this way, losses?

[Rodionov] The very concept of "national security" has changed under the influence of the changes in mutual relations among the states. It now includes not only armed defense but also conducting large-scale measures for preventing war, guaranteeing security in the sphere of politics, economics, and ecology, internal stability and the vital functions of society.

Along with this, the democratic transformations in the sovereign republics and the changes in the structures of state power have required the involvement of a wide circle of officials both in Russia and in the other sovereign states of the Commonwealth to work out national security and defense problems. According to my deep conviction, the training of these cadres must be carried out centrally.

[Miranovich] And who must train them?

[Rodionov] Our academy in its training programs could not devote proper attention to the issues of politics, economics, interstate relations, and ecology since it trains cadres primarily for the armed defense of the Homeland. This pertains to both programs designed to train students during a two-year period and to programs of continuously functioning Higher Academic Courses

(VAK) under the academy. The Higher defense courses (VOK) that have been started in recent years due to their specific composition and short term nature (eight months) cannot satisfy the demand of the organs of legislative and executive power and other state structures.

[Miranovich] Therefore, some sort of special training facility is needed but these new expenditures...

[Rodionov] It seems to me that we can organize training of these cadres for the state structures of the Russian Federation and the other independent states of the former Union with the least expenditures and the greatest effectiveness only based on the General Staff Military Academy. It is more involved with issues of national security and defense than other educational institutions and has the required training facilities with a modern technical system, professorial staff, and methodological experience. And since the requirement for cadres of an operational-strategic profile is decreasing due to the reductions of the Armed Forces, it would be possible to conduct reform of the academy without damage to its scientific potential.

Specifically, we propose transforming the General Staff Academy into the Russian Federation National Security and Defense Academy with its subordination to the President of Russia. The Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces and the General Staff could be tasked with the direct leadership of the academy after its transformation. This proposal is in accordance with the development of interstate relations and the military-political situation in the world that has been noted recently.

The subordination of the academy to the President would promote the development and strengthening of contacts with the state structures of Russia, the Academy of Sciences, and educational institutions. Well but the advisability of direct leadership of the academy by the Commander-in-Chief and General Staff is based on the fact that the security and defense capability are essentially indivisible and training of specialists for state structures must largely be carried out both while considering the military aspects of their practical activities and from united methodological positions. Furthermore, training of officers of an operational strategic profile and also specialists for the military industrial complex has a direct relation to the General Staff.

Of course, this is not the only possible variation. It seems to me that the decision about this must be made at the presidential level.

[Miranovich] Let us assume that this decision will be made. What do you imagine the structure of the academy will be like?

[Rodionov] First of all, a department of general security theory must be created. The disciplines studied by this department according to the profile will become for the students the scientific basis of the search for effective

solutions while developing and conducting state and interstate policy in this sphere and the implementation of scientific committees of experts on urgent problems of national and international security, military security and defense, economic security and conversion, ecological and information security. This department can be created based on the existing department of military-political sciences.

We also propose creating a department of Armed Forces military structural development theory. We have not yet developed the complex of issues being reviewed within the framework of this theory which has resulted in serious errors in the development of arms and military equipment and in the irrational utilization of the resources allocated for them.

We impart great significance to the creation of a department of military systematology. Military systematology is understood to be the study of various types of military systems (material and conceptual). We have not had such a department until now.

We consider it advisable to create a specialized department of military economics for the purpose of increasing the level of training of students in the sphere of military-economic grounding of decisions.

And I would especially like to stress the need for a department of military ecology. The illiteracy of the highest political leadership and military command authority in this sphere is dangerous not only in wartime but also in peacetime since constructive and economical solutions have not yet been found for the problems of nuclear weapons operation and testing, the storage of radioactive wastes, and the destruction of chemical weapons.

Besides those listed above, it seems advisable to create a new scientific subunit—an international and national-state security problems research center.

So, we envision the Russian Federation National Security and Defense Academy as an interdepartmental higher educational institution, subordinate to the President of Russia, to train civilian and military specialists with the highest qualifications in the national security and defense sphere. At the same time, this will be the military-technical center for research and forecasting of possible situations in the world in the future, for conducting state committees of experts of the most important decisions in the national security and defense sphere, for elaborating urgent military structural development problems, and for training and employing the Armed Forces. The academy should certainly maintain contacts and consider the recommendations of the Council of the Heads of States of the Commonwealth and also of state structures, including the military departments that are the customers and simultaneously the official sources of information for educational and scientific work.

We propose having as a minimum two base faculties—national security and operational-strategic. Training of cadres, primarily from among civilians, for work in the highest organs of legislative and executive power, in departments associated with the problems of security, defense, and international cooperation in this sphere, and also for teaching work on this profile must be carried out in the first department.

In our view, training of officer cadres of the highest qualifications for leading elements of the CIS Armed Forces from among the senior and highest officers who have an academic education and the experience of work in command and headquarters positions at the division level and higher must be carried out in the operational-strategic department.

We also envision the possibility for joint training of foreign students.

Furthermore, short-term Higher Academic and Higher Defense Courses for retraining the leading members, teachers and scientific associates according to the national security and defense profile could function in parallel or alternately.

Depending on the specific requirements and interests of the appropriate state structures of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States as a whole, and also of foreign states, other departments could be formed besides the listed two base departments. Say, for the organization of research and study with General Staff specialists, military-industrial departments, and other organs of the principles of formation and the implementation of military-technical policy, the problems of conversion of the defense industry and the technical equipping of the Armed Forces. And also to teach foreign students.

[Miranovich] As far as I know, you are not the first to come out with these proposals. Was there any sort of reaction to them from the leadership of the former Union or from the current leadership of the Armed Forces?

[Rodionov] There was no response from Gorbachev. Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov recognized our proposals as worthy of consideration and advised us to conduct preliminary detailed research of the theory of the subject of national security and to work out its methodological bases while considering the actual conditions and prospects for the security of the CIS and military reform.

We have already taken specific steps in this direction. The General Staff Academy has become one of the founders of the "Geopolitical and Security" section to consolidate the efforts of native and foreign scholars in solving the important problems of security of the individual, nations, states, and international communities. They also propose the implementation of a series of internal and international scientific programs on the problems of national and international security and the

broad participation of native scholars in the sphere of international cooperation on this problem.

Right now I would especially like to stress the need to create a single theory of security.

[Miranovich] Igor Nikolayevich, your arguments in favor of transforming the General Staff Academy into the Russian National Security and Defense Academy seem to me personally to be quite convincing. But will other states of the Commonwealth also consider them to be convincing? What is your prediction here?

[Rodionov] I will not dare to predict but I certainly hope for common sense. The experience of local wars and conflicts, and the results of research convincingly attest that under contemporary conditions the incompetence of those individuals, governments, and military leadership participating in their development and their ignorance of military science or the low level of its development in this country is becoming the primary reason for decisions that do not justify themselves, that are erroneous, or that are unpopular. The ignorance of military science of individual countries' political and military leadership is becoming dangerous not only for themselves but also for the surrounding states and for the world community as a whole.

The need for joint efforts in the development of military science is also confirmed by the recent events in the Persian Gulf. The war there demonstrated that the security policy of the world's states—that common code that is called upon to guarantee the security and survival of mankind under modern conditions—is being flouted by the military doctrines of sovereign states in accordance with which they also carry out the employment of their own armed forces. The solution of the problems of military structural development, training, and the employment of the armed forces, development of military doctrine and strategic concepts are guaranteed by the appropriate level of development of military science in the country.

So, in my view, a single modern military science must be created for the sake of the integrity of the common defense code that guarantees the security of the peoples of the world. And it must be generally recognized for all sovereign states without exception. Its primary function is to serve as the common international language for specialists and scholars, governments and military leadership of all countries during the resolutions of conflicts and contradictions. And I am convinced that the transformation of the General Staff Academy into the Russian National Security and Defense Academy would be an important step that opens new opportunities for the creation of a comprehensive, reliable national and international security system.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Western Developments in Surface-to-Air Missile Systems

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pp 6-7

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel and Candidate of Military Sciences A. Manachinskiy and Lieutenant Colonel and Candidate of Technical Sciences V. Chumak, based on information in the foreign press: "Surface-to-Air Missile Systems"]


[Text] At the present time, there is a significant arsenal of air defense systems in the inventories of many foreign armies, among which a priority role is assigned to surface-to-air missile [SAM] systems. Former military experts associate this with the fact that SAM systems have such qualities as constant readiness for use, the capability to detect aircraft at long ranges and the simultaneous tracking of several of them, automation of the processes for preparation to fire and launch of the needed number of missiles against several targets, the capability to withstand the impact of unfavorable weather conditions, and a high airborne target kill probability.

A SAM system is the sum total of surface-to-air guided missiles and systems and devices that support the preparation of data for firing, launch, guidance to the target and its destruction. It consists of devices for target detection and tracking, formation and transmission of commands (various types of radars; reconnaissance, target identification, and missile guidance sites; and command radio transmitters), launch devices (launchers), and the surface-to-air guided missiles that carry the warhead to the target.

The development of SAM systems is being carried out along two interrelated directions: the development of new systems based on the latest achievements of science and technology; modernization of SAM systems that have proven themselves well, during the course of which a portion of the technical systems or devices (radar, surface-to-air missile, launch devices, the base chassis, individual systems and units) are usually improved, although the introduction of new elements into the system is not excluded.

Both in the former and in the latter cases, the primary efforts of experts are concentrated first of all on improving the specifications of target detection and tracking sites. According to western press reports, adaptive signal processing methods are being widely used in them, phased-array antennas are being increasingly used as antennas, and the radars themselves are being supplemented by passive target detection and tracking systems: infrared-imaging, television, optical, and laser. An ever increasing number of radars are being equipped with

Figure 1. Surface-to-air missile systems for destruction of targets beyond line-of-sight range.



Key:

1. Launchers;
2. Missiles;
3. Missile flight trajectory;
4. Airborne target;
5. Ground-based target.

automatic target identification systems. Target recognition is carried out using computers according to the results of processing information that arrives from the site and its comparison with "images" of aircraft that are stored in the computer's memory. However, in the majority of cases, there is the capability to classify a target according to the principle: bomber, fighter, cruise missile, and decoy target. According to foreign experts, in the future individual target identification will occur according to types within each of the named classes.

The counter force method is being used in radars to increase air target detection range. It provides for the "burn through" (concentration of radiation in one direction) and the introduction of special analyzers of the Doppler components of the reflected signal that are equated with the rpm's of propeller blades which provides the capability to detect a hovering helicopter. Furthermore, specific methods to protect radars from jamming are being introduced. Specifically, they are adaptive moving target selection (MTS) and adaptive spatial-time signal selection. The first method is based on digital filtering during which a weighted summation of the received signals occurs. Their complex weight coefficients, during which valid signal and passive jamming characteristics are changed, automatically provides maximum signal-to-noise ratio. The second method is based on the use of so-called adaptive phased-array antennas and signals from the outputs of their elements

which are subject to a weighted summation which permits the formation of deep gaps of the radiation pattern toward the jamming source.

Increasing the jamming resistance of radio receivers is achieved through coherent signal processing and the use of false alarm and Dick-fix [not found] frequency stabilization schemes (wideband—limiter—narrow band) and also realization of a moving target selection process in digital form. At the same time, the selection devices themselves are being improved. Furthermore, they plan to increase jamming resistance by using multiple duplication of target information that is provided by radar, optical, television, thermal-imaging, and laser systems.

To protect a radar's transmission devices from active jamming, they propose shifting to coherent radiation and a complex form of probing signals, implementing a variation of radiation output, retuning the transmitter carrier frequency within a pulse group, and changing the pulse repetition frequency according to a random law or according to a program executed by a computer. Furthermore, the automatic selection of a sector of operating frequencies that are least susceptible to jamming (that is, adaptation of the radar transmitter to the jamming situation) must be realized.

According to foreign military experts, the reaction time of some systems can be reduced to 4-6 seconds due to heightened target designation accuracy, the introduction of systems that automatically select the target tracking channel that is not being jammed, automation of all


operations (up to total exclusion of human- operator functions) and the use of high-speed computers.

A trend toward increasing their mobility, rate of fire, the power of the missile warhead, and the SAM's unit reserves in combination with the simplicity of reloading launchers is being clearly traced during the improvement of SAM systems. The high mobility of modern SAM systems is insured first of all by installing its elements on vehicles that have high off-road capability (all-terrain vehicles and prime movers). These systems can be rapidly redeployed to a new position and brought to combat readiness in minimal periods of time.

The foreign press reports that they plan to carry out vertical SAM launches in the near future. They think that, as a result of decreasing the dimensions and weight of the launcher, the need to use turning and lift mechanisms will be excluded, and the capability to fire at targets that are approaching from any direction will also arise. If a launcher has to be oriented in a given direction during the inclined launch of a missile, then SAM's, placed in closed canisters vertically, do not require adjustments of their position beforehand until the launch command has been given. After launch, the engine of this missile provides a rapid change (break off) of the trajectory of movement, the autopilot turns the SAM in the direction of the target according to the assigned program, and then the seeker head is set into operation. During the simultaneous launch of several SAM's, the maximum rate of fire is determined only by the capabilities of the missile guidance site.

It has been reported that intensive scientific-research and research and development work directed at solving such an important task as guiding missiles along optical fiber cables—light guides [svetovody] (see page four of the insert) [not included] is being conducted in the United States and a number of other foreign countries. According to foreign experts, this will permit the multiple use of the majority of the system's expensive guidance elements that are located not on board the missile but on the launcher. Furthermore, in this case the possibility arises of also using SAM's to combat ground-based armored targets.

Figure 2. The function of antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile system kill probability to distance.



Key:

1. Kill Probability;
2. Range in kilometers;
3. Antiaircraft artillery;
4. SAM.

High jam resistance is an important property of fiber-optic cable. However, they point out that there are also such shortcomings inherent to it as comparatively low durability and rapid degradation of the transmitted signal which limits the SAM's operating range. According to foreign experts, in the next decade these shortcomings may be eliminated, in so doing cable length will increase to 50-60 km. At the present time, the United States is developing a system with a fiber-optic cable guided missile that is designed to destroy targets beyond line-of-sight range which, they think, will be able to destroy not only helicopters, but also tanks at a range of 6-7 km (Fig. 1).

Figure 3. Air Defense/Anti-Tank System with a launcher installed on a platform with a hydraulic lift.



They are examining the issue abroad of developing an air defense/anti-tank surface-to-air missile system on a platform that is raised into the air. According to expert calculations, with its use the capability will arise to strengthen air defense from low-flying target strikes and to reduce the vulnerability of combat crews. This will be achieved by using the system from behind natural cover (Fig. 3).

They are expressing the opinion on the advisability of joint use of SAM's and automated antiaircraft cannons. They think that this combination will permit them to best realize their qualities and to mutually compensate for each other's shortcomings. So, the developed hybrid antiaircraft missile—artillery [SAM/AAA] system provides high fire power and airborne target kill probability (Fig. 2). This is achieved through the use of SAM's at great distances and the use of artillery fire when the zone of destruction for the SAM is absent (the so-called cone of dead space). Using the SAM/AAA system, you can engage armored ground-based targets.

The SAM/AAA system consists of transportable and automated 20-40 mm antiaircraft cannons that were developed during the 1960-1970's and which have confirmed their high operating characteristics and reliability. As a rule, these systems are installed on the chassis of multipurpose all-terrain trucks or BTR's [armored transport vehicles] and are equipped with passive detection systems and laser rangefinders. This provides them with high mobility and self-sufficiency. The SAM/AAA system's weight and size specifications are such that it can be transported by both aircraft and helicopters.

Foreign experts think that the increased combat capabilities of modern and future antiaircraft systems can be totally realized only by automating their command and control. To do this, intensive work is being conducted to modernize existing ASU's [automated control systems] for a brigade command post (a group of battalions), command posts of antiaircraft battalions, batteries, and systems, and also the introduction of short-range surface-to-air missile system automated fire control systems.

It is being reported that an ASU has been developed for command and control on the scale of a short-range SAM battalion. It supports target detection at low altitudes, conducts an assessment of the degree of target threat, selects antiaircraft systems for firing, and distributes targets among them. The system permits fire control for up to 40 antiaircraft systems.

The timely provision of data on airborne targets to active air defense systems is considered to be no less important. As a result, the organization of an information channel from an individual detection radar or a system that has moved farther forward is seen as necessary. Foreign experts think that each of them must have its own search radar that permits it to determine target coordinates as rapidly as possible.

They provide the capability of joining up to six SAM radar sites into a single system with the organization of their operations along a chain in the "lead—follower" mode. In so doing, the followers will be able to receive information on all targets in the area that are being viewed by the lead radar via a communications channel and, furthermore, the lead radar receives data on safe air corridors for the fly through of its own aircraft. Networks for receiving information on the air situation from long-range radar detection aircraft are being organized at antiaircraft unit command posts. This provides the capability to not turn on SAM radars for radiation until the targets enter missile launch zones and insures their guaranteed destruction.

The future of air defense and its foundation—the SAM—are linked abroad with systems based on artificial intelligence. Robotized systems will be capable of detecting and identifying airborne targets, conducting fire against them, reloading missile launchers and even independently restoring them in the event of failure (damage). So, the United States at the present time is developing a new super-mobile SAM-robot. The press has reported that its launchers, according to preliminary information, will be deployed 10-15 km from the airborne target information sensor and it will be reloaded using robot technology. They assume that antiaircraft robots in the ground troops of foreign armies will be able to provide reliable cover for troops and the most important facilities at the beginning of the 21st century.

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Russian UN Observers in Yugoslavia

92UM0455A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Jan 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel R. Mustafin: "Russian Officers in Yugoslavia and Israel"]

[Text] As was reported earlier, an advance group of liaison officers from the UN observer mission arrived in Yugoslavia on 14 January. Its objectives include establishing working contacts with the command of the Yugoslav People's Army and the armed forces of Croatia, and preparing for and supporting the arrival of 10,000 "Blue Berets." Among the 50 military servicemen in the group representing the armed forces of 19 states, there are four officers from Russia who had been serving as military observers at the Iraq-Kuwait border prior to their arrival in Yugoslavia. Our officers are part of the Zagreb observer detachment, and they have already begun performing their duties.

Thus the UN operation in Yugoslavia is the fifth in which officers who just recently were called Soviet are participating. And now that Russia, the successor to the USSR, has inherited—among other things—the seat of a permanent member of the Security Council, they are referred to as Russian.

"Until recently, participation of the former USSR in UN peacekeeping operations," says Captain 1st Rank V.

Pavlov, curator of this direction in our military department, "was limited only to the zone of responsibility of the ONVUP [transliteration] (an agency of the United Nations observing fulfillment of the terms of peace in Palestine. Created in summer 1948 in the course of the first Arab-Israeli war. The zone of responsibility includes the territory of Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon, as well as the west bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza sector.—Author). Soviet officers served beginning in 1973 only in Cairo and Damascus, and for the most part under strict control."

Such "selectivity," which was occasionally the target of mild derision, and sometimes even of scowls on the part of colleagues returning from a week's tour of duty at observation posts located on the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, or war-torn Southern Lebanon, was explained by considerations, or more accurately incompatibilities, of an ideological nature.

Times changed, however. Improvement of international relations and the directly associated renaissance of the United Nations could not but encourage wider participation of the former USSR, and equally so, other permanent members of the Security Council in peace-keeping operations. In April of last year 20 of our officers were sent to the Persian Gulf region, where one of the UN operations was getting under way. In September of the same year 29 officers took off from Moscow for the Western Sahara to participate in an operation connected with a universal referendum being conducted there, the results of which were to determine the future of this sparsely populated area. Another three Russian officers set off last week for Cambodia, where they joined the UN mission in that country. And now, Yugoslavia.

Changes also occurred in the ONVUP. Our men made their appearance in Sinai in 1988. Then American, Russian and French officers had to make room for, and accept into their United Nations family, a few officers from the Chinese People's Republic. And in June of last year—that is, half a year before the day when A. Bovin, now vested in an ambassador's uniform, presented his credentials to Israeli President H. Herzog—two Russian officers arrived in Jerusalem, where the headquarters of the ONVUP are located. In the very near future we anticipate the appearance of our officers in Tiberias, as well as in Nahariyya (Northern Israel) and Nakur [transliteration], where the headquarters of the observer subunit for Southern Lebanon is located. Quite recently a Russian officer also began working in Beirut.

Changes have also occurred in financial support of military observers from Russia. Those who serve in the Western Sahara and on the Iraq-Kuwait border are now permitted to keep basic wages paid in hard currency, rather than surrendering them, as was previously done, to the state, which then turned around and gave them a monetary allowance that was naturally several times lower than the basic wages. Depending on the country in which the individual serves, his UN earnings are from \$85 to \$110 per day.

At first glance this seems like a lot of money to a native of the country of "victorious socialism." But most of it goes to housing, food and other expenses. And prices climbed significantly in Kuwait after the war. Nor should we forget the conditions in which officers live and work. As an example, observations posts in the Western Sahara are located on territory where population centers are hundreds of kilometers apart. And they must spend up to three weeks in succession at them without a break. It was just last fall, an old friend of mine who recently returned from the Persian Gulf told me, that they brought in some mobile homes equipped with refrigerators, air conditioning and other comforts, remotely recalling the rail cars we used to have for builders. Prior to this, army tents were the only shelter from the diabolical heat of the day and the desert chill of the night.

Until the oil wells torched by the retreating Iraqis were extinguished, gas masks had to be worn as protection from the smoke and soot. Add to these "pleasures" the various "war souvenirs"—the small, light-weight plastic mines that move together with the shifting dunes.

V. Pavlov said that we were also ready to examine the issue of allocating a military contingent to UN forces. If of course the Security Council asks us to do so, and if the corresponding decision is made by Russia's supreme legislative organs.

It is absolutely not mandatory to send a combat subunit, which by the basic standards consists of a motorized infantry battalion with a strength of 800 men, together with light infantry armament. We could send communication, transportation, engineer, medical and other subunits. Such a contingent should doubtlessly be formed on a voluntary basis, as is usually done in other countries. The principle of voluntary participation is also fully compatible with the conception of professional armed forces.

Contributing servicemen to the "Blue Berets" not only raises the prestige of the state which allocates its forces for these purposes, but also partially compensates for UN dues payable in hard currency, which is important to us, especially now, since we are experiencing an acute need for hard currency. Besides the daily wages received by every serviceman in the "Blue Berets," you see, the United Nations also pays compensation to the country providing such subunits. Together with various allowances, including compensation for weapons and gear, this sum reaches \$1,300 per serviceman monthly.

And one last thing. Russian military observers possess tremendous and in many ways unique experience in peacekeeping operations, which could be utilized in resolving our own interethnic conflicts. Though once again on a purely voluntary basis, and for good money. I would like to turn attention to one point in this regard that seems extremely important to me. UN military observers are never sent in until military operations between the opposing sides are terminated. Yugoslavia is an example of that. The "Blue Berets" do not and cannot have a military opponent. This is the first thing our half-baked politicians must understand. Before appealing to the United Nations, and demanding that it send UN observers to "hot spots" in the former USSR, all internecine battles and wars must be terminated.

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